Academic appendix

The aim of this article is the study of state procurement system in Russia and its specific features by means of theoretical and economic analysis.
The authors suggest adjusting the method of choosing the optimal way to place procurements. This should be done taking into account the specifics of the purchased products and the possibility or impossibility to estimate the quality of the goods. Using the tools of institutional theory, the authors managed to identify the transactional expenses and reveal the contradictions in the organizational and economic mechanisms of placing the state procurement. Consequently, the system of measures has been developed to neutralize their impact on the state sector of Russian economy and its further development.

This article covers the correlation between the state procurement and the state defense procurement. While analyzing the regulatory legal acts and the practice of the state procurement as well as the state defense procurement placement,  the author states that the inclusion of the entire state defense procurement into the state procurement is erroneous. Furthermore, he provides grounded arguments for reforming the system of state defense procurement and Тихомировsuggests the concept of its appropriate alteration.

The article focuses on analyzing the results of the state procurement placement, which was organized in form of open auction and electronic form of open auction in the first quarter of 2008. The authors use the open part of the Russian  Federation official website on procurements placement and the data from the proper websites of Moscow, Saint-Petersburg, Belgorod region and the Republic of Tatarstan. The auctions have been studied as the major method of the most mass and constant purchases of different groups of products. As a result, the effectiveness of purchases via auctions has been examined and the general tendencies of its dynamic have been estimated. The criteria of this effectiveness are:  the definition of accessibility of the procurement’s placement’s final result, the competitors’ analysis and the reducing of the contract’s initial price.

The work of O.S. Belokrylova and M.A. Korytsev «The receipt of the administrative rent and the minimal limit of the shadow transactions in the sphere of the state procurement placement» is based on analyzing different theories of the  bureaucracy‘s opportunistic behavior. As a result, there has been revealed a number of reasons why the corruption behavior of the officials has reached in Russia the level of a mass institutional practice. These reasons have been concretized by the examples of the state-financed procurements placement – and first of all the holding of contract work auctions. The authors argue the lack of effect in the mechanism of imposing sanctions on the government customers. This allowed building a graphical model to define the minimal limit of the shadow transactions and revealing the increasing effect of the punitive measures on the minimal limit of latent agreements between the customer and one of the auction’s  participants.