1. It seems obvious that Europe is not so much a geographical notion as a cultural-historical and ideological one. Not many people are aware that from the geographical point of view the center of Europe is Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania: from the cultural-historical viewpoint Vilnius belongs rather to the European periphery. When one speaks about Europe one hardly has in mind Turkey or Kazakhstan; however, strictly speaking, these may be regarded as European countries, since a certain part of their territory belongs to Europe.

2. What about Russia? Does it belong to Europe?

From the geographical point of view this question certainly presumes a positive answer. It is true that the major part of Russia is in Asia; however its central and most representative part is in Europe, and historically Russia is a European country which expanded into Asia. (This constitutes the difference between Russia and Turkey, not to mention Kazakhstan.) The Asiatic part of Russia belongs to its periphery and actually, very often, is not called Russia. Inhabitants of Siberia distinguish between Russia and Siberia: in particular, when travelling to the European part of the Russian Federation they use the expression “to go to Russia”, just as inhabitants of the outskirts of Moscow say “to go to the city”.

Also from the cultural-historical point of view the appurtenance of Russia to Europe raises no doubts: Russian culture is undoubtedly European. Russian literature, music and figurative art are generally acknowledged as outstanding achievements of the European cultural tradition. It is hardly possible to imagine European culture without Russian novels, Russian poetry, Russian ballet, Russian symphonic music, Russian avant-garde painting, or Russian cinema.
Nevertheless the question whether Russia really belongs to Europe is always present to our minds and is an object of constant discussion. The question was explicitly formulated by Petr Chaadaev at a time when Russia was one of the leading European countries and when, consequently, it seemed pleonastic.

Why then? What is the cause of these doubts, if the answer seems so evident?

3. The diffusion of a name related to a certain cultural-historical center and representing a particular cultural-historical tradition, generally speaking, may be based either on the principle of metonymy or on the principle of metaphor. Correspondingly the name of Europe, as we shall see, may function both as metonymy and as metaphor.

In the one case we have a cultural expansion, i.e. when a name related to a center becomes applied to the periphery of a given region. This is a natural process.

In the other we have a cultural orientation. This is an artificial process.

Let us cite two examples to illustrate the two cases.

The first example. Île de France, a feudal domain of Hugh Capet, in the 10th century became the center of a country which today is called France. Thus the name “France” as the definition of a country came into being.

The second example. In the process of the colonization of the New World (America) and subsequently of the Newest World (Australia, New Zealand), very often European names were given to new towns and regions: this evidences a clear tendency to transfer European cultural space to a newly assimilated territory. Thus we have New York (originally called New Amsterdam), New England, New Zealand, etc. Later on in America we also have such names as Ithaca, Syracuse, etc. Tom Sawyer, the celebrated hero of the eponymous novel of Mark Twain, lived in a small town which had the name of the capital of the Russian Empire, St. Petersburg. There actually is a St. Petersburg in the state of Florida, but, characteristically, Tom Sawyer’s St. Petersburg is on the banks of the Mississippi River; apparently the writer considered it a typical name for an American town. Once when I was in the United States I met a charming old lady who asked me where I was from. When she learned that I was from Moscow, she asked what state Moscow belonged to. She was sure that Moscow was an American town.

The difference between these two cases is obvious. In the first we have a natural process of cultural expansion, while in the other we face an artificial process of cultural orientation. In the former case we have a metonymy, in
the latter a metaphor, since metaphor is based on comparison and metonymy on the *pars pro toto* principle. In the one case centrifugal forces are manifested (the principle of metonymy), in the other centripetal forces prevail (the principle of metaphor).

