The article analyses representations of territories of Russian Empire in the funeral ceremonies of Alexander I. The emperor died at the end of 1825 in a small town far from the imperial capital where he was to be buried. The journey of the funeral cortege to St. Petersburg took several months. The cortege passed through several provinces of southern and central Russia and a number of large cities. A month after Alexander I was finally buried in St. Petersburg, Warsaw, the capital of the Kingdom of Poland as part of the Russian Empire since 1815, saw a special event - the symbolic funeral of the monarch.
Memorial events in provincial Russia, its capital, and in the recently acceded Kingdom of Poland, which still preserved its peculiar political character, was part of a single process. At the same time, similar events, such as funeral processions commemorating Alexander I had something special about them. Those on solemn processions carried banners with their provincial arms and the royal crowns of the Russian empire. They walked in a specific order which superimposed the political imagery of a territory onto the symbolism of local and imperial social hierarchy. By following the emperor’s coffin, the locals set up a narrative of themselves and their place in the empire.
I argues that numerous surviving accounts of these ceremonies allow us to see several interpretations of the hierarchy of Russian lands. It gives us as possibility to compare the standpoints of the central and regional authorities, and to see when and how much they were similar or different.
This article offers an original interpretation of the famous Russian serf Emancipation of 1861 as part of a broader imperial process affecting not just Russians alone but numerous categories of unfree people within the Russian Empire over the long 19th century. In addition, it links the history of serf reform within Russia with Russian antislavery politics in the international arena, arguing that all these registers -- the imperial and the national, the domestic and the foreign -- were intimately connected in the Russian emancipation enterprise, thus placing what is typically understood as a Russian national story into a much wider and more revealing intellectual and geographical framework.
On May 12, 1829, Emperor Nicholas I, by invoking Article 45 of the Constitution which had been granted to the Kingdom of Poland by Alexander I, was crowned King of Poland in Warsaw. This happened some three years after his coronation in the Assumption Cathedral of the Moscow Kremlin (August 22, 1826). The unique event in Warsaw, which marked the only coronation of a Russian emperor as King of Poland, has been obscured by the later tensions in Russo-Polish relations and almost erased from the official historical memory of the empire. At the same time, the coronation was Nicholas I' s fascinating attempt to find a compromise with Poland. It directly indicated that Poland is a political entity of its own and, thus, triggered the Polish uprising that happened half a year after.
The article considers the nature of the official interaction of the provincial gendarme staff-officers and the provincial administration during the reign of Emperor Nicholas I. The biography of Karl Flige (1785-1842), who consistently held the posts of the Kursk, Minsk and Chernigov provincial gendarme staff officer, and then served as the Kursk and Podolsk governors, is taken as an example.
Perceptions and representations of Soviet rule by the population is of fundamental importance to understanding public attitudes in the Era of Late Socialism. Popular perceptions of authorities are usually examined in the context of political protests, but this article deals with the main aspects of the meaning of everyday Soviet rule to the people of the Kirov region in 1964–1970. The CPSU sought to manage all spheres of everyday life. Therefore, the main idea which was accepted by Soviet people was that authorities had to resolve their everyday problems and to provide for all their social needs. A detailed examination of various aspects of popular perceptions of power is based on the analysis of letters to the regional newspaper “Kirovskaya Pravda” in 1964-1970. This article seeks to explore in detail the perceived – and claimed – “usefulness” or “uselessness” of the authorities in different social, cultural and economic contexts. It also includes a detailed discussion of the general impact of Khrushchev's departure on public discussions. In additional, this study reveals how the people of the Kirov region saw the management structure as hierarchical and identified each of its stages, metropolitan or local, with its utility in everyday life. The article is illustrated with case studies drawn from the citizens’ letters to the newspaper “Kirovskaya Pravda”.
The research paper aims to analyze a unique source - 38 school essays written in Kineshma, a provincial Russian town in 1964. The essays are entitled “Who is going to church now?”. I intend to address the question whether Soviet atheist propaganda was in fact efficient and to what extent patterns provided by anti-clerical rhetoric reached out for young Soviet people in the province. The paper is to present Soviet students' perception of the Orthodox believers as well as religiosity itself: the opposition of believers to socialist modernity and progress, the victimization of female and child religiosity, as well as the social stigmatization of believers.
