- The aim of this course is to provide a tool for analysis of strategic interactions in international relations context, and to practice deriving predictions using this tool.
- A student will be able to apply gametheoretic concepts to the analysis of real-world international relations problems.
- Strategic interactions
- Dominant and dominated strategies
- Nash Equilibrium
- Mixed strategies
- Backward induction
- Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
- Games with imperfect information
- Repeated games
- Coalitional games
- Bargaining games. The Rubinstein model. International bargaining and conflict
- Power change and war. Preventive war
- Private information and war. The problem of mistrust
- Arms competition
- Signaling games and diplomacy
- Domestic politics and international relations
- Climate change
- International organizations: Funding and influence
- International organizations: Voting and manipulation
- Dynamic games with incomplete informationBayesian updating, perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
- Simultaneous games with complete informationBest replies, dominance, rationalizability, iterated dominance, Nash equilibrium, mixed equilibrium, correlated equilibrium
- Simultaneous games with incomplete informationEx-ante strategic form, interim strategic form, Bayesian games, Bayesian equilibrium.
- Interim assessment (4 module)0.25 * Classroom Activity + 0.25 * Midterm 1 + 0.25 * Project + 0.25 * Referee Report
- An introduction to game theory, Osborne, M. J., 2009
- Martin J Osborne, & Ariel Rubinstein. (2009). A Course in Game Theory. Levine’s Bibliography. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.p.cla.levrem.814577000000000225
- Gillman, R., & Housman, D. (2019). Game Theory : A Modeling Approach. Boca Raton: Chapman and Hall/CRC. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsebk&AN=1896723