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Regular version of the site
Bachelor 2018/2019

Game Theory

Type: Elective course (Political Science and World Politics)
Area of studies: Political Science
When: 2 year, 1, 2 module
Mode of studies: Blended
Instructors: Ivan Grigoriev
Language: English
ECTS credits: 7

Course Syllabus

Abstract

Game theory is maths applied to describe, model and predict various economic, social and political phenomena. The subject area of game theory itself is fairly extensive, starting with some very basic models that can be successfully used as research heuristics that simplify and schematize certain phenomena of interest to the researcher, and to the more sophisticated models that involve advanced mathematics. This course is a basic introduction. It covers games of complete information, both dynamic and static. It also introduces the students to games of incomplete information and repeated games.
Learning Objectives

Learning Objectives

  • Understanding of game theory.
  • Understanding real-life applications where game theory can be used.
  • Knowing how to apply game-theoretic models to political science.
Expected Learning Outcomes

Expected Learning Outcomes

  • Able to learn and demonstrate skills in the field, other than the major field.
  • Able to identify scientific subject.
  • Able to solve professional problems based on synthesis and analysis.
  • Able to outlines the need for resources and plan its using for solving professional problems.
  • Student is capable of executing applied analysis of the political phenomena and political processes: - by using political science methods - and in support of practical decision making process.
Course Contents

Course Contents

  • Introduction to the course: what is game theory?
    Major concepts in game theory are covered.
  • Dynamic games
    Extensive games with perfect information
  • Static games
    Static games: dominance and best responses Static games: best responses and coordination games. Focal points.
  • Mixed strategy equilibria
    Static games with continuous strategies. Static games with mixed strategies. Combining simultaneous and sequential games
  • Repeated games
    Simple bargaining models. War of attrition. Repeated games
  • Uncertainty and asymmetric information
    Asymmetric information and signalling
Assessment Elements

Assessment Elements

  • non-blocking Final test
  • non-blocking Test
  • non-blocking Home assignments
  • non-blocking Class work
Interim Assessment

Interim Assessment

  • Interim assessment (2 module)
    0.2 * Class work + 0.35 * Final test + 0.22 * Home assignments + 0.23 * Test
Bibliography

Bibliography

Recommended Core Bibliography

  • Binmore, K. (2007). Game Theory: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.b.oxp.obooks.9780199218462

Recommended Additional Bibliography

  • Binmore, K. (2007). Playing for Real: A Text on Game Theory. Oxford University Press. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.b.oxp.obooks.9780195300574