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ORCID: 0000-0002-2849-0983
ResearcherID: L-1399-2015
Scopus AuthorID: 6602103851
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F. T. Aleskerov
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Eric S. Maskin

  • Eric S. Maskin has been at HSE since 2010.


  • 1976

    Doctor of Sciences*

  • 1976

    Harvard University

  • 1974

    Harvard University

  • 1972

    Harvard University

* Doctor of Sciences
A post-doctoral degree called Doctor of Sciences is given to reflect second advanced research qualifications or higher doctorates in ISCED 2011.

Honorary Degrees

  • M.A. (Honorary), Cambridge University, 1977
  • D.H.L. (Honorary), Bard College, 2008
  • Doctor Honoris Causa, Corvinus University of Budapest, 2008
  • Honorary Doctor, University of Cambodia, 2010
  • Doctor Honoris Causa, Free University of Brussels, 2010

Academic and Editorial Positions

  • Research Fellow, Jesus College, Cambridge University, 1976-77
  • Assistant Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1977-80
  • Associate Professor of Economics, M.I.T., 1980-81
  • Overseas Fellow, Churchill College, Cambridge University, 1980-82
  • Professor of Economics, M.I.T., 1981-84
  • Professor of Economics, Harvard University, 1985-2000
  • Visiting Overseas Fellow, St. John's College, Cambridge, 1987-88
  • Louis Berkman Professor of Economics, Harvard University, 1997-2000
  • Visiting Professor of Economics, M.I.T., 1999-2000
  • Visiting Fellow, I.A.S., Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, 2010
  • Visiting Lecturer in Economics, Princeton University, 2000
  • Albert O. Hirschman Professor of Social Science, Institute for Advanced Study, 2000
  • American Editor, Review of Economic Studies, 1977-82
  • Associate Editor, Social Choice and Welfare, 1983-2007
  • Advisory Editor, Social Choice and Welfare, 2007
  • Editor, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1984-90
  • Advisory Editor, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 1987-1994
  • Associate Editor, Games and Economic Behavior, 1988
  • Editor, Economics Letters, 1992
  • Associate Editor, Review of Economic Design, 1993
  • Associate Editor, BE Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2000
  • Associate Editor, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2001-2004
  • Editorial Advisor, Journal of Developing Areas, 2001
  • Associate Editor, International Journal of Game Theory, 2003-2007
  • Advisory Editor, International Journal of Game Theory, 2007
  • Advisory Editor, Division of Labor and Transaction Costs, 2005
  • Advisory Editor, Economics, 2006
  • Advisory Editor, Economic Theory, 2009
  • Advisory Editor, European Journal of Pure and Applied Mathematics, 2009
  • Advisory Editor, Journal of Dynamics and Games in Science, 2009
  • Editor, Monograph Series in Economic Theory, World Scientific Publishing, 2009

Fellowships, Grants, and Awards

  • National Science Foundation Graduate Fellowship, 1972-75
  • National Science Foundation Research Grants, 1977-
  • U.K. Economic and Social Science Research Council Grants, 1978-1995
  • Guggenheim Fellowship, 1980-81
  • Fellow, Econometric Society, elected 1981
  • Sloan Research Fellowship, 1983-85
  • Galbraith Teaching Prize, Economics Department, Harvard University, 1990, 1992
  • Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, elected 1994
  • Monash Distinguished Visiting Scholar, Monash University, 2003
  • Corresponding Fellow, British Academy, elected 2003
  • Fellow, European Economic Association, elected 2004
  • Honorary Professor, Wuhan University, 2004
  • Honorary Fellow, St. John’s College, Cambridge, elected 2004
  • Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics, 2007
  • Kempe Award in Environmental Economics, 2007
  • Honorary Professor, Tsinghua University, 2007
  • EFR – Business Week Award, 2008
  • Honorary Professor, State University-Higher School of Economics, Moscow, 2008
  • Member, National Academy of Sciences, elected 2008
  • Distinguished Fellow, House of Finance, University of Frankfurt, 2008
  • Honorary Professor, Shenzhen University, 2008
  • Grande Médaille of the City of Marseille, 2009
  • Honorary Fellow, Jesus College, Cambridge, elected 2009
  • Fellow, Royal Academy of Economic Sciences and Finance (Spain), elected 2009
  • Centennial Medal, Harvard University, 2010




