Ovsey Shkaratan

CIVILIZATION CONTEXT
OF THE MULTILINEAR DEVELOPMENT
OF EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

Препринт WP17/2010/01
Серия WP17
Научные доклады
Лаборатории сравнительного анализа развития постсоциалистических обществ
ГУ ВШЭ

Москва
2010
Mono- and multilinearity of development of the contemporary world

Monolinearity and multilinearity are basically two distinct conceptual approaches which determine how we analyze the process (or processes) of social development and evaluate its outcomes in different societies. Monolinearity regards development as a singular process, which proceeds without alternatives (e.g. from traditional societies to feudalism, industrialism and, finally, postindustrialism). The corresponding idea of a universal historical process for the humanity has gained a lot of popularity among social scientists across the world, although it is in no doubt a rather eurocentric approach. Marxist as well as liberalist denial of multilinear development for certain societies has been vastly influenced by Hegel’s scheme of stage-to-stage development which leads humanity to some certain form of ideal.

The key concept which constitutes Marx’s theory of historical development is a logical process of changing formations which lie in the foundation of certain historic organisms. This universalist concept has been somewhat adapted by a neomarxist I. Wallerstein for his world-system analysis. Although after introducing himself closely to the Russian case (including some other Asian societies) Marx nevertheless has questioned the universality of his scheme by introducing the so called Asian mode of production (primitive communism – slave society – feudalism – capitalism – socialism – communism).

Liberalist approach, although from a slightly different point of view, also denies any options of development other than singular: from traditional forms of economy onto industrial capitalism and its ultimate successor – postindustrialism. Take, for example, Fukuyama’s evolutionary scheme, in which he claims the modern liberal democracy to be the ultimate form of social organization for the humanity (Fukuyama, 1992). These views (of monolinear development) have become the conceptual basis to the so-called modernization theory (as of W. Rostow or T. Parsons). After all, liberal unitarism regards world as a hierarchic system, where some countries are always «ahead» of the others, although it has already become obvious that most of «the others» will never catch up with the core countries. We argue that both,
Marxist and liberal unitarisms with their optionless evolutionary approaches to certain sociohistoric organisms ignore the interconnection of common and particular in the human history and thus become a subject to discussion.

Along with unitarian approach, according to which the development processes within particular sociohistoric organisms follow a single logic in human history, there also exists a pluralist multilinear approach. It implies that humanity is represented by a set of relatively autonomous historic entities, each of which has a certain life cycle with its own stages of birth, development and decease. The fading historical organisms or civilizations are eventually substituted with new organisms or civilizations with unique development cycles.

The concept of monolinearity has been already criticized as far back as in the late XIX century by a Russian historian N. Danilevsky, whose notion of civilization concurrency («ryadopolozhennost’ tsivilizatsiy») (Danilevsky, 2003) suggests that along with some universal essentials civilizations may have rather distinct goals of development and their own criteria of civilization’s successful reproduction. Danilevsky is also the author of the idea that among the factors, which stipulate multilinearity of historical process and the variety of options of social development, a special role belongs to the type of civilization. He also produced his own theory of cultural-historical types: «…civilization is a notion far more extensive than science, art, religion, political, economic or social development taken alone. Civilization includes it all. I am saying that even religion itself is a notion inferior to that of civilization» (Danilevsky, 2003: p. 129).

He reckoned that such analysis of history-dependent types of civilization can help explain many phenomena in the past, the present and the future of different peoples, especially since he had learned about the particularities of Russian culture and history. Although he never criticized the Romano-Germanic culture, Danilevsky completely denied its universality and perceived his native Russian civilization as its equal but essentially different counterpart (Danilevsky, 2003).

But Danilevsky was not alone. Along with him, as well as apart, Chinese intellectuals have also been developing similar views. The search for nation-specific model of development in the late XIX century has pushed many Chinese social scientists and politicians to work out specific ways of adopting Western management and technology without destroying the nucleus of their national culture. It has been significantly later that Maoism embo-

died some features of modernizing civilizations and encouraged the discussion of national development concepts (Vinogradov, 2008).

In XX century the popularity has come to such advocates of historical pluralism as O. Spengler (The Decline of the West, 1922), A.J. Toynbee (A Study of History, 1956), L. Gumilyov (1993), S. Huntington (1992) and others.

Although what we must consider is that institutional structure and value systems, which regulate development processes within certain social organisms, may not, and usually are not universal in nature. Thus it makes sense, that different civilizations and, consequently, national states, which fall under these civilizations, are very likely to develop along different vectors (Shkaratan 2004, 2009). By accepting the possibility of concurrent development for countries, which belong to different civilizations, one does not have to deny the universality of technologies of existence in the very broad sense of its meaning.

Gzh. Kolodko, a well-known Polish economist, noted that if we consider history as a process of economic development and stagnation, «it teaches us one thing: all is determined through culture. This has been established by M. Weber’s..., and the history of the previous century proves it». I.e. «we think and act under the influence of inherited religious, race, national and mental particularities» (as cited in Russian from, exact reference see below). Although the conclusion from Kolodko’s statement is not as pessimistic as it may seem. Along with the recognition of the path dependency theory he believes that much is as well determined through the active position of individuals and societies: «The problem lies in the interaction of culture, institutions and politics... it is on the common ground of these 3 aspects where the battle for the future takes place. Undoubtedly the Protestant culture of Benelux or the Nordic character of Scandinavians facilitate the development a lot better than the current Islamic culture of Arabia and Sahel as it has been for several hundred years. But in the case of Islamic culture it is also possible to achieve such combination of institutions and politics, which can stipulate effective economic growth» (Kolodko, 2009: pp. 403–404, 410–411).

