Comparing the Manipulability of School Choice Mechanisms Under Incomplete Information and Cardinal Preferences

Student: Auster Ivan

Educational Programme: Economics: Research Programme (Master)

Final Grade: 9

Year of Graduation: 2021

Recently mechanisms allocating students to public schools or applicants to colleges and universities are undergoing changes. These changes are driven by different reasons. One of the main reasons for these changes was the lack of strategy-proofness of mechanisms, which were in use for quite some time – Boston mechanism is a good example for this. This paper analyses the problem of manipulability of different school choice mechanisms under incomplete information. We provide the results which seem to be quite contradictory to the results presented in the school choice theory literature. More precisely, we argue that the switch from the restricted Boston mechanism to the restricted Gale-Shapley mechanism cannot be supported in terms of manipulability if we make our model more realistic and assume the presence of incomplete information in it.

Full text (added May 9, 2021)

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