The electric energy industry plays a crucial role in the technological support of digitalization, and this leads to an increase in the requirements for its development. Leading developed countries are currently under energy transition and are creating innovative, intelligent energy systems (IES) of open type, which include active consumers, distributed generation mechanisms and the introduction of renewable energy sources. One can observe a deep structural transformation, expansion of the range of participants and creation of new value chains. The development of digitalization and IES provides with new opportunities for sustainable development of the economy and society. This stage facilitates the creation of new tasks for the investment climate in the power industry, so the development of an institutionalsystem is justified.
The article examines a key attribute of Russian national identity—national pride—as it is reflected in mass consciousness. To trace the dynamics of multiple facets of national pride and related phenomena from 1996 to 2015, we use data from five surveys. The results demonstrate a substantial growth in Russian national pride in specific country achievements and general pride in Russian citizenship over the last 20 years. This change is the result of the population’s and state’s need for positive social identity as well as from both real and imagined progress in the Russian economy and political influence, and it started long before the Crimea mobilization and Olympics of 2014. The structural difference in pride in various achievements persisted for the 20 years examined here, but became less distinct. Across the years examined here, Russian national pride has become more strongly related to belief in the superiority of the country and is therefore increasingly competitive.
The Input-Output Structural Decomposition Analysis approach enables a fairly comprehensive and detailed analysis of the economic growth sources using the input-output model. The active use of this approach is currently hampered by the lack of a reliable instrumental method for constructing symmetrical input-output tables and deflators that permit the output and import indicators to be recalculated by types of products for different years into constant prices, as well as by ambiguity of interpretations of the content of growth sources. The paper discusses the ways to overcome these methodological problems and gives an example of the experimental use of the structural decomposition analysis approach based on the data of the inputoutput tables of the Russian Federation for 2011–2015.
In recent years, key users of macroeconomic performance indicators have advocated increasing the availability of more detailed productivity statistics. In particular, expanding growth accounts to the industry level to meet the need for more granular measures of economic performance. In response to this, Australia and Russia have developed estimates of industry level KLEMS (Capital (K), Labor (L), Energy (E), Materials (M) and Services (S)) productivity growth. The chapter considers the progress of Australia and Russia KLEMS projects in terms of data construction and the usage of KLEMS for better understanding of industry sources of growth. For both countries, at least two decades of KLEMS data are now available, supporting more in-depth analysis of the determinants of growth at the industry level.
This essay examines the development of a form of Russian-speaking Belarusian national identity. While Belarus’s early post-Soviet nationalists relied upon Belarusian as the central pillar of national identity, this has been challenged by more ‘pragmatic’ nationalists using the ‘language of the people’, namely, Russian. Analysing history textbooks and popular history books that represent three key identity projects in Belarus, this study sheds light on the specific programmatic ideas of a new Russian-speaking Belarusian nationalism. Despite the emergence of the geopolitically-motivated Russian World (Russkii Mir) concept, some Russian-speaking nationalists have articulated a programme that paradoxically draws upon Russian neo-Eurasianist thought, but which is simultaneously anti-Russian.
Stereotypes are ideological and justify the existing social structure. Although stereotypes persist, they can change when the context changes. Communism’s rise in Eastern Europe and Asia in the 20th century provides a natural experiment examining social-structural effects on social class stereotypes. Nine samples from post-communist countries (N = 2241), compared with 38 capitalist countries (N=4344), support the historical, socio-cultural rootedness of stereotypes. More positive stereotypes of the working class appear in post-communist countries, both compared with other social groups in the country and compared with working-class stereotypes in capitalist countries; post-communist countries also show more negative stereotypes of the upper class. We further explore whether communism’s ideological legacy reflects how societies infer groups’ stereotypic competence and warmth from structural status and competition. Post-communist societies show weaker status-competence relations and stronger (negative) competition-warmth relations; respectively, the lower meritocratic beliefs and higher priority of embeddedness as ideological legacies may shape these relationships.