It is notable that in the case of metaphor (metaphorical toponymy revealing a cultural orientation) we usually meet the attribute “new”: New York, New Amsterdam, New Orleans, New London (there are several towns of this name in the United States), New England, Nova Scotia (a province in Canada) with a town named New Glasgow, New South Wales, New France (the name of the French territories in Canada until 1763), New Holland (the first name of Australia), New Zealand, New Caledonia, New Georgia (one of the Solomon Islands), New Guinea, New Ireland and New Britain (islands in the Bismarck Archipelago; previously they were called New Mecklenburg and New Pomerania), New Spain (a Spanish colony in Central America near Mexico City, founded in 1522), New Galicia (the area to the west and north of Mexico City), New Granada (a Spanish colony in South America, founded in 1538), New Siberia (one of the New Siberian Islands), New Brunswick, New Jersey, New Mexico, New Hampshire, New Hebrides, etc.; the list may be continued without difficulty. Such names may be repeated: if nowadays the name of New England is applied to a north-east region of the United States, in the 11th century it was the name of a territory on the north coast of the Black Sea, which was consigned by the emperor Alexis to his British body-guards: the towns of this territory, “Nova Anglia”, were called correspondingly London, York, etc.

However, in the case of metonymy (metonymical toponymy revealing a cultural expansion) we usually find the attribute “great” attached to the locality. Thus, for example, the name of Boston, primarily referring to the city of Boston, may extend to its suburbs, i.e. the territory lying outside the city borders, including Cambridge, Lexington, Watertown, etc.; in this case the expression “Great(er) Boston” is used. Here the word “great” properly means “in the broad sense of the word”. Examples of this kind are very usual in toponymy. Thus the name of Bretagne as the result of colonization was extended to England and Scotland and, consequently, we call the whole country “Great Britain” (later, in 1707, it was reinterpreted as the union of England and Scotland). Similarly Southern Italy with its original Greek population bears the name of “Magna Grecia” (i.e. Great Greece). In 1819-1830 when the Spanish colonies in South America were struggling for their independence, the republic of “Great Colombia” was founded, the country of Colombia being the center of this republic.

The same phenomenon may be observed in the history of Russia. Thus the name of Rus (the ancient name of Russia) originally referred to Kiev and the
surrounding territory which corresponds to the present Ukraine. The northern lands of contemporary Russia (such as Novgorod, Vladimir, Suzdal’, etc.) were outside Rus’ and, consequently, were not called Russian. Later on, however, they began to be considered parts of the “Great Rus’” (i.e. Great Russia), just as the suburbs around Moscow included more or less recently within the territory of Moscow may be called nowadays “Great Moscow”. In a Byzantine list of dioceses compiled in the 12th century, those dioceses are indicated which are governed by the Metropolitan of “Great Rus’” (τῇ μεγάλῇ Ῥωίσᾳ) whose residence was Kiev. Among them we find the bishoprics of Novgorod, Smolensk and Suzdal’: these towns did not belong to Rus’ (Russia) in the proper sense of the word, but they were considered parts of Great Rus’ (Great Russia) (see Appendix, Table 1).

Then the name “Great Rus’” (μεγάλῃ Ῥωίσᾳ) became semantically identical with the name “All Rus’” or “Whole Russia” (πᾶσα Ῥωίσᾳ) which was a component of the official title of the Kievan metropolitan: at least from the second half of the 12th century he was called “metropolitan of Kiev and All Rus’”. The opposition “Rus’” and “Great Rus’” was not mutually exclusive, but the name “Rus’” turned out to be the marked member of the opposition. Indeed, at this stage the name “Rus’” had a double meaning: on the one hand this name was related to the Kievan lands, on the other hand it could refer to a larger territory under the rule of the Kievan metropolitan. In relation to Kiev and the adjacent territory the names “Rus’” and “Great Rus’” were interchangeable, but in relation to Novgorod or Rostov they were contrasted (Appendix, Table II). Successively the name of “Rus’” was extended to the northern territories so that “Rus’” and “Great Rus’” became more or less synonymous (Appendix, Table III).

Later on, however—after the transportation of the metropolitan’s residence from Kiev to Vladimir in 1299, caused by the Tartar invasion and devastation of Kiev—the name “Great Rus’” began to be associated primarily with the northern lands: from this time on it signified not so much “All Rus’” (“Whole Russia”) as those territories of “All Rus’” which were not included in the original (Kievan) “Rus’” (Appendix, Table IV).

