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Обычная версия сайта
2019/2020

Теория игр II: усложнённые приложения

Статус: Дисциплина общефакультетского пула
Когда читается: 3 модуль
Язык: английский
Кредиты: 2

Course Syllabus

Abstract

Popularized by movies such as "A Beautiful Mind", game theory is the mathematical modeling of strategic interaction among rational (and irrational) agents. Over four weeks of lectures, this advanced course considers how to design interactions between agents in order to achieve good social outcomes. Three main topics are covered: social choice theory (i.e., collective decision making and voting systems), mechanism design, and auctions.
Learning Objectives

Learning Objectives

  • to consider the problem of making collective decisions when agents are self interested and can strategically misreport their preferences
  • To consider the problem of aggregating different agents' preferences, discussing voting rules and the challenges faced in collective decision making
Expected Learning Outcomes

Expected Learning Outcomes

  • Consider the problem of aggregating different agents' preferences, discussing voting rules and the challenges faced in collective decision making
  • to consider the problem of making collective decisions when agents are self interested and can strategically misreport their preferences. We explain "mechanism design" -- a broad framework for designing interactions between self-interested agents -- and give some key theoretical results
  • To understand the problem of designing mechanisms to maximize aggregate happiness across agents, and presents the powerful family of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms
  • Consider the problem of allocating scarce resources among self-interested agents, and that provides an introduction to auction theory.
Course Contents

Course Contents

  • Social Choice
    An Introduction to the Course9мин 1.1 Social Choice: Taste 3мин 1.2 Social Choice: Voting Scheme 15мин 1.3 Paradoxical Outcomes 9мин 1.4 Impossibility of Non-Paradoxical Social Welfare Functions 5мин 1.5 Arrow's Theorem 31мин 1.6 Impossibility of Non-Pardoxical Social Choice Functions 7мин 1.7 Single-Peaked Preferences
  • Mechanism Design
  • Efficient Mechanisms
  • Auctions
Assessment Elements

Assessment Elements

  • non-blocking Problem sets and quizes
  • non-blocking Final evaluation
    Финальная оценка выставляется на основании накопленной за онлайн-курс
Interim Assessment

Interim Assessment

  • Interim assessment (3 module)
    0.5 * Final evaluation + 0.5 * Problem sets and quizes
Bibliography

Bibliography

Recommended Core Bibliography

  • Auctions, Hubbard, T. P., Paarsch, H. J., 2015
  • Game theory and economic modelling, Kreps D. M., 1995
  • Game theory for applied economists, Gibbons R., 1992

Recommended Additional Bibliography

  • A primer in game theory, Gibbons R., 1992