Year of Graduation
Xenophobia Manipulation in Politics: Modeling the Effect of Exogenous Shock
Under growth of xenophobic attitudes migration issues serve as a specific area of power struggle in elections very often. This leads to the questions regarding how effective the greater xenophobia supply for parties is and how social-economic background reflects to this effectiveness. To answer them we propose theoretical model which considers electoral behavior of parties and population in the context of migration policy. In addition to its general assumptions we also examine the effect of economic crisis to equilibriums.The model represents two sequential games where parties make decisions about their participation in election and their costs of campaign advertisement. In the first game parties’ behavior depends on the legal restrictions on the xenophobic activities and opportunities to do business. In the second game their decisions are determined by levels of supplying xenophobia and amount of their loyals after the first game. Population in the first game chooses parties according to personal ideal levels of xenophobia. In the second game, in the period of electoral campaign, they also take into account the valence characteristics of parties. Economic crisis, in turn, can influence the opportunity cost of participation in election for parties as well as ideal levels of xenophobia for population.The main finding of our model without negative economic shock is that more xenophobic parties have more beneficial electoral platforms due to their less number on election. At the same time the most xenophobic party solely increases its final share of votes in relation to amount of loyals although it spends the smallest resources on campaign advertisement. When economic crisis has an impact on population behavior then parties’ levels of xenophobia change but all the rest indicators of equilibriums in the games remain the same as before. On the other hand, if the economic slump affects parties’ behavior directly then competition between them becomes tougher or the most xenophobic party gets significantly greater electoral support if the decline is slight.