Since the notion of “Great Rus’” began to be associated with the northern lands, which were becoming more and more important, at the next stage the territory originally called “Rus’” began to be called “Little Rus’” (“Little Russia”). The name “Little Rus’” for contemporary Ukraine was obviously formed by contrast with “Great Rus’”, which means that the perspective of Great Rus’ was adopted. As a result, the former opposition of “Rus’” and “Great Rus’” was transformed into the opposition of “Little Rus’” and “Great Rus’”, the exclusive
one. Ukrainians nowadays consider the name “Little Russia” as pejorative and offensive. They prefer the name “Ukraine” but both names have substantially the same significance (etymologically “Ukraine” means outskirts, borderline). Indeed, both the name “Little Rus’” and the name “Ukraine” manifest the same idea: the idea of periphery. Both names are due to the exchange of the center and periphery: the center (the territory which used to be called “Rus’”) becomes the periphery (“Little Rus’” or “Ukraine”, i.e. outskirts), while the periphery, vice versa, becomes the center.

Thus in the course of time “Rus’” becomes a general notion associated with the territory of both Great Rus’ (the northern lands of the country) and “Little Rus’” (the southern lands). Then it became possible to define Moscow or Novgorod as towns belonging to “Rus’” or, more particularly, to “Great Rus’”, but it was not possible to define these towns as belonging to “Little Rus’”. In the same way Kiev or Chernigov could be referred to as towns belonging to “Rus’” or, more particularly, to “Little Rus’”; however it was not possible to define them as towns of “Great Rus’”. At this stage the opposition of “Rus’” and “Great Rus’”, as well as the opposition of “Rus’” and “Little Rus’”, was not mutually exclusive: both “Rus’” and “Great Rus’”, on the one hand, and “Rus’” and “Little Rus’”, on the other hand, were contrasted as a general and a particular concept. However the opposition of “Great Rus’” and “Little Rus’” appeared as a mutually exclusive one. Indeed, any locality which belonged to “Great Rus’” also belonged to “Rus’” but not vice versa (the converse affirmation is not true: it would be wrong to affirm that any locality which belonged to “Rus’” also belonged to “Great Rus’”). Analogously, any locality that belongs to “Little Rus’” belongs also to “Rus’”, but not vice versa.

Finally, when the name “Little Russia” was substituted by the name “Ukraine” the mutually exclusive opposition of “Great Rus’”, and “Little Rus’” was transformed into the opposition of “Rus’” and “Ukraine”. Thus a territory which originally was called “Rus’” became opposed to a territory which in the course of time acquired this very name (Appendix, Table V).

It is worth noting that at the time when in the Kievan perspective the northern part of the country was called “Great Rus’”, in the Scandinavian perspective the whole country (both “Rus’” as such, i.e. Kievan Rus’, and “Great Rus’”) could be called “Great Sweden”. In both cases the word “great”, or its equivalent in the Scandinavian languages, has the same meaning: it refers to a periphery which is opposed to a center.

Something similar seems to have happened in Poland. We have here an opposition of “Little Poland” (Mala Polska) and “Great Poland” (Wielka Polska) but “Little Poland” similar to “Little Rus’” presents the historical center
of the Polish territory: just as we have Kiev in “Little Rus´” we have Kraków in “Little Poland”.

Generally a toponymic model of nomination with the attribute “great” is associated with a zone of colonization, not with a metropolis (mother country). Thus the name “Great Britain” refers to the perspective of continental “Britain”, i.e. Bretagne, “Great Greece” (Magna Grecia) refers to the perspective of historical Greece, “Great Colombia” to the perspective of historical Colombia, etc. Analogously the name “Great Rus´” refers to the perspective of what was originally called “Rus´” and what later on—from the perspective of “Great Rus´”—came to be defined as “Little Rus´” or “Ukraine”.

4. It is evident that the extension of a toponymic name—the application of a traditional name to a different territory—may appear either as metonymy or metaphor. When England was called “Great Britain”, it was the result of a metonymic association. When a town in America received the name New Amsterdam or New Orleans, it was the result of a metaphoric association.

The use of the attribute “great” (e.g., when we say “Great Britain” or “Great Rus´”) implies an identification of a peripheral territory with the historical center.