The institutional theory has also produced a hypothesis, according to which there exist different institutional matrices that can be regarded as latent mechanisms of functioning and reproduction of sociohistoric organisms. The matrix acts as a stable and historically dependent set of interacting institutions that are specific for particular civilizations. By applying
this logics in comparative analysis of Eastern and Western macrocivilizations some Russian economists argue that in historical perspective Eastern matrix persistently features non-market mechanisms of distribution, centralized state and the priority of collective values over individual ones (Kir-dina, 2000: pp. 24–29; Nureev, 2001).

The existing variety of development paths can generally be reduced to the differences that arise between two dominating types of civilization, which contingently can be referred to as European and Asiatic. The first one emerged from ancient polises and, basically, represents the chain of societ-ies with private property, the balance between civil society and civil institutions, advanced personality and the priority of individual values. The latter type — Asiatic one — is historically connected to Asian despotisms, the domination of state property, all-powerful government institutional structures, the lack of civil society and so forth. It is peculiar that in the course of human history this type of civilization has been dominating geographi-cally as well as historically. And it also explains why in the XXth century etacratism (in other terms, etatism or statism) has developed in the coun-tries, which fall under the Asiatic civilization area.

We rely on the explanatory concept of basic institutional structures, which distinguish Eastern civilizations from Western ones — the so called relations of power-property. This concept has been developed by an out-standing Russian orientalist L. Vasiliev in his works from 1960s–1990s (Vasiliev, 1982, 1994). He argues, that it refers to the social and economic organiza-tion, under which typical eastern community determines the macrostructure of the state. The basic principle of such communities is a complete absorp-tion of individuality by collectivity. A separate individual cannot become an owner of something — he can only possess. The essence of power-property relations is reduced to the principle where state is the sole owner of everything and may only sanction possession for private purposes (Vasiliev, 1994: p. 486). The state is an absolute authority, i.e. a despotism where all citizens are servants of the state.

A detailed study of power-property relations can be found in the pub-lications of R. Nureev, who holds the authorship of profound institutional analysis of this phenomenon. In his opinion, «...power-property emerges, when official duties ... become subject to monopolization, when power and supremacy originate not only from possession of property as a such, but a higher rank in traditional hierarchy» (as cited in Russian from Nu-reev and Runov, 2002: p. 12).

In spite of changing dynasties and even complete sociohistoric orga-nisms this system has been self-reproducing over millennia. Across the vast spaces of the planet it has regulated the lives of the greater part of humanity (as this type of societal system in changing its phenomenological features cannot by itself or through external influence reorganize the structure of its social organisms).

Yet it should be underlined that there is no such necessity as to draw the dividing line between monolinear and multilinear approaches. We cannot as well ignore the experience of the previous centuries, which has been in-stitutionalized in verifiable sources. This experience provides evidence of completely different options of social development not only for the orga-nisms that have literally become history, but for those which survived until today. Some of them progressed from savagery feudalism and then onto capitalism; some have initially turned to the Asian mode of production and have only recently developed the advanced forms of capitalism (postindustri-alism); the others got ‘stuck’ in a non-market phase of development and adapted it to the circumstances of contemporary global system. Yet we are only able to speculate within a definite historical horizon, that is measured by the life of a few nearest generations.

It has to be noted that along with distinguishing two dominating approach- es of mono- and multilinear there have also been attempts to create a pec-u liar mix of linear-stage interpretation of history and the concept of multi-linear evolution. According to such understanding of historical development some socioeconomic systems may be presented in particular sociohistoric or-ganisms, while others fit into the entirely different sociohistoric organisms. This implies the possibility of «historical relay» between various systems of sociohistoric organisms. The author of this global stage-to-stage understand-ing of historical process J. Semyonov suggests that his approach organically combines «the ideas of human unity and its onward development with the facts which point to the division of humanity into self-standing entities, which at various times emerge, flourish and decay» (as cited in Russian from Semyo-nov, 2003: pp. 233–234).

Starting from the end of 1990s the Western literature brings an increas-ingly bigger number of publications, which support theories of non-European modernity and variability of development and attempt to separate modernization concept from westernization. These ideas have gained a lot of support in developing countries, where authors draw attention to the lack of explanatory power of existing social theories, which are incompatible with non-Western forms of contemporary society.
Similar views were defended by a British sociologist N. Mouzelis. He argues, that modernization theory developed by T. Parsons, A. Giddens and many others is a europocentric theory. All of them, according to criticisms, suggest that we regard the non-Western trajectories of development as an imitation of a particular Western development model. At this point they stress that capitalism is a determinant concept for modernity. Yet Mouzelis notes that Western modernization, although it was the first case of rapid social and economic development in the course of human history, is no longer the only one possible today. Moreover, its domination is a temporary phenomenon as there are no guarantees it will be capable of sustaining itself in the next century (these words were written in 1999). In his analysis of modernization processes in Japan and some other Asian countries Mouzelis outlines some of their differences in respect to the Anglo-American model; in particular, their orientation on long-term economic growth instead of profit-maximization, which has been achieved through consequent government support of some vital industries. He also believes that in the nearest future the semi-authoritarian Asian capitalism will prove its advantages over its rival — liberal Anglo-Saxon regime (Mouzelis, 1999: p. 153).

