- Research Assistant:Laboratory for Comparative Social Research
- Postgraduate Student:Faculty of Social Sciences / School of Political Science
- Evgeniya Mitrokhina has been at HSE since 2014.
Master's in Sociology
Higher School of Economics
Bachelor's in Political Science
Higher School of Economics
Continuing education / Professional retraining / Internships / Study abroad experience
“Bayesian Approach in Social Science.” LCSR Summer School, HSE, Moscow, 2018 (by Hannes Kröger)
“Survey Experiments.” Barcelona Summer School in Survey Methodology, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 2018 (by Thomas Leeper)
“Panel Data Analysis.” ECPR Summer School in Methods and Techniques, CEU, Budapest, 2017 (by David Pupovac)
“Latent Curve Models: a Structural Equation Perspective.” LCSR Summer School, HSE, Moscow, 2016 (by Kenneth Bollen)
“Russian Summer School on Institutional Analysis.” CInSt, HSE, Moscow, 2016, 2017
“Theory and Methods of Network Analysis.” ANR-Lab, HSE, Moscow, 2014 (Stanley Wasserman)
2nd year of study
Approved topic of thesis: Consolidation of Power in Authoritarian Regimes: a Model and Empirical Analysis
Academic Supervisor: Zakharov, Alexey
- 2017XVIII Апрельская Международная конференция по проблемам развития экономики и общества (Москва). Presentation: Executive Constraints and Economic Growth in Autocracies
- XI Всероссийская научная конференция памяти Юрия Левады "Современное российское общество и социология" (Моква). Presentation: Влияние субъективного экономического благосостояния на электоральное поведения россиян
- Article Mitrokhina E. Executive Constraints and Economic Growth in Autocracies // Вестник Пермского университета. Серия: Политология. 2018. No. 4 (in press)
- Article Ожегов Е. М., Митрохина Е. М. Влияние партийного состава парламента на социально-экономическую политику в регионе: эмпирический анализ // Вестник Пермского университета. Серия: Политология. 2016. № 2. С. 61-81.
“Executive Constraints and Economic Growth in Autocracies” (2015-2017). Supervised by Alexey Zakharov. Author and Member of the Project.
In the work I address the question of how the degree of power that a dictator has impact economic performance using within and moment-based estimators. Political regime impose boundaries on the leader, however, may be violated if the leader has enough power. Personalism denoting the degree of leaders’ personal power and his ability to influence decision-making process without constraints is important for policy outcomes. Focusing on the observable indicators of personalism I distinguish power concentration, executive constraints, and leader-elite interactions as the factors that reflect personalisation of power in a regime along with institutions that to a certain degree impose boundaries on the leader, however, may be violated if the leader has enough power. I find that higher personalisation of power has negative impact on economic performance. Countries where dictators stay longer in power and have opportunity to purge the elites in general perform worse economically. The work shows only the general tendency that countries where a leader has a lot of power perform worse compared to those where the leader cannot make decisions on his own without the probability of being removed if the decisions harm the elite’s interest. Leaders may have different incentives that explain their behaviour, but still more power in hands of one man, the greater is the probability for the country to be economically unsuccessful.