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Магистерская программа «Стратегическое управление финансами фирмы»

Corporate Governance

2021/2022
Учебный год
ENG
Обучение ведется на английском языке
3
Кредиты
Статус:
Курс по выбору
Когда читается:
1-й курс, 3 модуль

Преподаватель


Лазарева Ольга Владимировна

Course Syllabus

Abstract

Corporate governance is a relatively young and rapidly growing sub-field within the fields of economics and finance. It refers to the various aspects of governance of a modern corporation. Large variety of business organizational forms, complexity of their governance structures, conflicts of interests arising within these structures make it important to study the process of governance of a modern corporation as a separate phenomenon. Aim of the course is to familiarize students with the theory and practice of the modern corporate governance. During the course we will discuss the results of the latest and most important research in the area of the corporate governance. Students will learn about the current practices and recent reforms of corporate governance in Russia and around the world. Also students will see how the modern econometric methods are applied in empirical studies on corporate governance.
Learning Objectives

Learning Objectives

  • knowledge of theoretical background behind corporate governance research: agency theory, theory of the firm, corporate finance.
  • knowledge of the modern CG practices in developed economies and emerging markets: different models, structure and participants of CG process, the role and the level of development of corporate law
  • understanding of the problems of corporate governance specific to Russian economy: characteristics of Russian corporations, evolution of corporate ownership structure, the state of Russian corporate law, stock market and corporate investments, Russian model of corporate governance
  • understanding research papers on corporate governance and ability to do research in this area
Expected Learning Outcomes

Expected Learning Outcomes

  • Analyses the role of shreholders in corporate governance. Compares shareholder ownership structures in different countries.
  • Compares different models of corporate governance. Formulates specific features of the Russian model of corporate governance. Analyses convergence of corporate governance systems.
  • Discusses different types of stakeholders and their role in corporate governance. Analyses the origins of corporate social responsibility and applies economic analysis to undestanding the CSR activities of firms.
  • Formulates agency problem with respect to the CEO. Analyses the role of CEO in relation to the board of directors. Comapres different types of CEO remuneration.
  • Formulates definition of corporate governance. Analyses theoretical foundations of corproate governance.
  • Formulates the role of the board of directors in corporate governance. Analyses the structure of the board of directors, its functions and regulation.
  • Uses different measures of the quality of corporte governance at the firm level and at the country level. Analyses and compares corporate governance ratings of firms.
Course Contents

Course Contents

  • Introduction. Theoretical foundation of corporate governance
  • The role of shareholders
  • The role of the board of directors
  • The role of top-managers (CEO)
  • The role of stakeholders and corporate social responsibility
  • Measuring the quality of CG and CG ratings
  • Comparative CG and the Russian model of CG
Assessment Elements

Assessment Elements

  • non-blocking Group work in class
  • non-blocking Test 1
  • non-blocking Presentation
  • non-blocking Term paper
  • non-blocking Test 2
Interim Assessment

Interim Assessment

  • 2021/2022 3rd module
    0.2 * Presentation + 0.15 * Group work in class + 0.3 * Term paper + 0.25 * Test 2 + 0.1 * Test 1
Bibliography

Bibliography

Recommended Core Bibliography

  • Andrei Shleifer, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, & Rafael La Porta. (2008). The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins. Journal of Economic Literature, (2), 285. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.46.2.285
  • Bebchuk, L. A., & Weisbach, M. S. (2010). The State of Corporate Governance Research. Review of Financial Studies, 23(3), 939–961. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhp121
  • Bebchuk, L. A., Cohen, A., & Wang, C. C.-Y. (2013). Learning and the Disappearing Association Between Governance and Returns. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsbas&AN=edsbas.3402CF4E
  • Black, B., & Kim, W. (2012). The effect of board structure on firm value: A multiple identification strategies approach using Korean data. Journal of Financial Economics, (1), 203. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.a.eee.jfinec.v104y2012i1p203.226
  • Claessens, S., & Yurtoglu, B. B. (2013). Corporate governance in emerging markets: A survey. Emerging Markets Review, (C), 1. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.a.eee.ememar.v15y2013icp1.33
  • Evidence on the international evolution and convergence of corporate governance regulations. (2011). Journal of Corporate Finance, 17(5), 1531–1557. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsnar&AN=edsnar.oai.tilburguniversity.edu.publications.071dd33d.5b0b.4b76.8243.08e20a5261f4
  • Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. (2003). Corporate Governance and Equity Prices. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsbas&AN=edsbas.21F82495
  • Gugler, K., Ivanova, N., & Zechner, J. (2014). Ownership and control in Central and Eastern Europe. Journal of Corporate Finance, (C), 145. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.a.eee.corfin.v26y2014icp145.163
  • Iwasaki, I. (2008). The Determinants of Board Composition in a Transforming Economy: Evidence from Russia. RRC Working Paper Series. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.p.hit.rrcwps.9
  • Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, (4), 305. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.a.eee.jfinec.v3y1976i4p305.360
  • Kitzmueller, M., & Shimshack, J. (2012). Economic Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility. Journal of Economic Literature, 50(1), 51–84. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.50.1.51
  • Lucian A. Bebchuk, & Jesse M. Fried. (2005). Pay Without Performance: Overview of the Issues. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, (4), 8. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6622.2005.00056.x
  • Miriam Schwartz-ziv, & Michael S. Weisbach. (2013). What do Board Really do? Evidence from Minutes of Board Meetings. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsbas&AN=edsbas.B1F95F2A
  • Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, & Andrei Shleifer. (1999). Corporate Ownership Around the World. Journal of Finance, (2), 471. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.a.bla.jfinan.v54y1999i2p471.517
  • Reinhardt, F. L., Stavins, R. N., & Vietor, R. H. K. (2008). Corporate Social Responsibility Through an Economic Lens. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsbas&AN=edsbas.DBA5307A
  • Steven N. Kaplan, & Bernadette A. Minton. (2012). How Has CEO Turnover Changed? International Review of Finance, (1), 57. https://doi.org/10.1111/
  • Steven N. Kaplan. (2012). the source. Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance in the U.S.: Perceptions, Facts and Challenges. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsbas&AN=edsbas.CE1351F3
  • Tirole, J. (2001). Corporate Governance. Econometrica, (1), 1. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.a.ecm.emetrp.v69y2001i1p1.35

Recommended Additional Bibliography

  • Borghesi, R., Houston, J. F., & Naranjo, A. (2014). Corporate socially responsible investments: CEO altruism, reputation, and shareholder interests. Journal of Corporate Finance, (C), 164. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.a.eee.corfin.v26y2014icp164.181
  • CUÑAT, V., GINE, M., & GUADALUPE, M. (2012). The Vote Is Cast: The Effect of Corporate Governance on Shareholder Value. Journal of Finance (John Wiley & Sons, Inc.), 67(5), 1943–1977. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01776.x
  • Fauver, L., Hung, M., Li, X., & Taboada, A. G. (2017). Board reforms and firm value: Worldwide evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, (1), 120. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.a.eee.jfinec.v125y2017i1p120.142
  • Reena Aggarwal, & Miguel Ferreira. (2011). Does governance travel around the world? Evidence from institutional investors. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsbas&AN=edsbas.91864299