  1. A Theorem on Utilitarianism, Review of Economic Studies, Vol. XLVI (4), 1978, pp.93-96.
  2. Fonctions de Préférence Collective Définies sur des Domaines de Préférence Individuelle Soumis à des Constraintes, Cahiers du Seminaire d'Econométrie, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1979, pp.153-182.
  3. A Differential Approach to Expected Utility Maximizing Mechanisms, (with J.J.4 Laffont), in J.J. Laffont (ed.), Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences, North Holland, 1979, pp.289-308.
  4. Implementation and Strong Nash Equilibrium, in J.J. Laffont (ed.), Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences, North Holland, 1979, pp. 433-440.
  5. Decision-Making under Ignorance with Implications for Social Choice, Theory and Decision, 11, 1979, pp.319-337.
  6. The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility, (with P. Dasgupta and P. Hammond), Review of Economic Studies, Vol. XLVI (2), 1979, pp.185-216.
  7. An Equilibrium Analysis of Search and Breach of Contracts, I: Steady States, (with P. Diamond), Bell Journal of Economics, 10, 1979, pp.282-316.
  8. On the Difficulty of Attaining Distributional Goals with Imperfect Information, (with J. J. Laffont), Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 1979, pp.27-37.
  9. Voting for Public Alternatives: Some Notes on Majority Rule, National Tax Journal, Vol. XXXII, 1979, pp.105-110.
  10. Condorcet Proportions and Kelly's Conjectures, (with P. Fishburn and W. Gehrlein), Discrete Applied Mathematics, 1, 1979, pp.229-252.
  11. Progress Report on Kelly's Majority Conjectures, (with P. Fishburn and W. Gehrlein), Economics Letters, 2, 1979, pp. 313-314.
  12. On Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control, (with P. Dasgupta and P. Hammond), Review of Economic Studies, 1980, pp.857-860.
  13. A Differentiable Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms, (with J.J. Laffont), Econometrica, 48, 1980, pp.1507-1520.
  14. On First-best Taxation, in J.R.C. Lecomber and M. Slater (eds.), Income Distribution: The Limits to Redistribution, Scientechnica, 1980, pp.9-22.
  15. Optimal Reservation Price in the Vickrey Auction, (with J.J. Laffont), Economics Letters, 6, 1980, pp.309-313.
  16. An Equilibrium Analysis of Search and Breach of Contract, II: A Non-Steady Example, (with P. Diamond), Journal of Economic Theory, 1981, pp.165-195.
  17. Nash and Dominant Strategy Implementation in Economic Environments, (with J.J.5 Laffont), Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1982, pp.17-47.
  18. A Characterization of Strongly Locally Incentive-Compatible Planning Procedures with Public Goods, (with J.J. Laffont), Review of Economic Studies, 1983, 50, pp.171-196.
  19. The Theory of Incentives: An Overview, (with J.J. Laffont), in W. Hildenbrand (ed.), Advances in Economic Theory (invited lectures from the 4th World Congress of the Econometric Society), Cambridge University Press, 1982, pp.31-94.
  20. The Gains to Making Losers Pay in High Bid Auctions, (with J. Riley), in R. Englebrecht-Wiggans, M. Shubik, and R. Stark (eds.), Auctions, Bidding, and Contracting, New York University Press, 1983, pp.205-230.
  21. Monopolistic Quantity Rationing, (with V. Bohm, H. Polemarchakis, and A. Postlewaite), Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1983, 98, pp.189-198.
  22. Unemployment with Observable Aggregate Shocks, (with O.Hart and S. Grossman), Journal of Political Economy, 1983, pp.907-926. Reprinted in S. Grossman, The Informational Role of Prices, MIT Press, 1989, pp.190-212.
  23. A Second-Best Approach to Incentive Compatibility, (with J.J. Laffont), in M. Boyer and R. Kihlstrom (eds.), Bayesian Models in Economic Theory, Elsevier Science Publishers, 1984, pp.143-154.
  24. On the Efficiency of Fixed Price Equilibria, (with J. Tirole), Journal of Economic Theory, 32, 1984, pp.317-327.
  25. Optimal Auctions with Risk-Averse Buyers, (with J. Riley), Econometrica, Vol. 52, No. 6, November 1984, pp.1473-1518. Reprinted in P. Klemperer (ed.), The Economic Theory of Auctions, London: Edward Elgar, 2000.