The use of the attribute “new”, however, is based on a different presumption: it implies a comparison, and comparison, according to Aristotle, is the basis of metaphor. Indeed, metaphor is based on comparison, which presupposes common characteristics. Metonymy is based on the association of objects or events, which have common coordinates. In this sense metaphor is based on similarity, metonymy on the contiguity of the associated phenomena.

A comparison presumes an initial distinction in the compared phenomena: we can compare only that which is recognized as different.

In the one case, when we use the attribute “great” in a toponymic nomination, we deal with a gradual relationship of a more or less general territory, otherwise, when we use the attribute “new”, relations of mutual exclusion are present. In the first case the opposed phenomena are not necessarily in a complementary distribution, in the second case they usually are.

This is why when we define something (in particular, a locality) as “new”, it is natural to define the opposite notion as “old”. Thus after the discovery of the “New World”, i.e. America, Europe acquired the name of the “Old World”. Analogously, after the appearance of the “New Testament” the Hebrew Bible was understood as the “Old Testament”; after the French revolution the previous order received the name of “ancien régime”; after the introduction of the Gregorian calendar which was defined as the “new style” the Julian calendar began to be called “old style”, etc.
When we define something as “great”, however, we do not usually define the opposite notion as “little” (even if, on occasion, we do, as in the case of the opposition “Great Rus” and “Little Rus” or “Great Poland” and “Little Poland”; however, these are rather exceptional cases, which are due to the change of a center and a periphery in the corresponding territory; see above).

In the case of a toponymic nomination based on metonymy the problem of center and periphery is actual; in the case of a toponymic nomination based on metaphor, the problem of old and new prevails. Generally speaking, metonymy is connected with relations in space, while metaphor is connected with relations in time. While a periphery is not necessarily contrasted to the center, the relations of old and new as a matter of principle appear as a contrasting opposition: the new is created as the antithesis of the old. When Constantine the Great in 330 founded the new capital of the Roman Empire, which received the name “New Rome”, along with the name “Constantinople”, the New Rome turned out to be opposed to the Old Rome as a Christian capital to a pagan one (later on this opposition turned into the opposition of an Orthodox center and a Catholic one). More or less the same happened after the Florentine union of 1439 (the union of the Catholic and Orthodox Churches) and the subsequent Fall of Constantinople in 1453. The Fall of Constantinople and the victory of the Turks over Byzantium were seen in Russia as divine punishments for the betrayal of Orthodoxy, after which Russia remained the only independent Orthodox country representing true Orthodoxy. As a result Moscow was declared the Third Rome and the New Constantinople, Constantinople being the second Rome. Moscow as Third Rome was opposed both to the first (Old) Rome and the first Constantinople. Moscow was understood as a center which had preserved the Orthodox tradition, while both Rome and Constantinople had lost it. In both cases a toponymic name (e.g. “New Rome”, “New Constantinople”, “Third Rome”, etc.) is based on metaphor, and this is revealed in the use of the attribute “new”. In both cases we have a distinct contrast of new and old, typical of the metaphoric principle of naming.

5. It remains to note that the name of Europe itself is based on metonymy. Indeed “Europe” originally was the name of Greece, more precisely of continental Greece, while the islands of the Aegean Sea as well as the Ionian Coast of Asia Minor belonged to “Asia”. Gradually the name of Europe was extended to other territories—first to the territories close to Greece and then, step by step, to more distant ones. The extension of the name revealed the metonymic principle of identification. The Ionian geographers, such as
Anaximander applied the name of Europe to the territory to the north of the Mediterranean sea, while the territory to the south was called “Asia”. Thus the opposition of Europe and Asia was originally associated not with the opposition of West and East, as it is nowadays, but with the opposition of North and South.

6. Returning to Russia one may say that Russia belongs to Europe not in a metonymic but in a metaphoric sense. In other words, the appurtenance of Russia to Europe appears as a result not of the expansion of Europe as the center of civilization to adjacent lands, but rather as a conscious and conspicuous orientation towards Europe: this was not a centrifugal but a centripetal process.

