Sino-North Korean Relations in the Context of DPRK Nuclear Armament Development, 2006-2018

From 2006 until 2018, relations of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the People's Republic of China (PRC) went through several periods in their development. The factor of the DPRK's developing nuclear military capabilities has had certain yet moderate influence on the development of bilateral ties. Closely before the first nuclear test, carried out by the DPRK in October 2006, Sino-North Korean relations were at a high stage of development, a sign of which were regular contacts between the leaders of the two states in the mid-2000s. The nuclear test cooled the relations between the two countries, but Pyongyang took several steps to demonstrate the highest interest in maintaining the status quo. After some two years, Beijing and Pyongyang have restored bilateral relations in many areas to the level reached earlier. Further, until 2009, when the DPRK conducted the second nuclear test, communications between the two states were always maintained at a high level, with Beijing taking the initiative in building relations of comprehensive trust. Unlike the 2006 case, the new test did not cause any significant damage to the bilateral relations. Contrary to what might happen, both sides relatively quickly returned to close relations in many areas. This situation remained unchanged during Kim Jong Il’s last days, as well as under Kim Jong Un who came to power in December 2011. It is especially important that most of the time, Pyongyang reproduced the discourse which advocated the historical proximity of the two countries, while the mainland Chinese official discourse of bilateral relations was by and large far from what has been reproduced in non-fiction literature, featuring topics from history common to the PRC and DPRK. In 2013, the DPRK conducted its third nuclear test, and the reaction of the PRC under the new leadership was somewhat tougher than in 2009. This led to a breakdown of previously established high-level contacts, but after five months, Xi Jinping's sharply negative reaction was replaced by a desire for constructive cooperation with Pyongyang. However, the rapprochement of the two countries has not returned their relations to the initial level. Despite attempts by the DPRK to return to the previous model of relations, the Chinese authorities took a tough stance. Pyongyang revised its views on the Chinese partner and began to demonstrate its willingness to pursue the Republic’s policies without consulting Beijing. Such a strained attitude to each other was especially relevant in late 2014 and in 2015. A new attempt to adhere to the standards of the relationship between the two allies was made by the North Korean authorities in the autumn and winter of 2015, but it did not bring success to either Beijing or Pyongyang. In turn, the DPRK’s fourth nuclear test (January 2016) worsened relations between the two countries once again. At that time, there was a noticeable difference within the DPRK between the official line, according to which China had no special significance for Pyongyang, and the internal political line, according to which relations with Beijing should be maintained by all means, even through Korean ethnic groups in the PRC. The PRC leadership considered it necessary to maintain working contacts with Pyongyang. The CPC leaders were even ready to take a peaceful initiative by sending its representatives to the DPRK for negotiations on various issues. In turn, the nuclear test in September 2016 led to the preservation of the positions of the parties, and in 2017, two republics openly criticized each other's vision on mutual ties between the two. The sixth nuclear test (September 2017) did not lead to significant changes in bilateral relations, given that the PRC introduced restrictions in the summer of 2017. Later, during 2018, there were no nuclear tests, and the effect of similar events in the past to a small extent formed the agenda of relations between Beijing and Pyongyang.