Transformation of the Configuration of Powers Between the Presidental Administration and Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation

The purpose of the study is to identify mechanisms for the redistribution of powers between the Presidential Administration and the Federal Assembly. Through the analysis of normative legal acts, and also through the conceptual apparatus of the veto players theory (within the framework of the methodology rational choice neo-instinctualism), it was revealed that the President's Administration was transformed into an institutional veto player of the legislative process. Previously, the presidential administration only served as an expert-analytical working apparatus. As a result, the institution of the presidency has the potential to influence the status of bills at several veto points. At the same time, the President's Administration (based on the analysis of specific cases) can act as an informal subject of the right of legislative initiative. Thus, an extremely high percentage of laws signed by the head of state can be explained by the fact that the legislative agenda is "filtered" in advance with the help of the Presidential Administration. Moreover, it was revealed that the Federal Assembly had lost an independent mechanism of parliamentary control: control and oversight powers were redistributed in favor of the Presidential Administration. Anticorruption policy, due to the creation of a new presidential office, has almost completely taken over the administration of the President, while the parliament has lost significant mechanisms of influence on state anti-corruption policies. At the same time, the increase in the powers of the Presidential Administration and the decrease in the autonomy of the Federal Assembly are due, first of all, to formal transformations that set the "corridor" of informal practices.