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Regular version of the site

Brian McLoone to speak on ‘The Impossible Worlds Problem for Fictionalist Accounts of Models in Evolutionary Biology’

Event ended

On November 24, 2017 the English Philosophy Colloquium, featuring Brian McLoone, Associate Professor at  the School of Philosophy, will be held at HSE. Brian McLoone will speak on ‘The Impossible Worlds Problem for Fictionalist Accounts of Models in Evolutionary Biology’.

Abstract:

Fictionalism is the view that at least some scientific models have the same ontological status as the worlds that are imagined when one reads a piece of literary fiction. A model of species richness among the islands of an archipelago is the same sort of thing, ontologically, as Shakespeare’s Verona. This does not mean fictionalists are committed to the view that literature furnishes models of the world just as accurate as those in science. What unites fictionalists is a view about the ontology of models, not their epistemology.

Since fictionalists believe models exist in the imagination of modelers, one challenge for fictionalists is to explain how their view is compatible with the existence of scientific models that appear to be conceptually impossible. This is because, at least ostensibly, what is conceptually impossible cannot be imagined—e.g., a four-sided triangle resting on the head of a happily married bachelor. If what is conceptually impossible is unimaginable, and if some bona fide scientific models are indeed conceptually impossible, then fictionalism seems to be in trouble. I will call this fictionalism’s “impossible worlds problem.”

Indeed, many models in evolutionary biology are, in some sense, conceptually impossible. This is because these models use a mathematical technique that makes it sensible to speak of fractions of organisms (e.g., a fraction of a shark). Does this mean fictionalism should be thrown out as an interpretation of these models?

Not necessarily. While certain models in evolutionary biology are conceptually impossible, these models are idealizations of “microscopic” processes that are conceptually possible. Once we recognize this fact, we can use the semantics of conditionals to solve the impossible worlds problem at least as it relates to evolutionary models. My talk will be about how this can be done.

Time: 16.40-18.10
Address: 21/4 Staraya Basmannaya ulitsa, room 508.

The presentation will be followed by discussion with the audience and a small reception. All are welcome to attend. Those unaffiliated with HSE should contact ucarlsson@hse.ru to request access to the building.