The prevailing viewpoint among the advocates of multiple forms of modernization and modernity can be expressed by the following citation from Swedish sociologist B. Wittrok: «To scholars, close to this or to analogous positions, it is natural to speak about a multiplicity of modernities. True enough, a set of technological, economic, and political institutions, with their origins in the context of Western Europe, have become diffused across the globe at least as ideals, sometimes also as working realities. These processes of diffusion and adaptation, however, do not at all mean that deep-seated cultural and cosmological differences between, say, Western Europe, China, and Japan are about to disappear. It only means that these different cultural entities have to adapt to and refer to a set of globally diffused ideas and practices. In their core identities, these societies remain characterized by the form they acquired during much earlier periods of cultural crystallization, whether these periods are located in the axial age or in the tenth to thirteenth centuries. These core identities have, of course, always in themselves been undergoing processes of change and reinterpretation, but they have continued to structure the most profound cosmological and societal assumptions of their civilizations, and it would be exceedingly naive to believe that they are now suddenly about to disappear».

In continuing his thought B. Wittrok outlines: «Modernity in this sense is not so much a new unified civilization, global in its extensiveness, unparalleled in its intrusiveness and destructiveness. Rather, modernity is a set of promissory notes, i.e., a set of hopes and expectations that entail some minimal conditions of adequacy that may be demanded of macro societal institutions no matter how much these institutions may differ in other respects. In both cultural and institutional terms, modernity, from the very inception of its basic ideas in Europe, has been characterized by a high degree of variability in institutional forms and conceptual constructions. It has provided reference points that have become globally relevant and that have served as structuring principles behind institutional projects on a world wide scale. Thus, we may look upon modernity as an age when certain structuring principles have come to define a common global condition. The existence of this common global condition does not mean that members of any single cultural community are about to relinquish their ontological and cosmological assumptions, much less their traditional institutions» (Wittrok, 2000: pp. 54–56).

In the second half of the XXth century two distinct models of economic development have come into prominence — American and Japanese. These models correspondingly rely on alternative systems of values. In the first case it is mostly individual effort, while in the latter — collective effort. The world significance of the Japanese case is related to the fact that Japan’s successful transformation owes to the use of traditional values as a source of modern institutions rather than a constraint. It is also quite obvious that Chinese economic miracle owes to a reasonable reliance on traditional values of its ancient civilization, which is principally different from that of the USA or Europe. It is not an individualist, but collectivist civilization just as Japan is. Similar development path can now be observed in such new industrialist countries as South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Malaysia which made a huge leap from agrarian to developed industrial economies in a matter of two-three generations. This group of countries also has one particular feature in common — none of them has ever had a lengthy period of real democracy. It is only in the most economically advanced cases where such democracy becomes possible. Yet almost nowhere among these countries the forms of social organization which are organic to developed Western societies have ever been directly applied. In all of them as well as in Japan the decisive factor of modernization was the active state intervention in the course of economic trans-
formation, including state enforcement of protectionist fiscal and customs policy.

A conclusion follows from the examples mentioned above: there are various types of economy in the modern world as well as different types of social and political organization, and the transformation outcomes across the world depend greatly on civilization factor.

Precisely in the context of successful economic development of East–Asian countries, India, and a number of South American states (Brazil among them), it became clear that the non-Western countries could learn to adapt and develop the achievements of the Western world (the so-called «core» of the world-system, or, in other words, «the golden billion») in production and trade without having to sacrifice their basic values and traditional culture. This has indeed a serious impact on the globalization: it becomes more possible to avoid the ‘trap’ of its hierarchic monocentric process which has been inspired by transnational corporations. These corporations, on the other hand, serve the interests of elites from the «core» countries of the world-system, which have been transferring the power and wealth from East to West and thus shaping the economic development of nations during the last five centuries. The changes in the world organization are connected directly to the interaction between civilizations and their own restructuring.

As a response to the growing tension between civilizations (the so-called «clash of civilizations») the West itself has started to consolidate which has been materialized in the form of a corresponding military organization (NATO), and political and economic unification (e.g. European Union). It is quite characteristic that in the beginning of 1990s the Trilateral Commission (the international organization which coordinated efforts from USA, Western Europe and Japan) accepted the model of European development according to which it has been nominally divided into Roman and Byzantine parts. The first part included countries, which were once a part of a single civilization with common history, religion and culture, and its borders were set by the eastern boundaries of Poland (Ponomaryova, 2009: pp. 119–120).

According to multilinear approach in the modern world there coexist several main civilizations with distinct institutional, axiological and behavioral characteristics. These civilizations are connected with dominating religious systems. As applied to Central European, Southern European and Eurasian areas (post-communist countries, which are in the process of transformation) — these religious systems are Catholicism, Protestantism, Orthodoxy, Islam. The social, economic and political situation in the corresponding countries is essentially different in a number of aspects. Moreover it explains the variation of development paths and the outcomes of liberal reforms in many post-socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Consequently we argue that these civilization particularities must be closely studied.

