An Experimental Study of Collective Cheating

The aim of this paper is to study collective cheating on the basis of Trust game modification. Several additional options and features were introduced that helped us to make new conclusions that were not mentioned earlier in various papers. This paper tests several hypotheses. The majority of hypotheses were proves, but still there were some that were rejected. The following hypotheses were checked: 1) as players gain experience, they will be coordinating on cheating; 2) subjects will elaborate group norm, and cheating will prevail for everybody; 3) Senders who receive something different from kr=6 will choose to check and will report ks=6, notwithstanding the true outcome; 4) senders will push Receivers to behave in such a way that both players in the pair receive maximized payoffs; 5) the sex of the opponent is significant for making decisions. The majority of hypothese were proved to be true, while some of them were rejected.