Law and Economics of Collective Dominance in the Enforcement of Competition Law in Russia

The purpose of this study is to analyze collective dominance in domestic anti-monopoly practice, identification of law enforcement issues . In this connection we consider the domestic judicial practice of collective domination in 2007-2017. The application of antitrust law prohibitions the correct determination of the magnitude of the market power of market participants. Therefore, it is important to identify the criteria by which it is possible to determine the possible threat of competition from one or several market participants. This paper analyzes the distribution of market power and the incentives of market participants to maintain “tacit” collusion. For this purpose, the market share of the economic entity is studied, the so-called “popular theorem” is used. An empirical analysis of domestic judicial practice and the quality of court decisions on collective domination allows us to draw conclusions about the problems in using the concept of collective domination both in terms of adequate criteria for identification and inconsistency of law enforcement, low quality of court decisions.