  26. Monopoly with Incomplete Information, (with J. Riley), Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 15, No. 2, Summer 1984, pp.171-196. Reprinted in G. Norman (ed.), The Economics of Price Discrimination, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1999; Also reprinted in M. Waldman and J. R. Johnson (eds.), Pricing Tactics, Strategies, and Outcomes, vol. I, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2007.
  27. Auction Theory with Private Values, (with J. Riley), American Economic Review, 75(2), 1985, pp.150-156, reprinted in P. Klemperer (ed.), The Economic Theory of Auctions, London: Edward Elgar, 2000.
  28. Input Versus Output Incentive Schemes, (with J. Riley), Journal of Public Economics, 28(l), 1985, pp.1-23.
  29. The Theory of Implementation in Nash Equilibrium: A Survey, in L. Hurwicz, D. Schmeidler, and H. Sonnenschein (eds.), Social Goals And Social Organization: Volume in Memory of Elisha Pazner, Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp.173-204. Reprinted in A. Rubinstein (ed.), Game Theory in Economics, London: Edward Elgar, 1995.
  30. The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, Part I (Theory), (with P. Dasgupta), Review of Economic Studies, 53(l), 1986, pp.1-26. Reprinted in K. Binmore and P. Dasgupta (eds.), Economic Organizations as Games, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986, pp.48-82.
  31. The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, Part II (Applications), (with P. Dasgupta), Review of Economic Studies, 53(1), 1986, pp.27-41. Reprinted in K. Binmore and P. Dasgupta (eds.), Economic Organizations as Games, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986, pp.83-102.
  32. An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria (with R. Radner and R. Myerson), Review of Economic Studies, 53(l), 1986, pp. 59-69.
  33. The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information, (with D. Fudenberg), Econometrica, 54(3), 1986, pp.533-554. Reprinted in Rubinstein (ed.), Game Theory in Economics, London: Edward Elgar, 1995. Also reprinted in D. Fudenberg and D. Levine (eds.), A Long-Run Collaboration on Games with Long-Run Patient Players, World Scientific Publishers, 2009, pp.209-230.
  34. The Existence of Equilibrium with Price-Setting Firms, American Economic Review, 76(2), 1986, pp.382-386.
  35. Optimal Bayesian Mechanisms, in W. Heller, R. Starr, and D. Starrett (eds.), Uncertainty, Information and Communication, Volume 3 (essays in honor of Kenneth Arrow), Cambridge University Press, 1986, pp.229-238.
  36. On the Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods, in G. Feiwel (ed.), Arrow and the Foundations of the Theory of Economic Policy(essays in honor of Kenneth Arrow), MacMillan, 1987, pp. 341-349.
  37. Monopoly with Asymmetric Information about Quality: Behavior and Regulation, (with J.J. Laffont), European Economic Review, 31(1), 1987, pp.483-489.
  38. A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, III: Cournot Competition, (with J. Tirole), European Economic Review, 31(4), 1987, pp.947-968. Corrigendum, European Economic Review, 32(7), 1988, pp.1567-1568.
  39. Optimal Nonlinear Pricing with Two-Dimensional Characteristics, (with J.J. Laffont 7 and J.C. Rochet) in T. Groves, R. Radner, and S. Reiter (eds.), Information, Incentives and Economic Mechanisms(essays in honor of Leonid Hurwicz), University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1987, pp.256-266.
  40. Correlated Equilibria and Sunspots, (with J. Tirole), Journal of Economic Theory, 43(2), 1987, pp. 364-373.
  41. The Simple Economics of Research Portfolios, (with P. Dasgupta), Economic Journal, 97, 1987, pp.581-595.
  42. A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large Fixed Costs, (with J. Tirole), Econometrica,  56(3),1988, pp.549-570.
  43. A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles, (with J. Tirole), Econometrica, 56(3), 1988, pp.571-599. Reprinted in J. Gabszewicz and J.-F. Thisse (eds.), Microeconomic Theories of Imperfect Competition: Old Problems and New Perspectives, London: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1999.
  44. Optimal Multi-Unit Auctions, (with J. Riley), in F. Hahn (ed.), The Economics of Missing Markets, Information, and Games, Oxford University Press, 1989, pp.312-335. Reprinted in P. Klemperer, The Economic Theory of Auctions, London: Edward Elgar, 2000.
