Belief Independency and Equilibrium Refinements in Signalling Games

Student: Zaloilo Andrey

Supervisor: Emiliano Catonini

Faculty: International College of Economics and Finance

Educational Programme: Double degree programme in Economics of the NRU HSE and the University of London (Bachelor)

Final Grade: 10

Year of Graduation: 2018

The paper takes a new approach to equilibrium refinements in signalling games. Having defined some of the desired properties for the process of restriction of Receiver’s off-path beliefs, we suggest a new equilibrium framework to satisfy the listed properties. This framework is used to define two equilibrium refinements, which are then compared to some of the more classic equilibria.

Full text (added June 15, 2018)

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