The concept of "necessity in a democratic society" in the decisions of the ECtHR.

The subject matter of the thesis is the concept of “necessity in a democratic society” under European Convention on Human Rights. Based on detailed analysis of the case law and different views of the legal scholars, the paper examines firstly, the notion of “democracy” in the text of the Convention, secondly, analyses the Court’s general approach to “necessity in a democratic society” criterion, thirdly identifies and analyses the elements of the test for "necessity" used by the Court. During the research of the stated issue several methods were used: systematic method, formal-legal method, comparative method and case study method. The thesis argues that democracy in the context of the Convention is concerned with respect for differences of opinion and belief, and focused on freedom of expression ans also with the balance between the rights of the individual and the democratic pursuit of the public interest. The thesis argues that assessing the “necessity” the Court uses four different concepts: pressing social needs, the principle of proportionality (fair balance), relevant and sufficient reasons, and the state’s margin of appreciation. Only when all these requirements are satisfied the restriction will be deemed necessary in a democratic society. Even though the elements of the concept of “necessity in a democratic society” can be identified, test lacks transparency because the requirements remain vague and have some element of subjectivity to it. The thesis argues that despite the criticism often levied against the “necessary in a democratic society” criterion (particularly principle of proportionality and doctrine of margin of appreciation) it is an appropriative tool for reaching justified and defensible judgements that also provide an adequately fair degree of predictability and certainty.