The System of Promotion and Punishment of Government Officials in Modern China

The study reviews the bureaucratic system of PRC and explores the system of promotions and punishments of government officials in China. Without a comprehensive understanding of the Chinese political system, historical development, structure, benefits, and limitations are impossible to make the prognosis of how it can be reformed. Gradually created an ancient system with a combination of the nomenklatura system became the core of modern Chinese one with its specifics. Elite recruitment is one of the most important functions of the CCP. Our main question is “How the evaluation process of local government officials works in China?” Without an effective work of cadres, the whole system will fall into stagnation, which incentives influence officials’ effectiveness, while no such thing as elections exists in the country? Can the anti-corruption campaign (ACC) bring more harm than positive changes? We look into an evaluation process of cadres, comparing the career trajectories and checking if they are differing, within a dualist system, and what indicators are used for promotions. We discuss localism and needed balance between de-, centralization, and technocrats with ideologically loyal policymakers on places. Finally, we examine the ACC as an example of gov. control and method of punishment of ineffective bureaucrats. We also reflect on how risky it is to run such a campaign. Despite the fact of widely spread corruption, PRC represents a unique case of economic growth for more than 20 years, as A. Wedeman claims, economic development and corruption in China have been working together. Xi is using the ACC to place new cadres on positions, and also investigations among biggest SOE’s showed that the campaign went in different directions, but can it be called effective? The dilemma is rising here: will people be grateful for the ACC while economic growth is slowing down? And what is