  45. Renegotiation in Repeated Games, (with J. Farrell), Games and Economic Behavior, 1, 1989, pp.327-360. Reprinted in E. Maskin (ed.), Recent Developments in Game Theory, London: Edward Elgar, 1999, pp.388-421.
  46. Renegotiation-Proof Equilibrium: Reply, (with J. Farrell), Journal of Economic Theory, 49(2), 1989, pp 376-378.
  47. Efficient Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria in Repeated Games, (with R. Evans), Games and Economic Behavior, 1, 1989, pp.361-369.
  48. Rational Expectations with Imperfect Competition: A Bertrand-Edgeworth Example, (with J.J. Laffont), Economics Letters, 30, 1989, pp.269-274.
  49. Disadvantageous Oil Tariffs and Dynamic Consistency, (with D. Newbery), American Economic Review, 80(l), 1990, pp.143-156.
  50. The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Insider Trading on the Stock Market, (with J.J. Laffont), Journal of Political Economy, 98(l), 1990, pp.70-93.
  51. The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values, (with J. Tirole), Econometrica, 58(2), 1990, pp.379-409. Reprinted in J.J. Laffont (ed.), The Principal-Agent Model: The Economic Theory of Incentives,London: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2003.
  52. Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Games, (with D. Fudenberg), Journal of Economic Theory, 51, 1990, pp.194-206.
  53. Contract Renegotiation in Models of Asymmetric Information, (with M. Dewatripont), European Economic Review, 34(2&3), 1990, pp.311-321.
  54. Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games, (with D. Fudenberg), American Economic Review, 80(2), 1990, pp.274-279. Reprinted in E. Maskin (ed.), Recent Developments in Game Theory, London: Edward Elgar, 1999, pp. 339-344.
  55. Repeated Games with Long and Short-Run Players, (with D. Fudenberg and D. Kreps), Review of Economic Studies, 57, 1990, pp.555-573.
  56. On the Dispensability of Public Randomization in Discounted Repeated Games, (with D. Fudenberg), Journal of Economic Theory, 53, 1991, pp.428-438.
  57. The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values, (with J. Tirole), Econometrica, 60(l), 1992, pp.1-42.
  58. Production Fluctuations and Fiscal Policy in an Economy with Aggregate and Idiosyncratic Shocks, (with O. Hart) in P. Dasgupta, D. Gale, O. Hart and E. Maskin (eds.), Economic Analysis of Markets and Games(essays in honor of Frank Hahn), MIT Press, 1992, pp.107-127.
  59. Auctions and Privatization, in Horst Siebert (ed.) Privatization, J.C.B. Mohr Publisher, 1992, pp.115-136.
  60. Centralization of Credit and Long-Term Investment, (with M. Dewatripont) in P. Bardhan and J. Roemer (eds.) Market Socialism: The Current Debate, Oxford University Press, 1993, pp.169-174.
  61. The Invisible Hand and Externalities, American Economic Review, 1994, Vol. 84, No. 2, pp.333-337. Reprinted in R. Tresch (ed.), Public Sector Economies: Critical Concepts, London: Routledge, forthcoming.
  62. Conceptual Economic Theory, in P. Klein (ed.), The Role of Economic Theory, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994, pp.187-195.
  63. The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information, (with D. Fudenberg and D. Levine), Econometrica, 62(5), 1994, pp.997-1039. Reprinted in E. Maskin (ed.), Recent Developments in Game Theory, London: Edward Elgar, 1999, pp. 345-387. Also reprinted in D. Fudenberg and D. Levine (eds.), A Long-Run Collaboration on Games with Long-Run Patient Players, World Scientific Publishers, 2009, pp.231-274.
  64. Majority Rule, Social Welfare Functions, and Games Forms, in K. Basu, P. Pattanaik, and K. Suzumura (eds.), Choice, Welfare, and Development(essays in honor of Amartya Sen), Oxford University Press, 1995, pp.100-109.
  65. Feasible Nash Implementation of Social Choice Rules when the Designer does not Know Endowments or Production Sets, (with L. Hurwicz and A. Postlewaite), in J. Ledyard (ed.), The Economics of Informational Decentralization: Complexity, Efficiency and Stability(essays in honor of Stanley Reiter), Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995, pp. 367-433.