Civilization systems and models of economic development in post-socialist countries

Since the very beginning of Perestroika in the mid 1980s the advocates of liberalism were convinced that civilization characteristics do not play a significant role in determining the outcomes of their economic strategy. At the same time the fewer supporters of civilization distinctness opposed the reforms and were mostly unnoticed among those, who insisted on the revival of the planned economy. The actual policy of economic transformation in Russia relied on purely universalist prescriptions. The non-market institutional factors of economic growth were completely ignored. It was claimed that the archetypes of the nation, the national culture, its religious tradition, etc. are of no significance for the economic progress of the country. The successful cases of the USA, Germany, Japan, China, Korea and others were usually presented as a proof of this thesis. Yet the true factors of economic success went unnoticed. While the USA relied on individualism and individual effort, China and Japan have made a full use of their collectivist values, solidarity and national consensus to encourage accelerated industrialization. Endless arguments on economic policy in post-socialist countries focused mostly on discussion of successes and failures of liberal reforms, while obvious contrasts in development outcomes between West- and East-Christian countries have been ignored.

The system of quasi-socialist countries had its own core, semi-periphery and periphery. The core is the predominance of ‘pure forms’ of etacratism (or statism). The periphery is a combination of weakening characteristics of etacratism, which was enforced by the armed forces of the etacratic USSR, and economic institutions, values and social norms peculiar to the West. We argue, that the core consists primarily of the former Soviet republics.
(excluding Ukraine and Baltic states); semi-periphery includes Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, Ukraine, etc.; and, at last, in the periphery lie Poland, Hungary, Czech republic, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and some other countries.

It is quite peculiar, that the geographic area of socialism overlaps with the region of second serfdom in the Western part of Soviet domain (Prussia, Poland, Hungary etc.) and its Southern and Eastern regions, where state (Asian) mode of production had a rather long tradition. The latter have never had private property as a working institution in centuries. These societies were literally classless with no civil rights or rule of law. In other words, these societies (Russia, Transcaucasia, Middle Asia) cannot be analyzed or explained in the terms, which are used for describing the structure and genesis of Western and East-European societies (despite all their dissimilarities).

Etacratism in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (first area) was enforced from the USSR. The ones that resisted most were the countries which already had the most experience of market economy, some forms of civil society and the rule of law in the course of their history. During the 45 years of Soviet domination these countries have always been the most unreliable periphery of the «true socialism». All of them belonged to Catholic and Protestant Christian cultures. At the same time, etacratism voluntarily and rather autonomously developed in countries, which have never known capitalist relations and had a different history — China, Vietnam and Mongolia.

The contemporary societal system, which formed in CEE countries, was a result of a single anti-communist revolution of 1989–1991, which according to V. Ilin had a system nature. These revolutions were encouraged by the idea of catch-up modernization. In CEE and Baltia the original goal of transformation, which included higher standards of mass consumption, social state and technological modernization was rather quickly reduced to two basics which represent the idea of progress — market economy and competitive democracy (political pluralism along with democratic freedom) (Ilin, 2006: pp. 262–266).

Economic reforms in Baltic and CEE countries went under the «Back to Europe» motto. These countries’ elites as well as the most part of the population, especially intelligentsia, were convinced, that liberal reforms will bring them what they strived for. After a relatively short period of time the positive results of those reforms — effective market economy and working liberal democracy — became clear in such countries as Czech Republic, Slovenia, Poland, Hungary and Slovakia. All these countries can be characterized as the carriers of European cultural tradition, western Christianity, private property and a particular experience of civil relations and rule of law.

The development in Russia, as well as some other countries of the former USSR, went in a different manner despite similar prescriptions. The achievements of market economy and liberal democracy were far more modest than in the CEE neighborhood. I hold the following conceptual viewpoint on Russia’s development. The contemporary Russian society, as well as Soviet, belongs to a particular civilization (Eurasian), which is essentially different from European (Atlantic) in relation to its institutional structure and system of values. Thus, in the social space of Europe there actually exist at least two substantially distinct «Europes».

The historical roots of the contemporary Russian order go back to its ancient history. Russia has always been a part of the Orthodox Eurasian civilization which has never had stable institutions of private property, free market, civil society and the rule of law (Berdyaev, 1990; Pivovarov and Fursov, 1999; Pivovarov and Fursov, 2001; Pimenov, 1999). It is quite obvious, that in this particular socioeconomic order social inequality, the structure of inter-group relations and stratification as a whole would also be of particular nature. For hundreds of years, in spite of the interaction with other systems, in this highly persistent etocratic order there reproduced the same estate hierarchy, although sometimes in a transformed form. This hierarchy was very clearly described by a well-known Russian historian V. Klyuchevskiy (Klyuchevskiy, 1918). In an estate system groups differ in their legal rights, which, in turn, are strictly connected with their (group) duties. These duties have a legal status and involve particular commitments to the state, which is how it enforces social differentiation. Thus estate differentiation is mostly juridical in its nature, unlike ethnic, religious or economic differentiation. Estate belonging is usually inherited by members of the group, although it is not strictly determined, which accounts for the relative openness of this system.

It has to be noted, that most attempts to associate medieval Russia with feudal states were enforced by the ideologists of communist regime. Although in the tradition of the national historical school, which is also represented by such names as S. Soloviev, P. Milyukov, G. Vernadskiy, it was quite common to underline the specifics of social and cultural area of Rus-
Sia as compared with Western European countries. Its feudal nature was denied. This type of social relations preserved until 1917 and with slight changes was re-established in the USSR. The agrarian revolution of the beginning of the XX century has brought everything to where it was: a state of duty, nationalized land and total diffusion of private rights (Chernikova, 2005; Medushevskiy, 2007: p. 75). This has lead to the reconstruction of the quasi-estate system, the subjugation of estates by the state itself and the forming of a new ruling estate («nomenklatura»).

