Decreasing Manipulability in Allocation Mechanisms

Student: Rubtsova Sofya

Faculty: St.Petersburg School of Economics and Management

Educational Programme: Economics (Bachelor)

Year of Graduation: 2021

We study the problem of allocation of N indivisible objects among N agents, who have strict ordinal preferences over the objects, without monetary transactions. Our focus is strategy-proof and ordinally efficient mechanisms, among which only Serial Dictatorship was known before. We propose a new mechanism in this class that improves upon SD in terms of the set inclusion of envy-free preference profiles – Paired Serial Dictatorship. We also introduce two parametrized families of fairness notions, and show non-existence of a strategy-proof and ordinally efficient mechanism that gives any two agents with first two identical preferences equal probabilities to obtain these objects.

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