In the opposite case Russia would have become, so to say, a part of Great Europe, i.e. a zone on the periphery of Europe to which the European cultural model had been extended. It would have been a process of gradual and consequent evolution, and historically such an evolution was quite possible. Indeed, the europeanization (westernization) of Russia began at the end of the 15th and beginning of the 16th century: it started with Boris Godunov and continued with the False Dmitrii. The process was resumed after the Time of Troubles, especially in the second half of the 17th century.

This evolution, however, was impeded by the reforms of Peter I, which had not an evolutionary, but a revolutionary character—not a natural but an artificial one. As a result Europe became for Russia not a metonymy, but a metaphor: instead of becoming an organic part of Europe (i.e. a Great Europe), Russia became a New Europe.

But conscious orientation of this type presumes a contradistinction of Europe and Russia as two contrasted entities: indeed, the orientation towards Europe suggests that previously Russia did not belong to Europe.

This idea was a starting point of the reforms of Peter I.

What I am saying may seem a paradox. As a matter of fact Peter I is known as a Kulturträger. It is generally accepted that as a result of his reforms Russia adopted European cultural values and became a European country. But at the same time, I believe, Peter created a cultural contrast between Russia and Europe, which did not exist (at least in this form) previously. In the words of Pushkin (which go back to Algarotti), Peter cut a window from Russia to Europe. Adopting this metaphor I would say that in order to cut his window Peter had to build a wall separating Russia from Europe. And it is not by chance that Peter and his associates proclaimed Russia after the reforms to be a new country.
7. The artificial character of the reforms of Peter I is recognizable from their initial stage. It is notable that Peter begins with the adoption of the signs, i.e. the forms of European culture, obviously presuming that the content should follow the form (this is typical in cases in which the processes of civilization bear the characteristics of a metaphorical assimilation). This artificiality later on determines the subsequent development of Russia: signs (forms) precede content. Thus Lenin developed the impossible idea of realizing Karl Marx’s program by making an anti-capitalist revolution in an agricultural country. Both the initiative of Peter and the initiative of Lenin had a conspicuously utopian character: they were based not on what was, but on what should be, not on an actual state of affairs but on a state of affairs which had to be achieved.

In 1698 Peter returned from the first of his foreign travels: he had been touring across Europe—Prussia, Sweden, Curland, Holland, England, Austria—under the name of Sergeant Peter Mikhailov, and it was the first case in the history of Russia that a tsar had left his country. On the day following his arrival in Moscow Peter began cutting—with his own hand—the beards of the boyars, or old-Russian noblemen, forcing them also to dress in foreign clothes. This act was intended to symbolize the beginning of a new and European stage of Russian history. Later on beards as well as Russian national clothes involved expulsion from society: a nobleman who refused to shave his beard or preferred to wear traditional clothes automatically lost his nobility.

It is difficult to find anything European in these acts: they remind us rather of an aborigine who wants to dress like a white man.

Such performances obviously demonstrate a proclivity towards Europe, a desire to be European; at the same time they create a contrast between Russia and Europe. Dressing in German clothes does not transform a Russian into a German; on the contrary, it increases the contrast between them. Indeed, there is an obvious difference between a German who wears German clothes and a Russian who is obliged to wear such clothes. This is analogous to the difference between a German who speaks German and a foreigner who speaks German as a foreign language. A man who speaks a foreign language is not free in his linguistic behavior, he has to be oriented towards a native speaker who defines the norms of speech, for the native speaker has natural habits of speech, having mastered his language in a natural, not an artificial way. In a sense the difference between a German speaking German and a Russian speaking German is greater than the difference between a German speaking German and a Russian speaking Russian, because in the latter case each uses his own language.
8. Dressing in foreign clothes produces the effect of a masquerade. It should be noted that in pre-Petrine Russia West European clothing was considered comical and was used in contemporary masquerades (in particular, demons in icon-painting could be painted in West European clothing, which corresponded to their carnival costumes). A Russian nobleman, shaved and dressed in foreign clothes, would at first have felt like a mummer, like a carnival merry-maker. At the same time traditional Russian clothes in official carnivals arranged by Peter and his collaborators were used as motley, as the costume of buffoons.