The etacratic societal system (i.e. Soviet quasi-socialist system) has been shaped as far back as in the 1917 (the October Revolution) and became an organic extension to the Eurasian civilization. Since then it has become a concurrent branch to the capitalist economic system with its own principles of functioning and development. This system is oriented towards «power-maximizing, that is, toward increasing the military and ideological capacity of the political apparatus for imposing its goals on a greater number of subjects and at deeper levels of their consciousness». Herewith the control under the economic surplus is external because it belongs to the power holders of the government (Castells, 1997: p. 16).

In the post-communist period, while this order has been completely or partly rejected in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, etacratism has been preserved in Russia and it later re-emerged in the form of what I call a neo-etacratism. After the collapse of the USSR Russia has actually failed to establish a competitive private-property economy, democracy and civil society. Two distinct types of socioeconomic relations coexist in Russia today, and together they form up a quite new phenomenon in the history of our country: along with the dominant role of etacratic relations there exist some elements of private-property economy with intention towards formation of free market relations. The Russian principle of «privacy» is only enforced when it comes to appropriation and acquisition which are not limited by production purposes. Through appropriation the new owners of property in Russia have acquired the resources, which have in fact been created with the effort of the preceding generations. And it is not at all surprising that the state can easily re-appropriate any private assets, as this property is and has always been nobody’s property (the Soviet principle). The true control over the major part of national wealth is concentrated in the hands of government officials and managers and, only partly, in the hands of private corporations (Shkaratan, 2009).

A significant addition to the arguments expressed above is an institutional theory of economic development of Russia proposed by a Russian economist and sociologist O. Bessonova. As a central component of her concept she assumes that along with market economies there have always existed redistributive economies with their own laws of functioning. In her arguments she strongly relies on the ideas of a well-known institutionalist K. Polanyi (in particular, his concept of redistribution) and some native authors on Asian mode of production. Russian economy has always been redistributive starting from IX century until XX, and its economic evolution should be regarded in terms of evolution of redistributive institutions. As a result of all the events in the post-Soviet years there has formed and institutional foundation of «liberal redistribution», that is such system of economic relations where the institutional nucleus of redistributive economy would inevitably be reproduced in the form of some sort of liberal economy. These forms also include contractual management model, budget regulation and some autonomy for economic actors of market exchange and individual proprietorship (Bessonova, 2006).

Pretty much the same confidence is expressed in the argument of Russian political scientist V. Pastukhov, who claims that Russian communism can be viewed as an anomaly only in the Western culture, although it is a historically logical phase of development for Russia. The collapse of communist system designated a new phase of evolution of a specific Eurasian civilization. «...Russia is following its own historical path, while the West is on its own, no matter how similar their shifts may sometimes look... An adequate interpretation of Russian history is most likely possible in terms of parallel, rather than catch-up development» (as cited in Russian from Pastukhov, 2006: pp. 7–8).

Following the same path of civilization analysis another Russian sociologist S. Kordonskiy, in turn, contradicts the dominating tradition and argues in favor of estate structure of contemporary Russian society in a series of publications from 2008. He has shown how estates, instead of classes, have always been and continue to be the principal elements of Russia’s social structure. Although these estates were different at various times (Tsar Russia, USSR and contemporary Russia), the essence of relations between the elements of its social structure has never changed. «Russian transformation» may be regarded as a process of changing principles of estate organization (Kordonskiy, 2008).
Among the Western intellectuals it has become more common to identify Russia not just as «non-European» (these ideas have actually been quite spread in the Western science in earlier centuries up to XIX), but as «non-Asian» as well. That is, Russia is regarded as a self-standing civilization/culture which emerged on the edge of Europe, yet preserved its own identity (Marshall, 2003).

It may as well be noted that the rather reliable data from large-scale studies of human values, which have been analyzed in the works of J. and N. Latov (including their own surveys), provide evidence that the earlier assumptions about Russian mentality as either Western-like (as was suggested by V. Yadov’s group) or Eastern-like (as in the original works of G. Hofstede and D. Bollinger) are not quite correct. «The truth lies literally in the middle: Russian mentality is an intermediate of Western and Eastern. According to the recent data Russia is slightly closer to the West and it is thus more of a Eurasia rather then “Asiope”... we’re an anomaly either by Western or Eastern measurements» (as cited in Russian from Latov and Latova, 2007: p. 54; Latov and Latova, 2001).

It is also quite characteristic that B. Russel (he was, probably, the first one), M. Djilas and many others paid attention to the similarity of the substantial features of so called Soviet socialism and what was referred to by Marx as Asian mode of production (in contemporary terminology it is more often referred to as state mode of production) (Vasiliev, 1982; Vasiliev, 1994: pp. 13–48; Nureev, 2009; Nureev and Runov, 2002).

In his famous book «Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power» K.A. Wittfogel studied the XXth century totalitarianisms and has revealed among them many common patterns, which were characteristic to the «Asiatic mode of production». He has as well clearly stated the objective of his research — to defend the liberal and democratic values. «My belief in those values», he wrote in the introduction to his book, «has brought me in 1933 in one of the Nazi’s camps. Since then I have often thought of my comrades, with whom I have survived through the horror of totalitarian terror... They asked me, if I was to be released, to tell all the good people of all the cruelty of totalitarian regimes in any of its forms and masks» (Wittfogel, 1962; cited in Russian from Pimenov, 1999: p. 74–75). The similarity is truly discouraging. In many respects it has been reproduced in contemporary Russia.