  66. Credit and Efficiency in Centralized and Decentralized Economies, (with M. Dewatripont), Review of Economic Studies, 62, 1995, pp.541-555. Reprinted in S. Bhattacharya, A. Boot and A. Thakor (eds.), Credit, Intermediation and the Macroeconomy Models and Perspectives, Oxford University Press, 2004.
  67. Long-Term Investment by Japanese and American Firms, Japan and the World Economy, 7, 1995, pp.249-254.
  68. Contractual Contingencies and Renegotiation, (with M. Dewatripont), Rand Journal of Economics, 1995, pp.704-719.
  69. A Walrasian Theory of Money and Barter, (with A. Banerjee), Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. CXI, (4), 1996, pp.955-1605. Abridged version reprinted in Spanish as Una Teoría Walrasiana de Dinero y Trueque, Gaceto de Economia, 3(5), 1997, pp.5-15.
  70. Theories of the Soft Budget Constraint, Japan and the World Economy,1996, pp. 125-133.
  71. Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality, Review of Economic Studies, 66, 1999, pp.23-38. Reprinted in J.J. Laffont (ed.), The Principal Agent Model: The Economic Theory of Incentives,London: Edward Elgar, 2003.
  72. Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts, (with J. Tirole), Review of Economic Studies, 66, 1999, pp.83-114.
  73. Two Remarks on the Property-Rights Literature, (with J. Tirole), Review of Economic Studies, 66, 1999, pp.139-149.
  74. Implementation and Renegotiation, (with J. Moore), Review of Economic Studies, 66, 1999, pp.39-56.
  75. Recent Theoretical Work on the Soft Budget Constraint, American Economic Review, 89, No. 2, 1999, pp.421-425.
  76. Democracy and the Good, (with P. Dasgupta), in I. Shapiro and C. Hacker-Cordon (eds.), Rethinking Democracy for a New Century, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
  77. Uncertainty and Entry Deterrence, Economic Theory,14, 1999, pp. 429-437.
  78. Bargaining, Production, and Monotonicity in Economic Environments, (with M. Chen), Journal of Economic Theory,89(1), November 1999, pp. 140-147.
  79. Introduction, in E. Maskin (ed.), Recent Developments in Game Theory, London: Edward Elgar, 1999, pp. ix-xviii.
  80. "Managing Ecosystem Resources" (with K. Arrow, G. Dailey, P. Dasgupta, S. Levin, K.-G. Maler, D. Starrett, T. Sterner, and T. Tietenberg), Environmental Science and Technology, 34, 2000, pp. 1401-1406.
  81. Efficient Auctions, (with P. Dasgupta), Quarterly Journal of Economics,Vol. CXV, May 2000, 341-388.
  82. Auctions, Development, and Privatization: Efficient Auctions with Liquidity-Constrained Buyers (text of the Marshall lecture to the European Economic Association), European Economic Review, Vol. 44 (4-6), May 2000, pp. 667-681.
  83. Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions, (with J. Riley), Review of Economic Studies, 67, 2000, pp. 439-454.
  84. Asymmetric Auctions, (with J. Riley), Review of Economic Studies,67, 2000, pp. 413-438. Reprinted in P. Klemperer (ed.), The Economic Theory of Auctions, London: Edward Elgar, 2000.
  85. Soft Budget Constraints and Transition, (with M. Dewatripont and G. Roland), in E. Maskin and A. Simonovits (eds.), Planning, Shortage and Transformation(essays in honor of Janos Kornai), Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000, pp. 143-156.
  86. Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form, (with Y. Qian and C. Xu), Review of Economic Studies, 67, 2000, pp. 359-378.
  87. Soft Budget Constraint Theories: From Centralization to the Market (with C. Xu), Economics of Transition, 9, 2001, pp. 1-27. Reprinted in E. Berglof and G. Roland (eds.), The Economics of Transition: Proceedings of the 5th Nobel Symposium, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, pp. 12-36.
  88. Markov Perfect Equilibrium, I: Observable Actions, (with J. Tirole), Journal of Economic Theory, 100, 2001, pp.191-219.
  89. Kinds of Theory, in T. Negishi, R. Ramachandran and K. Mino (eds.), Economic Theory, Dynamics and Markets(essays in honor of Ryuzo Sato), Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001, pp. 45-55.
  90. Roy Radner and Incentive Theory, Review of Economic Design, 6, 2001, pp.311-324. Reprinted in T. Ichiishi and T. Marschak (eds.), Markets, Games, and Organizations (essays in honor of Roy Radner), Berlin: Springer, 2002, pp. 179-192.
  91. On Indescribable Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts, European Economic Review, 46(4-5), 2002 pp. 725-733.