As a result two contrasting cultures were found in Russia: the traditional culture which was declared to be obsolete and obscure, and the new culture which was proclaimed as enlightened and progressive: from the point of view of one culture, the other may appear unnatural, comic, and carnivalesque. On the one hand, in Petrine buffoonery fools were dressed in Russian national costume. On the other, in Russian folk rituals it was possible to represent demons dressed in European clothes (characteristically in an ethnographic novel by Gogol` a demon wears German clothes).

Russian official life turned out to be extremely carnivalesque. Carnival became an element of Russian court life; participation in carnivals was obligatory. The tsar himself felt obliged to take part in carnival ceremonies since they belonged to the cultural program which was compulsory for his milieu. Masks could be used even in official institutions, which appeared very strange to foreign visitors. We learn of an occasion when Peter ordered all the senators and administrators of the highest level to be masked. We can only imagine what an assembly of the Senate looked like: it must have been something similar to a nightmare . . . At first carnival ceremonies were coordinated with Russian traditional festival periods, such as Yuletide or Shrovetide -traditional occasions for carnival amusements,—but gradually they were extended to the entire year.

9. Characteristically the reforms of Peter I intended to turn Russia into a European country in many cases began with carnival sport. In particular, “toy soldier regiments” created in the beginning of the 1680s became the basis of the Russian regular army; one might say that the military reform started by playing soldiers. In a similar way Peter’s church reform of 1721, when relations between Church and State were adopted from the European model accepted in Protestant countries, was preceded by the buffoonery of the “All-Jesting Council”, also called the “Most Holy Council of Drunkards and Fools”; it could be said that ecclesiastical reform began with an obscene and blasphemous parody of the Church. Analogously, the parody of a traditional image of the
tsar in buffoon weddings (a burlesque “tsar” took part in these ceremonies) preceded the assumption by Peter of the imperial title: in 1721 he officially began to be styled “emperor” and “Otets otechestva” (i.e. *pater patriae*), just as Roman emperors were called (one should bear in mind that the word *tsar* previously meant “emperor”, not “king”). At the same time Peter began to be called “the Great”, similar to Constantine the Great and Charlemagne and also “the First”: he was named “the Great” and “the First” because western monarchs—never Russian rulers!—were styled in this way. (Subsequently the Russian emperors Paul, Alexander and Nicholas were called “the First”, although there was no Paul II in Russian history, while both Alexander II and Nicholas II appeared much later).

All this strikingly recalls a child who imitates the behavior of an adult.

Carnivalization, re-naming—all this manifested a general cultural program which reveals the artificial character of the europeanization (westernization) of Russia. In the time of Peter towns with foreign names appeared, such as “Sankt Peterburg” (Saint Petersburg), “Shlissel’burg” (Schlüsselburg), and others. Previously, such names were understood as burlesque (e.g. the young Peter had built a town “Presburg” for his “play” troops); subsequently, however, the capital of the Russian empire itself was named in the same way.

Together with new clothing and new names a new Russian alphabet was created. The new forms of letters (projected by Peter himself) were assimilated to Latin letters, at the same time being conspicuously different from the traditional forms. The letters remained the same, only their form was changed. From the practical point of view there was no need to change the forms of the letters: the letters, so to say, acquired a European appearance similar to the people who were dressed in European clothes.

10. Peter began the construction of the new, European Russia with the building of Saint Petersburg. The new capital of the new state was built as a European city with a European name, specifically as a city of Saint Peter, which obviously recalled Rome. Characteristically the coat-of-arms of Saint Petersburg was very similar to that of the papal capital (“Claves Ecclesiae Romanae”) and may be seen as a transformation of the latter: the crossed keys in the papal arms correspond to the crossed anchors in that of Saint Petersburg; the fact that the anchor flukes are turned up is especially telling, since they correspond to the position of the key-bits in the papal coat-of-arms. In this way the arms of Saint Petersburg corresponded semantically to the name of the city: name and blazon were the verbal and visual expressions of the same idea.
It is remarkable that the new capital of the future empire was erected not in the center of the country but in its periphery. In this sense Saint Petersburg was contrasted with Moscow, which occupies a central position. This constitutes a rare case (in fact, Istanbul, formerly Constantinople, is also in the periphery of its country, but this is not typical: the new capital of Brazil was built in the center of the country, while the former capital had been in the periphery; also in Kazakhstan the capital was transferred from the periphery to the center of the country). However, the intentions of Peter are clear: on the Western border of his country he built a small European enclave, which was intended to expand subsequently to cover the entire Russian territory. The opposition of West and East, of Europe and Asia, was transferred in this way within the borders of Russia.

