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Бакалавриат 2019/2020

Теория игр

Направление: 41.03.05. Международные отношения
Когда читается: 3-й курс, 3, 4 модуль
Формат изучения: Full time
Язык: английский
Кредиты: 5

Course Syllabus

Abstract

This is a compulsory course for 3rd-year students of the joint Higher School of Economics and University of London bachelor program in International Relations. It consists of two large parts: 1) Introduction to Game Theory. The main objective of this part of the course is to introduce basic game-theoretic concepts and techniques such as dominant and dominated strategies, Nash equilibrium, backward induction, mixed strategies, coalitional games, imperfect information. 2) Applications of Game Theory to all aspects of International Relations including war, diplomacy, and trade (spring semester). We will apply game theory tools to analyze real-world cases by constructing theoretical models.
Learning Objectives

Learning Objectives

  • The aim of this course is to provide a tool for analysis of strategic interactions in international relations context, and to practice deriving predictions using this tool.
Expected Learning Outcomes

Expected Learning Outcomes

  • A student will be able to apply gametheoretic concepts to the analysis of real-world international relations problems.
Course Contents

Course Contents

  • Strategic interactions
  • Dominant and dominated strategies
  • Nash Equilibrium
  • Mixed strategies
  • Backward induction
  • Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
  • Games with imperfect information
  • Repeated games
  • Coalitional games
  • Bargaining games. The Rubinstein model. International bargaining and conflict
  • Power change and war. Preventive war
  • Private information and war. The problem of mistrust
  • Arms competition
  • Signaling games and diplomacy
  • Domestic politics and international relations
  • Climate change
  • International organizations: Funding and influence
  • International organizations: Voting and manipulation
  • Dynamic games with incomplete information
    Bayesian updating, perfect bayesian eq. Main application: signaling games, cheap talk games, persuasion.
  • Simultaneous games with complete information
    Best replies, dominance, rationalizability, iterated dominance, nash equilibrium, mixed eq., correlated eq. Main application: oligopolies
  • Simultaneous games with incomplete information
    Ex-ante strategic form, interim strategic form, bayesian games, bayesian equilibrium. Main application: auctions, juries.
Assessment Elements

Assessment Elements

  • non-blocking Midterm 1
  • non-blocking Midterm 2
  • non-blocking Project
  • non-blocking Referee Report
  • non-blocking Classroom Activity
Interim Assessment

Interim Assessment

  • Interim assessment (4 module)
    0.25 * Classroom Activity + 0.25 * Midterm 1 + 0.25 * Project + 0.25 * Referee Report
Bibliography

Bibliography

Recommended Core Bibliography

  • An introduction to game theory, Osborne M. J., 2009
  • Martin J Osborne, & Ariel Rubinstein. (2009). A Course in Game Theory. Levine’s Bibliography. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.p.cla.levrem.814577000000000225

Recommended Additional Bibliography

  • Gillman, R., & Housman, D. (2019). Game Theory : A Modeling Approach. Boca Raton: Chapman and Hall/CRC. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsebk&AN=1896723