The Strategies of Justification of Possibility of a priori Knowledge in Modern Analytic Philosophy

In this work I consider the notion of a priori knowledge and, namely, - one of the approaches to it’s conceptualization. This approach considers apriority as identical with analyticity. I consider the Paul Boghossian’s strategy as an example of this approach. In first chapter I formulate the very notion of apriority – a proposition is a priori, if and only if our assumption of it’s possible falsehood logically leads to skepticism and/or relativism. In the second chapter I criticize Boghossian’s thesis, that the notion of epistemic analyticity introduced by him – the grasp of proposition is sufficient for holding it true – expresses the notion of a priori introduced in the first chapter, adequately. Also in this chapter I criticize the Boghossian’s understanding of a priori knowledge as non-empirical, as well as some moments of his strategy. In third chapter I consider possible alternatives to the notion of epistemic analyticity – truth due to meaning, the predicate’s presence in the subject, definition, implicit definition and constitutive rule. The conclusion of this chapter is following – none of these alternatives expresses the notion of a priori knowledge adequately. Accordingly, the general conclusion of this work is mostly pessimistic – the notion of analyticity is not the adequate way of conceptualization of the notion of a priori knowledge.