As follows from numerous contributions to the social science in the past few years, there is emerging a new intellectual tradition to consider multiple options of social and economic development. It is argued that the theory of Eurasianism (N. Savitsky, N. Trubetskoy, L. Gumilev, etc.) can become an important system element of the analysis of the development processes in contemporary Russia and it Eastern neighbors. The supporters of this theory suggest that Russia belongs not only to Europe, but to Eurasia as well. This geographic factor explains the ethnic structure of the country’s population, which along with Slavs includes many Turkic and other non-European ethnoses. Yet, unfortunately, this reality has always been and is still disregarded by Russia’s ruling classes (Russkiy uzel..., 1997; Gumilev, 1993 etc.).

The cultural workers of the West usually perceive Russia as a country of a different, non-western order. Many observers have come to a conclusion that Russia is some sort of a Eurasian hybrid without any features typical for either part of the world. Oswald Spengler claimed that Russia resembles a centaur with a European head and Asiatic body. With the victory of bolshevism Asia has conquered Russia, after it had been annexed by Peter the Great (Spengler, 1993: p.110). According to other outstanding English historian of the XX century Arnold Toynbee Russia is a part of an all-world non-Western majority. Russians have never belonged to Western Christianity. Eastern and Western Christianities have always been alien to each other, antipathic and even hostile, which is, unfortunately, what we observe in relations between Russia and the West today, although both sides are already in what may be regarded as a post-Christian stage of their history (Toynbee, 1995: p.156). Toynbee wrote that for almost a thousand years Russians were a part of a Byzantine civilization — a sisterly society of the same Greek-Roman origins, yet a different civilization (Toynbee, 1995: p.156). In resuming discussions about Russian civilization S. Huntington wrote that some researchers distinguish a particular Orthodox civilization with Russia at its core, which is different from the Western Christian world due to its Byzantine origins, 200 years of the Tatar Rule, bureaucratic despotism and a limited influence of the Renaissance, Reformation, Enlightenment and other significant events which took place in the West (Huntington, 2003: p. 56).

The dominating position among Russian social researchers and ruling elites has always implied that the country belongs to a European community. Usually the authors underline that Russia is a country of European culture and is very much oriented toward European institutions. This point of view is typical for those who shape the domestic and foreign policy in
Russia. Europeism is still the leading ideological orientation in the country (Smirnov, 2008).

It has to be noted that our own compatriots, although uncertain in their attitudes towards the Western way of life, have been quite determined in their orientation towards traditions and particularities of Russia, and relied on its deeply researched national historical experience rather than following somebody else’s prescriptions. According to the survey data, which has been collected by the Public Opinion Fund, in 2005 only 5% of respondents suggested that the cultures and values of Europeans and Russians have much in common. 21% suggested that there are minor differences and 63% were quite sure that there is a significant difference. This result hasn’t changed since the earlier surveys of VCIOM in 2000. In answering the question «To what extent do you think the Western type of social organization may be suitable for Russia?» only 4% regarded it as a universal solution, while 67% of respondents were quite sure or almost sure that it has little perspectives (Dubin, 2003: pp. 137–153).

Yet in making economic and social policies of the 1990s and the first decade of 2000s the ruling classes in Russia relied purely on Western models and prescriptions. Although it cannot be ignored that among the most conservative representatives of this class it has recently become popular to appeal to the origins of «the synodic Russia» and the well-known formula of the Russian count S. Uvarov «Orthodoxy. Autocracy. Nationality».

Russia’s south-eastern neighbor, Kazakhstan, was able to achieve the national solidarity of its social and ethnic parts through the implementation of a particular state ideology and policy that relied on its Eurasian identity. And it is quite symbolic that the newly created university, which has been established in Kazakhstan’s capital and marked the new era in its development, has been named after the outstanding Russian historian L. Gumilev, who, as mentioned earlier, for many years studied Eurasian civilization. In analyzing the consequences of Kazakhstan’s belonging to this particular civilization its researchers point that in its national culture the values of obedience and collectivism are clearly prevailing. The socialization of personality is still based on the mechanism of subordination to paternalist and estatist origins of traditional culture. Personal behavior is to a certain extent affected by this culture, which supports such subsystems as «zhuz», family, clan and locality. The population distrusts the law as an effective means of enforcing personal rights and interests, yet it can distinguish between the interests of the state and the interests of society. Estatism as a part of national culture is rooted in people’s expectations of support from a strong state. Yet apart from such collectivity personality is gradually taking shape and recognizing its own interest.

Surveys provide clear evidence that Kazakhstan’s population rejects the Western liberal path of development as a national idea. It is insulted by the mere possibility of becoming a periphery to the West. According to analysts the Kazakhs are experiencing a «syndrome of native countries» leaning them towards the Islamic East. As follows from representative survey data the majority (67.8%) would rather accept a cultural mix with traditional and Western elements. Yet the Western experience in creating socially oriented market economies and its technological achievement is regarded as positive and useful to the same extent as preserving and development of traditional Eastern values which are organic to Kazakh mentality (Abdikerova, 2009: pp. 42–47).

