Concept of Decision as a Problem of Political Philosophy: From Karl Schmitt to Contemporary Interpretations

Author presents a critical study of the decision theory using the ideas of its two representatives, Niklas Luhmann and Carl Schmitt. The author argues that the notion of the history of the decision theory as a transformation of voluntaristic decisionism in favor of the theory of rational choice does not sustain criticism if you refer to a detailed analysis of the problem fields in the theories of Luhmann and Schmitt. The author refers to the problem of neutrality in the context of Schmitt's theory of solution in order to show the problem of political slippage as a methodological "blind spot". Further, using the example of Lumann's decision theory, the author confirms that Lumann is facing the same problem. The author tries to parse the paradox of the solution in the context of the question "Who decides?" and at the end of the work he turns to the concept of "auctoritatis interpositio" in order to look at the problem through the optics of contemporary interpretations of the present-day lacuna in the framework of the theory of decision.