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Regular version of the site

Institute of Control Sciences seminar "Expert opinion and data analysis"

On Wednesday, December 9, the National Research University Higher School of Economics hosted an Institute of Control Sciences seminar "Expert opinion and data analysis".

Topic: "Individual Manipulation under Incomplete Information"
Speakers: Veselova Y. A. (NRU HSE, IPU RAS), Karabekyan D.S. (NRU HSE)

Seminar leaders:
Doctor of Technical Sciences, prof. Aleskerov Fuad Tagievich
Doctor of Technical Sciences, prof. Novikov Dmitriy Aleksandrovich

Annotation:
We consider the problem of manipulation by voters in the context of incomplete information. Two approaches are applied to the analysis of manipulability: calculating the proportion of profiles where at least one voter has an incentive to manipulate; and calculating the proportion of profiles where manipulation is successful. In addition, two models of strategic behavior of voters are considered. In the first model, the voter makes a decision based on the fact that the other voters are not manipulating. In the second model, the voter takes into account the possible strategic behavior of the other participants. We analyze the influence of the approach and the type of information on relative manipulability by the example of calculating the corresponding indices for 12 collective choice rules. In addition, it is shown in which cases the combined effect of two types of uncertainty (due to incomplete information and uncertainty in the actions of other voters) leads to non-manipulation.