The Effects of Xi Jinping's Cadre Policy on Incentives for Bureaucracy

After Xi Jinping became General Secretary, a route for personalization of power and fight with corruption was taken. These changes in domestic politics reduce institutionalization of previously established system of career incentives for regional officials. Current study investigates changes in cadre management policy during 2012-2018. 172 observations of regional officials were codified according to their career movements. Personal performance indices for six variables were calculated for each official. It compares one’s economic and social performance to the national average. Findings show that promoted officials present average or worse economic indicators than their colleagues with different career paths. Social indices of promoted regional officials, however, distinct significantly. Also, officials who made public appearances with Xi Jinping seem to have lower economic performance than promoted officials with no connections. Regional officials, who were accused of bribery at their time of service, show no major differences from their non-arrested colleagues. Further research should focus on social indicators and their role in career paths of regional officials.