This article aims to show the possibilities of the interpretation of the Thaw period anti-religious propaganda through the lens of the emotional narrative. The author offers to consider the use of the victimized image of religious children for evoking the reprobative public reaction. This atheistic campaign was carried out mostly by means of discreditation of the believers, contrasting them with the social norms and the image of the ideal Soviet citizen – the builder of communism. Images of children-martyrs are archetypical of the Russian culture; they were often used in the stories about Young Pioneers-heroes, as well as in visual propaganda during the Great Patriotic War. Due to the Soviet media, the religious upbringing was based on intimidation and horrification so the sense of fear affected a child’s personality. The key components of the image of religious children were reconstructed through the prism of narration and pictures in press, films, letters into the press media, ideological books and handbooks. Sociological surveys of soviet children and youth, letters of the Soviet people show that the stereotypes of fearful religious children were quite effective. Studying fear as a tabooed emotion helps us to understand the “emotional scope” of the Soviet propaganda in a more profound way, as well as to identify the mechanism of the formation of the “emotional component” of the “the Other” image. Geographically, the research covers Central Russia – the region which was given much attention by the media due to its historical legacy that appealed to the concept of the Holy Rus in the collective consciousness.
Both human and animal studies have demonstrated remarkable findings of experience-induced plasticity in the cortex. Here, we investigated whether the widely used monetary incentive delay (MID) task changes the neural processing of incentive cues that code expected monetary outcomes. We used a novel auditory version of the MID task, where participants responded to acoustic cues that coded expected monetary losses. To investigate task-induced brain plasticity, we presented incentive cues as deviants during passive oddball tasks before and after two sessions of the MID task. During the oddball task, we recorded the mismatch-related negativity (MMN) as an index of cortical plasticity. We found that two sessions of the MID task evoked a significant enhancement of MMN for incentive cues that predicted large monetary losses, specifically when monetary cue discrimination was essential for maximising monetary outcomes. The task-induced plasticity correlated with the learning-related neural activity recorded during the MID task. Thus, our results confirm that the auditory processing of (loss) incentive cues is dynamically modulated by previous monetary outcomes
This chapter deals with segmentation, definition of reference units and annotation of the first corpus of Russian narratives by individuals with brain damage – people with aphasia and right hemisphere damage – and neurologically healthy speakers. We show that such parameters as pause length and intonation contours cannot be used for segmentation of impaired speech. Instead, we use syntactic criteria for identification of the reference, or – as they are called in this paper – elementary discourse units (EDUs). The Russian CliPS (Clinical Pear Stories) corpus contains multi-layer annotation of audio- and video-recordings, performed on micro- and macro-linguistic level, and can be used as a source for qualitative and quantitative research on various aspects of speech in aphasia and right hemisphere damage.
Review on: Crimea in War and Transformation by Mara Kozelsky (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019. xiv, 280 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Illustrations. Photographs. Figures. Tables. Maps. $74.00, hard bound).
This article tests the hypothesis that Ukraine experienced a state breakdown in 2014. The methodology employed to test this statement is based on achievements of structural-demographic theory, created by Jack Goldstone and developed by Peter Turchin. The rea-sons for a fiscal crisis, intra-elite conflict and mass mobilization (the three criteria for a state breakdown) are discussed. It is demonstrated that budget management in Ukraine was ineffective, and, coupled with an unbalanced political system, led to the fiscal crisis. The intra-elite conflict was caused by Yanukovych’s politics and by lack of resources as a consequence of elite overproduction, which led to fewer opportunities among the traditional elites. To demonstrate the mass discontent that was the main factor for the protests and rallies, evidence is presented that the population of Ukraine experienced immiseration in 2010–13. The final factor determining the future of the Ukrainian system was the delegitimization of power. This could happen only under the conditions of intra-elite conflict. All of these factors arose because of the high degree of capital concentration in the hands of the economic elite. The article concludes that we have every reason to say that a state breakdown occurred in Ukraine.
The paper presents firsts results of the pilot fieldwork of the Russian language of one group of East Siberian old-settlers in the context of their ethnic and cultural history and their role in Russian expansion eastward, including to Alaska in 18th -19th centuries. From one perspective, regional features of the old-settlers’ Russian testify to the cultural and historical processes that had involved various groups of Russian-speaking population of the East Siberia. From another perspective, these linguistic materials are compared to the data on Russian language in Alaska, which, supposedly, will help to clarify the processes that shaped Russian linguistic and cultural heritage of the only overseas Russian region.