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ORCID: 0000-0002-9441-6837
ResearcherID: O-2795-2016
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S. Yakovlev
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Sergey Severinov

  • Affiliated Researcher:HSE / Подразделения вузовского обучения - 7.1
  • Sergey Severinov has been at HSE University since 2015.

Education and Degrees

  • 1998

    PhD
    Stanford University

  • 1995

    Master's
    Stanford University

Publications1

Article Boulatov A., Severinov S. Optimal and Efficient Mechanisms with Asymmetrically Budget Constrained Buyers // Games and Economic Behavior. 2021. No. 127. P. 155-178. doi

Publications

[1] ‘Competition Among Sellers Who Offer Auctions Instead of Prices’, with Michael Peters, Journal Of Economic Theory, 75[1], July 1997, pp. 141-179.

[2] ‘On Information Sharing and Incentives in R&D’, Rand Journal of Economics, 32, Autumn 2001, pp. 542-564.

[3] ‘Bequests as Signals: An Explanation for the Equal Division Puzzle’, with B. Douglas Bernheim, Journal of Political Economy, 111, August 2003.

[4] ‘Internet Auctions with Many Traders’, with Michael Peters, Journal Of Economic Theory 130, 2006, pp. 220-245.

[5] ‘Bequests as Signals: Implications for the Fiscal Policy’, Journal of Public Economics 90, 2006. pp. 1995-2008

[6] ‘Screening when Not All Agents Are Strategic: Does A Monopoly Need to Exclude?’, with Raymond Deneckere, RAND Journal of Economics, Winter 2006, pp. 816-841.

[7] ‘The Value of Information and Optimal Organization’, Rand Journal of Economics, 39[1], Spring 2008,pp. 238-265

[8] ‘Individually Rational, Balanced-Budget Bayesian Mechanism and Surplus Allocation’, with Grigory Kosenok,  Journal of Economic Theory  140, 2008, pp. 126-161

[9] ‘An Efficient Solution to the Informed Principal Problem’, Journal of Economic Theory, 141[1], July 2008, pp. 114-133

[10] ‘Mechanism Design with Partial State Verifiability’, with Raymond Deneckere, Games and Economic Behavior, November 2008, 487-513.

[11] ‘Ascending Double Auction’, with Michael Peters, Journal of Economic Theory, November 2008, Vol 37(2), pp. 281-306.

[12] ‘Investment Tournaments’, with Michael Schwarz, Journal of Labor Economics, October 2010 Vol. 28 (4), pp. 893-922.

[13] ‘Strategic Information Acquisition and Transmission’, with Rossella Argenziano and Francesco Squintani, American Economic Journal-Microeconomics, 2016, Vol. 8(3), pp. 119-155.

[14] ‘Disclosure and Legal Advice’, (2016), with Yeon-Koo Che, forthcoming in American Economic Journal - Microeconomics.


Participation in Conferences

North American Meetings of the Econometric Society, 1998-2001, 2003, 2004. 2006, 2007

European Meetings of the Econometric Society, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2002.

Canadian Economic Theory Conference, 1997-2006,2008, 2010, 2012, 2013

World Congress on Game Theory, 2004,2008.

Society for Economic Dynamics, 2004.

Society for Economic Design, 2006

International Conference on Game Theory, Stony Brook, 2000 

NSF/NBER Decentralization Conference, 2002-2005.

NSF General Equilibrium Conference, 2003.

Law and Mechanism Design Conference (2002),

Midwest Economic Theory Conference (2001), (2002)

Workshop on the Economics of Transition (1996) organized by the Social Science

Research Council, New York, held in St.Petersburg, Russia

Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics (2003).

WZB Conference on Economics and Psychology (2003).

NSF/CEME Conference on Mathematical Economics (2005)

Duke-Northwestern-Texas Industrial Organization Conference (2006)

Lisbon UECE Meetings on Games and Applications (2011, 2012)

Public Economic Theory Conference (2013)