Optimal Signals in Networks with Information Sets

Student: Gorbunova Lyubov

Faculty: International College of Economics and Finance

Educational Programme: Financial Economics (Master)

Year of Graduation: 2021

Will a biased sender ask an unbiased, partially informed expert to reveal information to a receiver in the equilibrium? Why can a restricted support be beneficial for the better- informed, biased sender? Can players agree to ask the third person to reveal some information available to the first informed one to the second, uninformed, if there is a conflict of interest between the first two? I introduce a new player Expert, who does not act strategically. He is partially informed, in the sense that he does not know the exact state of the world, but observes, in what subinterval the state of the world is. The main result of my work is that partial revelation of information about state of the world never hurts the sender. When it comes to communication with an expert, interests of the sender and the receiver are aligned.

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