Strong growth, intensive structural change and expanding informality have characterized many developing and emerging economies in recent decades. Yet most empirical investigations into the relationship between structural change and productivity growth overlook informality. This paper includes the informal sector in an analysis of the effects of structural changes in the Russian economy on aggregate labour productivity growth. Using a newly developed dataset for 34 industries covering the period 1995–2012 and applying three alternative approaches, aggregate labour productivity growth is decomposed into intra-industry and inter-industry contributions. All three approaches show that the overall contribution of structural change is growth-enhancing, significant and decreasing over time. Labour reallocation from the formal sector to the informal sector tends to reduce growth through the extension of informal activities with low productivity levels. Sectoral labour reallocation effects are found to be highly sensitive to the methods applied.
On the eve of transition in the late 1980’s the perspectives of the economic development for most economies of the Soviet Bloc in Central, Southern and Eastern Europe seemed optimistic. They had been already industrialized; their labor force was relatively healthy and educated. Being technological backwards in many industries these countries had lots of opportunities for catch up, extending international trade and allowing the inflow of foreign direct investments. However, after two decades of transition these expectations did not materialize to the fullest extent. On the one hand, by 2008, the last year before the global financial crisis, GDP per capita of all post-transition economies grew, except Moldova and Ukraine. On the other hand, six of the twenty economies of the region increased the lag behind the twelve advanced West European economies (EU12). A reasonable question in this context is to what extent is this backward take-off caused by the command-economy past or some myopic country-specific issues of the post-transition development?
With the growth accounting framework this study confirms the leading role of total factor productivity in late transition at the aggregate level. Delving into industry levels the literature shows that, at least, for some East European economies the key driver of TFP growth in most CEE economies was manufacturing. This is not surprising, because manufacturing was also one of the most technologically backward sectors of the economy in early transition with multiple opportunities for improvements through adaptation of better practices and ways of production from the West. So, catching up in technologies seems to be the most essential driver of the post transition growth.
At the same time, this exposition of the story of growth in transition critically depends on data quality, essential for measurement of economic growth and productivity. That is why it is important also to take into account that transition in economies of the region coincided with the transition in state statistics from the Material Product System of national accounts to the United Nations System of National Accounts. All this is important for understanding of the limitations of existing data and suggested interpretations, especially in the comparative perspective with developed economies.
The paper aims at creation of an effective business model of global generating companies performing on Russian market and to develop a transformation plan of business for one of these companies.
The justifiability scale (JS) is widely used to measure individual and country differences in moral attitudes. However, the validity of the instrument has been barely assessed. The current study addressed the concurrent and content validity of four popular JS items (justifiability of homosexuality, suicide, prostitution, and euthanasia). A sample of 493 Russians completed both JS and the four validated multi-item scales. Results demonstrated that multi-item scales measuring suicide, prostitution, and euthanasia attitudes explained less than half of the variance of the corresponding JS items. The JS underestimated the justifiability of homosexuality, prostitution and suicide, and overestimated the justifiability of euthanasia. The JS homosexuality item appeared to be a precise measure of attitudes towards male but less so female homosexuality. The concurrent validity of the four items was associated with item non-differentiation. We conclude that JS items should be used either after accounting for their bias, or as indicators of more abstract latent constructs.
Most contemporary sociologists’ aversion towards nationalism contrasts with the alleged nationalist views of one of the key classics of sociology, Max Weber. The considerable accumulated scholarship on the issue presents a unified belief that Weber was indeed a nationalist yet varies considerably in the significance attributed to the issue. Most authors entrench Weber’s nationalism within biographical studies of Weber’s political views as an individual beyond Weberian sociological theorizing. A different approach suggests that the notions of nationality in Weber’s works do have certain theoretical value as potentially capable of enriching the current understanding of the nation. The present article aims to bring together the notions of nationality dispersed within Weber’s various writings with the Weberian methodological individualism. The main argument of the article is that individualism and nationalism in Weber’s thought are not a contradiction despite the collectivism associated with the essentialist view of the nation. Instead, they represent a reflection of the fundamental shift from an earlier view of society as a meganthropos towards the pluralist problematization of the micromacro link definitive for the modern social theory. Analyzing the internal logic of this change provides new insights into the currently debated issue of retraditionalization, especially in relation to the ongoing renaissance of nationalism.
