First-Person Arguments in the Libertarian Theories of Free Will

The thesis analyses free will from the first-person perspective and considers whether it is possible to protect and prove libertarian free will by using first-person methods. The key condition for free will is the process of choosing from the first-person perspective. Positions such as classical compatibilism and event-causal libertarianism fail to justify the selection process. The positions that assert the illusory nature of free will are also analyzed. Criticism of these positions makes it possible to answer positively the question of whether it is possible to state unequivocally about real alternative opportunities through the choice from the first-person perspective. The paper also defends the position of libertarianism and asserts that it is in the conditions of indeterminism that freed will is possible, since libertarian concepts form an adequate definition of the process of choice. It is concluded that further research is needed to integrate first-person methods into the contemporary discussion of free will.