Together with the building in stone of Petersburg—a city intended to represent the whole of Russia—Peter prohibited stone buildings elsewhere in the country. In this way, along with the image of Saint Petersburg, the image of a backward, wooden Russia was created as the antithesis of the new city. Saint Petersburg was associated with the Russia of the future; what was actually created, however, was not only an image of the future country but also an image of its past. And this latter image did not completely correspond to reality: traditionally Moscow was described as “built of white stone”, now it had to be perceived as wooden. The creation of a new culture involved a conspicuous discrediting of the old: the new was created at the expense of the old, as its antithesis.

In an analogous way Peter prohibited monks to write; they were not allowed even to have paper or ink in their cells. In pre-Petrine Russia monasteries had been notable cultural centers; monks were busy with literary activities, which might even be mentioned in their monastic vows. Now monasteries could be considered as centers of the obsolete traditional culture, and consequently monks could be prohibited to write.

All this is very far from europeanization: what we perceive is merely the desire to imitate Europe . . .

Thus together with the building of a new Russia the image of old Russia was formulated to symbolize the old, traditional culture. From the point of view of new Russia old Russia appears as its opposite, as “anti-Russia”,—and vice versa. In this way two cultures were set up which were antagonistically opposed.

There is a scene in Tolstoy’s War and Peace in which Natasha, a noble girl, is portrayed in a village; the peasants treat her as if she were a doll: they touch her body and her clothing and they discuss her in her presence. From the point of view of the new Russia, peasants could be understood as mummers, but
from the point of view of traditional Russia it was the nobles who appeared as mummers. This was the result of conscious cultural policy, a result of the cultural contrast which was created by the reforms of Peter I and which was conditioned by the artificial character of these reforms.

Nothing of the kind is to be found in the history of France or Germany; it appears to be a specific characteristic of Russia—the new Russia created by Peter I.

Later, under the influence of the ideas of Herder and Hegel concerning “the spirit of the people” (*Volksgeist*), the concept of the people as a moving force of historical development became popular. This concept received in Russia specific connotations: the notion of the people turned out to be opposed to the notion of civilization. This determined a special role for the Russian *intelligentsia* which was intended to become a link connecting the people and civilized society.

11. It is evident that the desire to europeanize Russia does not always make Russia similar to Europe: in many cases the differences between Russia and the Western countries may be determined precisely by the importation of Western culture. Russian culture after Peter I was highly semiotic: it was directed to the assimilation of signs, when new forms of expression were adopted in order to achieve a corresponding content. Usually content generates expression; here, on the contrary, expression was intended to generate content.

Such an orientation towards Europe could lead to paradoxical results. In the 18th century, along with the ideas of the Enlightenment, serfdom was established in Russia. Russian serfdom was based on the personal attachment of a peasant to his landowner, and not to the land owned by the latter. As a result it became possible to sell peasants without land, to separate the members of a family, etc. The enslaving of peasants in Russia in the 18th century was realized in most inhuman forms. The practice of selling peasants without land began in the second half of the 17th century but in the 18th century it became a widespread phenomenon. This was determined by the bureaucratic reforms of Peter I, viz. the population census and the introduction of a poll-tax, when free peasants and serfs were registered under the same heading: as a result free peasants became serfs. The mentioned reforms were part of the general process of bureaucratic centralization and modernization—the process directly connected with the tendency to europeanize the Russian bureaucratic system (the census was an element of bureaucratization, the reduction of catalogues was an element of modernization). It should be recalled that in the western countries neighboring Russia, such as Poland or Prussia, serfdom still existed, and this might justify the enslaving of peasants in Russia; it was natural for Peter to imitate his western neighbours.
Characteristically, literacy was drastically reduced following the reforms of Peter. In pre-Petrine Russia people were basically literate, i.e. they could read and write (learning to read was a part of religious education). As the result of the reforms of Peter and his followers—the reforms characteristic of Europeanized Russia—the overwhelming majority of the peasants became illiterate.