A conclusion follows: «Eurasianism does not only suggest the mere attempt to synthesize ethnic and geopolitical realities of Europe and Asia, but shapes the new viewpoint, the new world representation which is based on Western and Eastern values as well. The geopolitical situation of Kazakhstan, between Europe and Asia, causes the interlacing of such Western-like personal qualities as activity, dynamism, individualism, entrepreneurship, pragmatism and such East-specific characteristics as respect to the authorities and the elderly, hospitality, passiveness, conformism, etc.» (Abdikerova, 2009: p. 45). Precisely in relying on the perception of the world according to Eurasian mentality and using the advantages of the authoritarian system, which tends to gradually implement market and democratic reforms, the Kazakh authorities led by the president N. Nazarbaev have achieved such outstandingly successful results in development of their national sovereign state.

As for the countries, which we refer to as the «periphery» of the «real socialism», in spite of all the uncertainty their situation most likely owes to a gradual integration (return?) to the European civilization and economic domain. To support this I will refer to some interesting ideas expressed by renowned Ukrainian sociologists E. Golovakha and N. Panina. In analyzing the nature of the post-Soviet anomy they distinguish essential differences between Ukraine and Russia. Yet this chaos, they follow, can be overcome alternatively: «The mild Athenian experience of shaping democratic norms in social life and the “iron order” of Sparta are still relevant for the states, which face the anomy problem caused by destruction.
in the system of norms and values. This experience is of primary importance to some post-Soviet societies, which had initially declared a democratic way of coping with anomalies but have had to swap for Spartan methods in order to deal with numerous social problems during their transition» (as cited in Russian from Golovakha, Panina, 2008: p. 5).

Based on this historical note the authors continue with direct comparisons between Russia and Ukraine. Russia has a specific situation in Eurasian physical, political and spiritual space, it is an intermediate of Europe and Asia. «This explains the Eurasian ideology which is quite organic for the spirit of traditionalism... Recently it has been the primary source of strengthening Russia’s sovereignty and the establishment of a new social order». The authors also mark Russia’s tradition for autocracy. Ukraine, on the other hand, occupies the specific situation between «Europe» and «Eurasia», and this explains why in coping with anomalies it relies mostly on European values. They also highlight the typical Ukrainian phenomenon of strong opposition to most kinds of authority.

The factors outlined above determine why Russia and Ukraine have went along different paths of dealing with the post-Soviet anomy. Russia has chosen reasonable autocracy and super-state Eurasian-oriented ideology along with reestablishment of «the Great Russia». The Ukrainian way, on the other hand, was oriented towards acquiring new sovereignty with rather contradictory elements: «ideology of Europeism and the readiness to oppose any autocracy and traditionalism, isolationism and belief for the sacred role of the new charismatic leader of political opposition» (Golovakha and Panina, 2008: p. 10).

To strengthen my point I also refer to some interesting observations from professor S. White (Glasgow University). According to the materials from representative surveys of 2005–2006, which he had organized for his study Russians are significantly better supporters their particular development path compared to Belorussians or Ukrainians (59% against 49% and 49% correspondingly). On the other hand, only 25% of Russians support orientation towards Europe compared to 31% in Ukraine and 40% in Belarus. While the majority of Russian population regrets over the collapse of the Soviet Union, the same is true for the people of Belarus and Ukraine in less than half of the cases and, besides, they are less likely to support the idea of the joint state on the territory of the CIS (White, 2007: pp. 40–46).

How can this affect the development of sociology as a science? There is an obvious conclusion: if the civilization variety of humanity leads to radical differences in the economic, social and value-institutional development of nations, if there are no more doubts about the non-synonymy of westernization and modernization, it becomes inevitable that there emerge national and regional sociologies with essentially different theoretic foundations. And in this respect the debate on public sociology, which has recently taken place in the Current Sociology journal (Vol. 56, No. 56(2008)), is a very good example of how challenging these matters have become in past few years. The initiative if this debate belongs to a renown American sociologist M. Burawoy and it has involved such authors as A. Martinelli, M. Wieviorka, A. Habib, etc. (Burawoy, 2008a; Burawoy, 2008b; Martinelli, 2008; Wieviorka, 2008; Habib, 2008).

Several years prior to this discussion M. Burawoy gave an exclusive interview to a Russian sociologist V. Radaev, where he clearly stated his position on the misinterpretability of the events, which have taken in the post-Soviet Russia, in terms of Western sociology. In discussing the problems of transition in China and CEE countries in American Journal of Sociology, he wrote that it was particular how nobody paid attention to the case of Russia, which was, according to his own view, an example of complete transformation failure. Although its experience has never been integrated into world sociology as, for example, China’s, he thinks, it could benefit greatly if it could provide a more sound explanation of its rather unique case without reducing it to some general theoretical scheme (Radaev and Dobryakova, 2006: pp. 37–38).

The analysis of the recent data from three consequent representative surveys of Russia’s economically active population, which took place in the post-Soviet period, shows that the social and economic order of contemporary Russia is not essentially economic homogeneity, including similarities in parameters of power, human, cultural and social resources (Shkaratan et al., 2009).

