Incentive schemes under O-Ring production functions

Student: Titov Vitalij

Supervisor: Kosmas Marinakis

Faculty: International College of Economics and Finance

Educational Programme: Bachelor

Final Grade: 10

Year of Graduation: 2014

<p>This paper studies the optimal incentive schemes under O-ring production functions, introduced firstly by Kremer. We investigate how presence of endogenous efforts, their observability, minimal effort requirement and number of agents influence the incentive schemes under moral hazard in teams. We also birefly discuss how the model might explain the motivation systems present in management consulting industry.</p>

Full text (added June 20, 2014) (264.87 Kb)

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