The article presents the results of the study based on the data of the 2012 European Social Survey. The author analyzed the correlation between the population’s attitude towards democracy and the assessment of the importance of its individual aspects (“understanding” of democracy). The analysis was carried out on data from Russia and groups of European countries (Northern Europe, Western Europe, Southern Europe, and the post-socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe). The average resident of all European countries would like to live in a democracy; Nordic countries most strongly wanted to live in a democracy, whilst those who least strongly wished to came from postsocialist countries, especially Russia. Despite a number of similarities between groups of European countries, one can see significant differences between groups of countries in Western and Northern Europe and the group of post-socialist countries and Russia. Russians and the population of the group of post-socialist countries have a lesser attitude towards democracy in their understanding of the importance of its individual characteristics (correlation coefficients with each of the signs of democracy are lower than in other groups of countries). Most signs of democracy are equally important components in the perceptions of the population of Russia and post-socialist countries, while in other groups of countries these views are more differentiated. The study draws attention to the lack of validity of questions about the general attitude towards democracy, used in many international and national polls. It is associated with differences in the understanding of this concept by supporters of democracy in different groups of countries.
Two problems associated with the adequacy of traditional methods for describing the national economy as an object of study are considered. The first of them is due to the fact that technological progress leads to a decrease in the degree of representativeness of traditional macroeconomic indicators, i.e. to reduce the degree of representativeness of generally accepted methods of describing the economy. The second problem is related to the erosion of the borders of the national economy in connection with the processes of globalization, which leads to the fact that the national economy is gradually losing its representativeness as an object of study.
To date, macroeconomic science has grown extraordinarily and acquired thousands of interesting theoretical models and serious empirical research. The purpose of this work is to draw the attention of Russian researchers to some issues that seem especially significant.
The aging of the population during the twentieth century sparked a discussion on end-of-life issues and particularly voluntary life termination due to unbearable suffering (euthanasia and related practices). Most of the euthanasia attitude studies have been focused on groups directly involved in end-of-life issues, such as physicians and patients. This article investigates the typical views of common Russians in regard to euthanasia and related practices, and looks for their determinants. A survey of 1201 respondents in 2014 was conducted using a probabilistic sample representing the population of Russia. Measurement of euthanasia justifiability included descriptions of patients’ conditions and types of life termination procedures. Analysis of the results showed that basic values were important predictors of euthanasia justifiability. However, a model derived from international and western research failed to confirm this. Our hypothesis regarding the relations between values of autonomy and justification of euthanasia found only weak support, while benevolence values demonstrated a strong negative effect. Proximity to death showed a negative effect: the fact of caring for sick close ones, as well as one’s own ill-health, were related to a lower justification of euthanasia. Religiosity demonstrated only marginally significant coefficients. Contrary to our hypothesis, interactions between death proximity indicators and trust in physicians and people in general were insignificant. Another unexpected result was a negative link between confidence in the healthcare system and euthanasia justifiability. We attribute these findings to a “priestly” model of care prevalent among Russians; the characteristic structuring of values among Russians, in which care for others contradicts personal autonomy; as well as endorsement of avoidance over approach motivations. In conclusion we list the limitations of the study and point out the weak explanatory power of the models presented.
The discussion of the draft "Development Strategy of the Federal State Statistics Service until 2024" by participants of the professional and expert community is given. The comments made, suggestions and comments will be studied in preparing the final text of the Rosstat Development Strategy until 2024.