  92. Implementation Theory, (with T. Sjöström), in K. Arrow, A. Sen, and K. Suzumura (eds.), Handbook of Social Choice Theory Vol. I, Amsterdam: North Holland, 2002, pp. 237-288.
  93. Auctions and Efficiency,(text of the Seattle lecture), in M. Dewatripont, L. Hansen, and S. Turnovsky (eds.), Advances in Economic Theory(invited lectures from the 8th World Congress of the Econometric Society), Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 1-24.
  94. Mechanism Design for the Environment, (with S. Baliga) in K.G. Mäler, and J. Vincent (eds.), Handbook of Environmental Economics,Elsevier Science/North Holland, Vol 1, June 2003, pp.306-324.
  95. Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Sealed High-Bid Auctions, (with J. Riley), Games and Economic Behavior(issue in memory of Robert Rosenthal), 45, 2003, pp. 395-409.
  96. Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint, (with J. Kornai and G. Roland), Journal of Economic Literature, 41(4), 2003, pp. 1095-1136. Reprinted in Hungarian, Közgazdasági Szemle, 60, 2004, (7-8) pp. 608-624 and (9) pp. 777-809. Reprinted in Russian, Voprosy Economiki, 11, 2004, pp. 4-33.
  97. The Fairest Vote of All, (with P. Dasgupta), Scientific American, 290 (3), 2004, pp. 64-69.
  98. Jean-Jacques Laffont: A Look Back, Journal of the European Economic Association, 2 (5), 2004, pp. 913-923.
  99. The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government, (with J. Tirole), American Economic Review, 94 (4), 2004, pp. 1034-1054. Reprinted in T. Dewan, K. Dowding, and K. Shepsle (eds.), Rational Choice Politics, London: Sage Publications, 2009.
  100. The Unity of Auction Theory, Journal of Economic Literature, 42 (4), 2004, pp. 1102-1115.
  101. Why Has Inequality Increased in China? Division of Labor and Transaction Costs, 1 (1), 2005, pp.67-71.
  102. Public Goods and Public Science, in K. Maskus and J. Reichman (eds.), International Public Goods and Transfer of Technology Under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime, Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp.139-141.
  103. Uncertainty and Hyperbolic Discounting, (with P. Dasgupta), American Economic Review, 95 (4), 2005, pp.1290-1299 (winner of the 2007 Kempe Award in Environmental Economics).
  104. On the Rationale for Penalty Default Rules, Florida State University Law Review, 33 (3), 2006, pp. 557-562.
  105. Bargaining and Destructive Power (with P. Dasgupta), Annals of Economics and Finance, 8 (2), 2007, pp. 217-227.
  106. On the Fundamental Theorems of General Equilibrium (with K. Roberts), Economic Theory, 35 (2), 2008, pp. 233-240.
  107. Public-Private Partnerships and Government Spending Limits (with J. Tirole), International Journal of Industrial Organization, 26 (2), 2008, pp. 412-420.
  108. Mechanism Design: How to Implement Social Goals, in Les Prix Nobel 2007, Nobel Foundation, 2008 (Nobel Lecture). Reprinted in American Economic Review, 98 (3), 2008, pp. 567-76. Also reprinted in Russian, Proceedings of the Tenth Annual Conference on Economics, Moscow, 2009.
  109. On the Robustness of Majority Rule (with P. Dasgupta), Journal of the European Economic Association,6 (5), 2008, pp. 949-973.
  110. Can Neural Data Improve Economics? Science, 321, 2008, pp.1788-1789.
  111. The Value of Victory: Social Origins of the Winner’s Curse in Common Value Auctions, (with W. van den Bos, J. Li, T. Lau. J. Cohen, R. Montague, and S. McClure), Judgment and Decision Making, 3 (7), 2008, pp. 483-492.
  112. Sequential Innovation, Patents, and Imitation, (with J. Bessen), Rand Journal of Economics, 40 (4), 2009, pp. 611-635.
  113. Evolution, Cooperation, and Repeated Games, in S. Levin (ed.), Games, Groups, and the Global Good, Springer, 2009, pp. 79-84.
  114. Nash Equilibrium and Mechanism Design. Games and Economic Behavior. 2011;71:9-11.
  115. Foreword. In Social Choice and Individual Values, third edition 3rd ed. NJ: Yale University Press; 2012.
  116. Culture, Cooperation, and Repeated Games, in L.Harrison and Y. Yasin (ed.), Volume in Memory of Samuel P. Huntington. Forthcoming.
  117. The Arrow Impossibility Theorem: Where Do We go from Here?. In Arrow Lectures Columbia University Press; Forthcoming.


