CANCELED! Lecture and Seminar by Hannu Nurmi, Professor at University of Turku , on voting procedures and voting theory
ATTENTION! THE EVENT HAS BEEN CANCELED!
On March 20 and 21, Hannu Nurmi, Professor at University of Turku, will deliver a lecture and a seminar at HSE University.
March 20, lecture ‘Voting Procedures and Their Properties’
Abstract: Numerous voting systems exist. Each of them has an underlying rationale, i.e. the reason why they have been taken into use. As is well-known, voting systems exhibit somewhat differing combinations of social choice desiderata, but it is obvious that each system suffers from at least one serious flaw that undermines the legitimacy of choices resulting from the system. We discuss the vulnerability of procedures to a variety of anomalies or paradoxes. Vulnerabilities are proven via counterexamples, while invulnerabilities are explained. The second part of the lecture singles out a specific class of choice criteria, viz. those related to monotonicity. In variable electorates these criteria are often called variations of the no-show paradox (a.k.a. violations of participation).Vulnerabilities of procedures to various monotonicity paradoxes are discussed in two types of settings: those with an empty core in the initial preference profile, and those where the core is nonempty at the outset.
 Felsenthal, D. S. and Nurmi, H. (2018). Voting procedures for electing a single candidate. Proving their (in)vulnerability to various voting paradoxes . Cham: Springer Briefs in Economics.
 Nurmi, H. (1987). Comparing voting systems . Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
Start time: 3.10 pm
Address: 20 Myasnitskaya Ulitsa, Room 101.
Working language: English.
March 21, seminar ‘Is voting theory relevant for the design of voting systems? Should it be?’
Abstract: The seminar looks at the general relevance of the social choice results for the design of political decision making institutions. Attention is paid primarily but not exclusively to criteria used in evaluating voting systems and characterizing them. The plausibility of the requirements (e.g. ability/willingness to rank alternatives) imposed on voters are touched up on. The discussion is largely speculative and based on the speaker’s intuitive understanding of the reasons why the politicians (parlamentarians, candidates, campaign managers, party activists) are often cavalier, ignorant and/or nonchalant ab out the results social choice theory. It is hoped the audience feels free to present views augmenting, evaluating and possibly contradicting those of the speaker.
 Felsenthal, D. S. and Nurmi, H. (2017). Monotonicity failures afflicting
procedures for electing a single candidate . Cham: Springer Briefs in Economics.
 Nurmi, H. (1987). Comparing voting systems .Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
Start time: 4.40 pm
Address: 20 Myasnitskaya Ulitsa, Room 125.
Working language: English.
Everyone interested is welcome to attend! If you need a pass to HSE, please contact the organizers via email at firstname.lastname@example.org, prior to March 19.