• A
  • A
  • A
  • АБB
  • АБB
  • АБB
  • А
  • А
  • А
  • А
  • А
Обычная версия сайта
Магистратура 2019/2020

Дизайн механизмов

Лучший по критерию «Полезность курса для расширения кругозора и разностороннего развития»
Направление: 38.04.01. Экономика
Когда читается: 2-й курс, 1 модуль
Формат изучения: без онлайн-курса
Прогр. обучения: Прикладная экономика и математические методы
Язык: английский
Кредиты: 5

Course Syllabus

Abstract

Mechanism design is a science of how to construct economic mechanisms (rules, environments, institutions) with desirable properties. While the usual microeconomic approach aims at understanding how agents behave in certain environments given certain rules, Mechanism design aims at finding "good" rules that lead to desirable outcomes. At the same time the rules themselves have to be simple and non-manipulable, i.e. provide incentives to participate sincerely. Mechanism design uses game theory tools and can be considered as its most applied part. The range of applications is very broad: from auctions and internet marketplaces to admission of young students to colleges, voting mechanisms, online dating services, and many others.
Learning Objectives

Learning Objectives

  • overview of general methods used to design mechanisms in different areas of life
Expected Learning Outcomes

Expected Learning Outcomes

  • Know types of games and solution concepts
  • Understand the main concepts and properties of mechanism design
  • Know standard auction forms and able to find optimal bidding functions
  • Know Revenue Equivalence Theorem, its assumptions and applications
  • Able to define and apply fair division, assignment, matching and voting mechanisms
  • know properties of these mechanisms
  • Able to identify deficiencies in real-life markets
Course Contents

Course Contents

  • Introduction to voting. Basic voting rules and their properties.
  • Independence of irrelevant alternatives and its relaxations. Arrow's impossibility theorem.
  • VCG--mechanisms. Auctions.
  • Matching and assignment mechanisms: dictatorships, core, serial, deferred, and immediate acceptance.
  • Introduction to Computational social choice.
  • Bargaining. Claims problem.
Assessment Elements

Assessment Elements

  • non-blocking test 1
  • non-blocking test 2
  • non-blocking test 3
  • non-blocking test 4
  • non-blocking exam
Interim Assessment

Interim Assessment

  • Interim assessment (1 module)
    0.6 * exam + 0.1 * test 1 + 0.1 * test 2 + 0.1 * test 3 + 0.1 * test 4
Bibliography

Bibliography

Recommended Core Bibliography

  • Handbook of Computational Social Choice. (2016). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781107446984

Recommended Additional Bibliography

  • Maurice Salles. (2017). Felix Brandt, Vincent Conitzer, Ulle Endriss, Jerôme Lang, and Ariel Procaccia (eds), Handbook of Computational Social Choice. Œconomia, (4), 609. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsdoj&AN=edsdoj.36f5aed642d4bd999af031217bc8811
  • Paul Klemperer. (2004). Auctions: Theory and Practice. SUNY-Oswego, Department of Economics. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.b.oet.tbooks.auction1