Effects of Protectionism in the Russian Domestic Markets

The purpose of this work is to study the impact of protectionism tools on prices and output in physical terms and to quantify consumer losses. Using the example of the market for large-diameter pipes and solid-rolled wheels, it is shown that non-tariff measures can have the same effect as tariff measures, and protective measures do not always lead to an increase capitalization of protected companies. The review in the first Chapter shows that the role of protectionist solutions, and especially non – tariff measures, is growing in the modern economy. Empirical studies usually point to negative short-term effects of tariff and non-tariff protectionist measures in the form of price increases. However, the long-term effects are less obvious. The second Chapter describes the main events in the market of large-diameter pipes since 2001 and all-rolled wheels since 2015, which served as the reasons for the protectionist policy in the Russian Federation. In both cases, the policy led to an increase in prices, which attracted the attention of the Federal Antimonopoly service of the Russian Federation. In the third Chapter, two variants of control markets are proposed for the best validity of results for analyzing events for the large diameter pipe market for the difference in difference method. A quantitative assessment of the impact of protectionist measures on prices in the domestic market is given. Non-tariff measures increased prices by 10-17%, while the tariff measures increased prices by 12.5%. The assessment of consumer losses from existing protective measures was carried out. During the entire term of the protective policy, the total overpayment of PJSC Gazprom, as the main buyer of large-diameter pipes, amounted to 50-250 billion rubles or 100-280 billion rubles, depending on the choice of the benchmark. The maximum value of Gazprom's overpayment for large-diameter pipes was determined when comparing open data on purchases in 2013 and total losses-it was 30 to 40%. Further regulatory measures on the market allowed Gazprom to demand a reduction in the inflated price, resulting in a surplus of 40-80 billion rubles.