"Good" Institutions and Democratization in an Authoritarian Regime as Dictator's Rational Choice

In accordance with the views of the majority of contemporary researchers (de Mesquita, 2005), the main task of the dictator is to maximize rents, which is implemented through the maximization of power. However, a large part of modern autocrats acquires institutions that limit their personal power in this list you can include elections (both held under the full control of the state, and relatively free, of the legislature, the protection of property rights, rule of law and independent courts. In the work we were able to show that in certain situations a restriction of personal power of a dictator can be part of a rational strategy for maximizing rents. Empirical evidence suggests that the creation of legislatures increases the likelihood of survival of the authoritarian leader, protecting him from uprisings, although the excessive strengthening of parliaments, which is expressed in the increase of the effective number of parties leads to a decrease in the average period of the reign of the dictator. We have highlighted several key mechanisms through which the legislature increase the rent extracted by the dictator: first, enhance the stability of the winning coalition at the expense of reducing incentives to rebel; secondly, allow to divide and weaken the opposition, which is achieved by offer minor concessions. In addition, the incentives for the creation of parliaments arise from the dictator because of the desire to insure themselves against potentially the worst outcome associated with insurrection; in connection with the external pressure and the need to build normal relations with Western States, demanding democratization; in connection with the need for economic growth, which is ensured by the strengthening of legislatures.