Bachelor 2025/2026

Game Theory

Type: Compulsory course (Political Science and World Politics)

Delivered by: Department of Political Science and International Affairs

Where: Saint-Petersburg School of Social Sciences

When: 4 year, 1, 2 module

Open to: students of all HSE University campuses

Instructors: Коновалов Александр Викторович, Arseniy Samsonov

Language: English

ECTS credits: 6

Contact hours: 30

Course Syllabus

Abstract

Game theory is a branch of applied mathematics that describes strategic interaction. In other words, it analyzes situations where multiple agents make decisions to maximize their gains, and each agent’s gain depends on his and other agent’s actions. Game theory is often applied in economics and political science. While some game-theoretic models involve advanced mathematics, this course is a basic introduction. It covers games of complete information, both dynamic and static, and their application to models widely used in political science. The course also includes elements of social choice theory that focuses on axiomatic properties of electoral systems.

Learning Objectives

• 1. To know the main theories and methodological approaches within game theory.
• 2. To know the main formal models and solution concepts used in political analysis.
• 3. To be able to construct, solve, and critically evaluate game-theoretic models.
• 4. To possess skills of strategic thinking and decision-making in political science contexts.

Expected Learning Outcomes

• Applies game-theoretic methods to analyzing and solving problems characteristic of political science
• constructs and interprets formal game-theoretic models (e.g., Nash equilibrium, extensive-form games, repeated games) to represent political interactions such as elections, legislative bargaining, or international negotiations
• determines and interprets equilibrium outcomes—such as Nash equilibria, subgame-perfect equilibrium, and elimination of dominated strategies—in various strategic settings relevant to political science
• critically assesses the assumptions, strengths, and limitations of game-theoretic models when applied to political phenomena, and to relate theoretical predictions to empirical evidence from political science research

Course Contents

• Introduction to the course: what is game theory?
• Static games of complete information.
• Extensive-form games with complete information.
• Political science applications of static and dynamic games with complete information.
• Elements of social choice theory.
• Repeated games.

Assessment Elements

• Class work
• Test 1
  Test 1 is administered in the second half of the first module.
• Exam
  The exam is scheduled for the exam week. The number of problems on the problem set is around five or six. Problems may be subdivided, so that for each problem the student has to answer two questions related to the problem (e.g., first find the strategies played by the players in the equilibria; and then calculate the payoffs the players will get in each equilibrium).
• Test 2
  Test 2 is administered in the middle of second module.
• In-class games

Interim Assessment

• 2025/2026 2nd module
  0.15 * Class work + 0.4 * Exam + 0.05 * In-class games + 0.2 * Test 1 + 0.2 * Test 2

Bibliography

Recommended Core Bibliography

• Binmore, K. G. (2007). Game Theory: A Very Short Introduction. New York: OUP Oxford. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsebk&AN=209659
• Gibbons, R. (1992). Game Theory for Applied Economists. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsebk&AN=390677

Recommended Additional Bibliography

• Binmore, K. (2007). Playing for Real: A Text on Game Theory. Oxford University Press. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.b.oxp.obooks.9780195300574
• Drew Fudenberg, & Jean Tirole. (1991). Game Theory. The MIT Press. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.b.mtp.titles.0262061414
• Martin J Osborne, & Ariel Rubinstein. (2009). A Course in Game Theory. Levine’s Bibliography. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.p.cla.levrem.814577000000000225
• Mueller, D. C. (2003). Public Choice III. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsebk&AN=120731
• Osborne, M. J. (2009). An introduction to game theory / Martin J. Osborne. New York [u.a.]: Oxford Univ. Press. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edswao&AN=edswao.324093616