• A
  • A
  • A
  • ABC
  • ABC
  • ABC
  • А
  • А
  • А
  • А
  • А
Regular version of the site

On Wednesday, March 20 the all-Russian seminar "Mathematical methods of decision analysis in economics, finance and politics" was hold.

Speaker: Ozgur Evren (NES) and Stefania Minardi (HEC Paris)
Title: "Warm-Glow Giving and Freedom to be Selfish"

Speaker: Ozgur Evren (NES) and Stefania Minardi (HEC Paris)
Title: "Warm-Glow Giving and Freedom to be Selfish"

 

Abstract. Warm-glow refers to other-serving behavior that is valuable for the actor per se, apart from its social implications. We provide axiomatic foundations for warm-glow by viewing it as a form of preference for larger choice sets driven by one's desire to have freedom to act selfishly. Specifically, an individual who experiences warm-glow values the availability of selfish options even if she plans to act unselfishly. Briefly put, warm-glow necessitates free will. Our theory accommodates the empirical findings on motivation crowding out and provides clear-cut predictions for empirically distinguishing between warm-glow and other motivations for prosocial behavior, a task of obvious importance for policy. The choice behavior implied by our theory subsumes Riker and Ordeshook (1968, APSR) on voting and Andreoni (1990, Econ J) on the provision of public goods.

Address: 11 Pokrovskiy Bulvar, Building G, Room Г-609.