Working Papers

  1. On the Robustness of Unanimity Rule (with P. Dasgupta).
  2. Balanced-Budget Mechanisms with Incomplete Information (with D. Fudenberg and D. Levine).
  3. Rational Expectations with Imperfect Competition, I: Monopoly (with J.J. Laffont).
  4. Incentives, Scale Economies, and Organizational Form (with Y. Qian and C. Xu).
  5. Evolution in Repeated Games (with D. Fudenberg).
  6. Wage Inequality and Segregation by Skill (with M. Kremer).
  7. Multi-Good Efficient Auctions with Multidimensional Information (with P. Eso).
  8. Is Majority Rule the Best Election Method? Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science Occasional Paper, 11, 2001.
  9. Bargaining, Coalitions, and Externalities
  10. Notes on Equilibrium Existence in Economies with Oligopolistic Firms, in GeneralEquilibrium: 40th Anniversary Conference, CORE discussion paper, 1994.
  11. Multi-unit Auctions, Price Discrimination and Bundling (with J. Riley)
  12. Pandering and Pork-Barrel Politics (with J. Tirole)

Professional Societies

American Economic Association

  • Nominating Committee 1995-6, 2008-9
  • Chair, Search Committee for Editor, AEJ: Microeconomics, 2006

Econometric Society

  • Fellow, elected 1981
  • Council, 1989-1995, 1999-2004
  • Executive Committee, 1993-1994, 2000-2004
  • Vice-President, 2001-2002
  • President, 2003
  • Chair, Officers Nominating Committee, 2006

Society for Social Choice and Welfare

  • Council 1995-2001

Game Theory Society

  • Charter Member
  • Council, 2001-2003
  • Executive Vice President, 2008-2010
  • President, 2010-2012

European Economic Association

  • Fellow, elected 2004

Global Economic Society

  • Founding Member

Ten Facts about HSE's International Community

Every year, the HSE family welcomes representatives of new countries and becomes more interesting and diverse. On June 4, 2017, international students will talk to visitors about their home countries and introduce them to their cultures at The Whole World at HSE festival. To give you a quick pre-festival snapshot of how international HSE is, we’ve brought together ten facts about the university international life for you.

First Ever Monument to Anonymous Peer Reviewer Unveiled at HSE

The concrete block in the courtyard of the HSE Institute of Education has been a lasting image of the WW2 era. However, last summer, the institute’s staff came up with the idea of turning it into a piece of art. The idea was put forth by Igor Chirikov, Director of theCentre of Sociology of Higher Education, whereby this useless piece of concrete would be transformed into a monument to the ‘anonymous peer reviewer’. Moreover, this idea ended up garnering the most support as a result of an internal vote.