Even today many European researchers and analysts are still convinced that social and economic order of contemporary Russia is not essentially different from that of the developed European countries, although many
recent facts and events seriously contradict with this conceptual approach. Many Western scholars still believe that Russia merely represents one type of capitalism. E.g. for D. Lane since the beginning of 1990s Russia has been transforming from state socialism to a cooperative state-coordinated capitalism. He relied on the premise that the early post-communist ruling elites were attracted by Western achievements and their institutions of market economy, private property, democracy and civil society. Western capitalist societies and, especially, the American one became the working models of what was so much desired by Russia’s elites. Yet the author characterized Russian economy at that time as a rather perverted and chaotic formation (Lane, 2000).

M. Castells, who spent much time studying the case of Russia in the mid 1980s – the end of 1990s, has noted the following: «The crisis that is sweeping Russia, again, at the end of the XXth century, challenges us to exercise our conceptual creativity... Yet, more often than not the intellectual categories through which we interpret Russia’s problems and conflicts are prisoners of an obsolete framework, still largely tainted by Cold War overtones. We still think in terms of dichotomies between capitalism and socialism, liberalism and sovietism, West and East, entrepreneurs versus bureaucrats, freedom versus communism, centralism versus localism. Our prevailing way of thinking simply does not fit Russia, or the world by that matter. And in the case of Russia the analytical challenge is even greater, because end of century’s Russia combines different processes of change, while being fully immersed in the new global reality» (Castells and Kiselyova, 1998: p. 44).

Though a most popular characteristic by M. Castells to a contemporary Russian «capitalism» can be defined simply by the term «wild». It is ironic how the forms of status, which have developed in today’s post-reform Russia, have a lot in common with what was perceived by the Soviets as state-monopolistic Western imperialism (Castells and Kiselyova, 1998).

It was approximately at that time that M. Burawoy, a prominent American sociologist, set a question of whether the transformation processes in Russia were actually leading it towards capitalism. He characterized the trajectory of Russian development as a process of «involution» which is synonymous to Weber’s notion of «burglarious capitalism», where banks and trade monopolies receive profits and invest nothing in further production (it is very threatening how this trend has persisted until today). According to Burawoy the mode of production in contemporary Russia remained almost unchanged since the Soviet times (Burawoy, 2001: pp. 269—290).

There have been several other attempts to integrate and conceptualize the views of contemporary social scientists on the character of social and economic relation in post-communist countries. One of the most popular approaches is the so called variety of capitalisms approach. A summary of this approach has recently been done by J. Drahokoupil (Drahokoupil, 2009). According to this approach the variety of social and economic systems, which exist in contemporary Europe, may be reduced to several fundamental forms («liberal dependent capitalism», «patrimonial capitalism», «hybrid state market capitalism», «oligarchic capitalism», «Weber’s political capitalism», etc.). So it, basically, reduces the problem of determining the outcomes of various policies to the problem of diagnosing various states of capitalism in different countries depending on the structure of its economic institutions and the presence of foreign capital. The general point is that in most of the CEE countries (from Poland and Czech Republic) including Russia there has formed a certain type of controlled market economy. Although it is never discussed how and why Russia and its predominantly «orthodox» post-socialist neighbors deviate from any of these classifications and raise a number of questions.

Although such approach is applicable to Europe («the common and particular»), it can hardly be extrapolated on societies and nations, which belong to Eurasian civilization. Thereby we suggest the further development of the idea of Russia as a carrier of Eurasian civilization, which is bound to its Western area. It is actually peculiar how the Western border of the USSR before the WWII coincided with what we would call a true border of Eurasian civilization. It explains how in all aspects of Russia’s life the elements of neighboring European civilization were reproducing across centuries. Since the period of the Russian Empire in the times of Peter the First and until the revolution of 1917 «the European component» in Russia’s existence had been especially loyal (Poland, Finland, Baltic countries) and Russian sovereignty itself had been an organic part of the European «concert» of countries.

Nevertheless, the advocates of the capitalist development for Russia have recently paid attention to the variety of national models of market-based economy. It is obvious that neither Anglo-Saxon, nor Asian and Rhenish capitalisms could prove effective in our country. We can only have Russian capitalism, although in order to make it work we would still have to learn about the variety of existing world practices (Avtonomov, 1999: p. 6).
For us Russia is a part of this Eurasian substrate, which along with essentially European civilization demarcates the existence of «two Europes»: that is two macrocivilizations over the geographic domain of contemporary Europe.

References


Шкаратан, О. И.


В статье анализируются моно- и мультилинейные концептуальные подходы к развитию человечества, представленные в трудах таких выдающихся интеллектуалов, как Н.Я. Данилевский, О. Шпенглер, А.Дж. Тойнби, Т. Парсонс, И. Валлерстайн, Ф. Фукуяма, Л.Н. Гумилев, С. Хантингтон, Гж. Колодко, Л.С. Васильев, Ю.И. Семенов, М. Музилис, Б. Витрок и др.

Подчеркивается, что разнообразие линий социально-экономического развития народов основывается на различиях двух доминирующих макротипов цивилизации — «европейского» и «азиатского». В контексте этих и локальных цивилизационных различий рассматриваются модели социально-экономической трансформации постсоциалистических стран; при этом особое внимание уделяется российскому вектору посткоммунистического транзита, в основу анализа которого, по мнению автора, может быть положена теория евразийства Л.Н. Гумилева, Н.С. Савицкого, Н.С. Трубецкого и концепции современных российских авторов С.Г. Кордонского, В.Б. Пастухова, О.Э. Бессоновой и других ученых.


Ovsey Shkaratan
