Collusion Deterrence: Russian Experience in International Context

The purpose of this work is to evaluate the effectiveness of the Russian antitrust authority – the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Russian Federation (FAS of Russia), and additionally to compare the possibilities and results of law enforcement in Russia with international standards for fighting cartels. The first part of the work consideres the similarities and differences of antitrust policies of the United States, the European Union and the Russian Federation, also it compares the size of fines of these antitrust systems. Data for Russia was collected within the work. The analysis revealed that in Russia, the median value of the ratio fine to the cartel's revenue is 15%. in order to achieve optimal deterrence fines, the FAS of Russia needs to increase the fines by 4.6-6 times. In the second part of the work, I tested the assumption that the disclosure of the cartel leads to a price decrease in the relevant market. The study was conducted on purchases of thermal stabilizers of the soil of "Transneft" using the "difference-in-differences" method. Bid-rigging cartel operated from 2012 to 2016. I constructed the benchmark to use the method and collected data. Although the current penalties are lower than those in the US and EU, they are still significant for companies and have a positive impact on markets. It was shown that when the price overcharge was 30.5-193.6%, due to the investigation of the antitrust authority, the price fell by 62.3% on average. Despite the limited opportunities for punishing cartel members provided by Russian law, investigations by the Federal Antimonopoly Service of Russia help reduce prices and thus increase consumer winnings.