The University’s Development Is Not an Administrative Process, But a Creative One

HSE Vice Rector Ivan Prostakov discusses the results of a recent International Advisory Committee (IAC) meeting, as well as the priorities the university has set for its international activities.

‘Improvement at HSE Has Exceeded Our Expectations’

Last week HSE International Advisory Committee held its annual meeting in Moscow. Eric Maskin, Nobel laureate in Economics, 2007, Chairman of the Committee and members of the IAC have talked to HSE News Service about the results of the meeting.

Monument to Anonymous Peer Reviewer to Be Erected at HSE

A group of HSE staff has launched a Kickstarter account to raise funds for an unusual project – a monument to an anonymous peer reviewer. If enough money is raised, the monument will be erected near the HSE Institute of Education.

HSE Professor Elected Vice President of the International Game Theory Society

At the end of July it became officially known that the academic supervisor of the HSE International Laboratory of Game Theory and Decision Making, Professor Hervé Moulin, was elected as Vice President of the International Game Theory Society (GTS). The main purpose of the organization is to promote and support research, teaching and applications of game theory.

'In Order to Have Teaching That’s Really Worthwhile, You Have to Have People Who Are on the Frontier of Research'

The only way to detect weaknesses in one’s own ideas is to expose them to criticism from colleagues, says Eric Maskin, winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2007, Chairman of the HSE International Advisory Committee, and chief researcher at the International Laboratory of Decision Choice and Analysis. The HSE news service recently spoke with him and Fuad Aleskerov, head of the Laboratory, about the the value of other people's opinions, joint research projects and opportunities for international cooperation in our time.

‘It Is Important for Us to Turn HSE into a World-class Research University’

On December 7, the sixth meeting of the HSE International Advisory Committee opened with leading experts from around the world in the field of science and education coming together to discuss the university’s achievements and the challenges it faces, as well as its objectives for the coming years. Following two days of discussions, the committee members will form recommendations on changes to the primary areas of development.

Globalization Is not Saving Developing Countries from Inequality

The processes of globalization should have contributed to reduced inequality in the world. In reality, however, the situation looks differently, with income inequality in the populations of developing economies growing. To correct this, the level of education of low-skilled workers must be increased, said Eric Maskin, Chief Research Fellow at the HSE International Laboratory of Decision Choice and Analysis and Nobel Laureate in Economics for 2007.

New International Labs at HSE St. Petersburg to Study Economy of Health and Game Theory

On June 26, the HSE Academic Council approved the opening of two new international laboratories. Specifically, the St. Petersburg School of Economics and Management will gain a laboratory for the study of healthcare economics, management, and policy, as well as a laboratory for game theory and decision-making. The labs' academic supervisors will be renowned international scholars.

‘The Future Growth of the World Economy is Critical for Geopolitical Decisions’

The XVI April International Academic Conference on Economic and Social Development is scheduled to take place from April 7-10, 2015, but plans are already underway among the organizers and participants alike. Recently, Dale Jorgenson, Samuel W. Morris University Professor of Economics at Harvard University, spoke with the HSE news service about his long history of cooperation with HSE. Professor Jorgenson, an internationally recognized expert on information technology and economic growth, among other subjects, shared his expectations for this year’s conference.

'It’s Good to See that Society Is Starting to Listen to Scholars’ Opinion'

Last Friday, the day before Russian Science Day, we published stories by several HSE scientists on how they got into science. We received a lot of responses, so we decided to continue the project. Today, another four HSE scholars, including one Nobel laureate, discuss their journeys into science.

HSE IAC: a Meeting in a New Context

On May 30th the third annual meeting of the Higher School of Economics International Advisory Committee (IAC) opened at the HSE.

Eric Maskin: ‘The Secret of a Successful Career Is Not a Secret’

On the September 19th Eric Maskin, Nobel laureate in economics, Professor at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton University (USA), Chief Research Fellow at the HSE International Laboratory of Decision Choice and Analysis, arrived in Moscow again. What is his programme for this visit to the HSE?

International Laboratories as Part of the Development Strategy

In late 2010 – early 2011 international research laboratories which are jointly headed by prominent international researchers and leading experts of the university started their work at the Higher School of Economics. Maria Yudkevich, HSE Vice Rector, told us about the specifics of the research and educational work of the HSE international laboratories.