Economics of Information
- Understand the role of information in Economics
- Being acquainted with classical and modern ways to model information in Economics
- Be able to solve basic and modified models covered in the course
- Apply the concepts of the course to real world frameworks
- Know the classical results of Information Economics
- Understand how the information is transmitted between the economic agents.
- Understand how the economic agents experiment and learn unknown fundamentals.
- Adverse Selection/Asymmetric InformationLemon’s Market, Signaling, Screening, Moral Hazard
- Information TransmissionCheap Talk and Reputation, Disclosure, Bayesian Persuasion, Global Games
- Experimentation and LearningClinical Trials and the Gittins Index, Social Learning, Strategic Experimentation
- Home Assignment 1
- Home Assignment 2
- Home Assignment 3
- Midterm Exam
- Final ExamThe topics covered in the exam and in the midterm do not overlap. For the students who had a valid reason for not taking the midterm the final exam counts as 85% of the grade.
- Interim assessment (3 module)0.45 * Final Exam + 0.05 * Home Assignment 1 + 0.05 * Home Assignment 2 + 0.05 * Home Assignment 3 + 0.4 * Midterm Exam
- Bengt Holmstrom. (1981). Moral Hazard in Teams. Discussion Papers.
- Dirk Bergemann, & Juuso Valimaki. (2006). Bandit Problems. Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
- Dye, R. (1985). Disclosure Of Nonproprietary Information. Journal of Accounting Research, 123.
- Emir Kamenica, & Matthew Gentzkow. (2011). Bayesian persuasion.
- George A. Akerlof. (1970). The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, (3), 488. https://doi.org/10.2307/1879431
- Jung, W., & Kwon, Y. (1988). Disclosure When The Market Is Unsure Of Information Endowment Of Managers. Journal of Accounting Research, 146.
- Lones Smith, & Peter Sørensen. (1999). Pathological Outcomes of Observational Learning.
- Martin Cripps, Godfrey Keller, & Sven Rady. (2005). Strategic experimentation with exponential bandits.
- Michael Spence. (1973). Job Market Signaling. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, (3), 355. https://doi.org/10.2307/1882010
- Stephen Morris, & Hyun Song Shin. (2006). Global Games: Theory and Applications.
- Vincent P. Crawford, & Joel Sobeli. (1982). Strategic information transmission.
- Callander, S. (2011). Searching and Learning by Trial and Error. American Economic Review, 101(6), 2277–2308. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.6.2277
- Ilan Guttman, Ilan Kremer, & Andrzej Skrzypacz. (2013). Not Only What But also When: A Theory of Dynamic Voluntary Disclosure ∗.
- Strategic experimentation. (1999). Econometrica, 67(2), 349–374.
- Viral V. Acharya, Peter M. DeMarzo, & Ilan Kremer. (2010). Endogenous Information Flows and the Clustering of Announcements. NBER Working Papers.