Thus Peter I created European Russia, but at the same time he created its opposite: the image of Asiatic Russia as backward, obscure and ignorant. Consequently, he is responsible for the basic cultural tension which determined the subsequent evolution of Russian culture and, more generally, the course of Russian history.

Translated by Boris Uspenskij

APPENDIX:
THE SUCCESSIVE EVOLUTION OF THE RELATION BETWEEN “RUS’” AND “GREAT RUS’”

I.

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IV.

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According to Aristotle, a metaphor is essentially nothing other than a hidden or implied comparison. Thus, “When the poet [Homer] says of Achilles that he ‘leapt on the foe as a lion,’ this is a simile; when he says of him ‘the lion leapt,’ it is a metaphor—here, since both are courageous, he has transferred to Achilles the name of ‘lion’” (Ars rhetorica, III, 4). Aristotle evidently refers to the description of Achilles in Iliad, XX, 164.

Quintilian (Inst. Orat. VIII, 6, 9) is in essential agreement with Aristotle: “On the whole, metaphor is a shorter form of simile, while there is this further difference, that in the latter we compare some object to the thing which we wish to describe, whereas in the former this object is actually substituted for the thing. It is a comparison when I say that a man did something ‘like a lion’; it is a metaphor when I say of him, ‘He is a lion’.”

The expression “Otets otechestva” literally means “father of the fatherland”, at the same time “father of fatherhood”. This expression is nothing other than a literal translation of the Latin pater patriae, an honorary title of the Roman emperors: it clearly reveals the conspicuous orientation of Peter towards the Roman empire as a cultural model. In the Russian cultural context, however, the expression had a very different effect. Since paternity (fatherhood) in general can refer either to blood or to spiritual kinship, and Peter obviously was not the people’s father in the sense of blood kinship, the title was understood as a pretension to spiritual kinship. But it is only a priest who can be a spiritual father; in its turn, the title “Otets otechestva” could be applied only to a bishop as the spiritual father of priests, and—first and foremost—to a patriarch. Actually the ecumenical patriarch of Constantinople as well as the patriarch of Alexandria were both addressed in this way. Moreover, in so far as the official adoption of this title coincided with the abolition of the patriarchate in Russia (it occurred in the same year), when the Russian church began to be entirely dependent on the state, and the monarch was subsequently declared to be “Supreme Judge” of the Ecclesiastical College, this title could be interpreted in the sense that Peter had become the head of the Church and had declared himself patriarch. As a matter of fact this is precisely how it was interpreted. But according to canon law only a bishop is able to head the Church. Peter, therefore, was accused of willfully “assuming ecclesiastical power by naming himself otets otechestva”.

The notion that the tsar had proclaimed himself to be a spiritual or even holy person must have been furthered by Peter’s command to be called without his patronymic, for that was precisely how clerical persons and saints were addressed. He called himself Peter tout court (without patronymic), whereas his father was called Aleksei Mikhailovich (i.e. Alexis, son of Michael), his grandfather Mikhail Fedorovich (Michael, son of Theodor), and so on. If Peter had been a monk or a priest, he would have been called without patronymic—simply Peter—but he was not. If he had been a saint he would have been called St. Peter, also without patronymic; thus this kind of naming could be understood as a claim to sainthood.

As a result Peter was perceived by his contemporaries and by the Old Believers of subsequent generations as the Antichrist, a view which in turn called forth a whole series of allegations derogatory to the emperor.

Certainly Peter knew the cultural language of his epoch and could therefore foretell the effect of his actions. It looks as if Peter deliberately disregarded his native “cultural
language” as erroneous and accepted as the only correct language that of the imported West-European cultural ideas.

Generally, pre-Petrine Russian culture was characterized by the identification of persons and objects with the corresponding persons and objects found on a hierarchically general plane which in this sense appeared as ontologically initial or “the first”. Thus Constantinople was identified with Rome and Jerusalem and accordingly was called the “second” Rome and the “new” Jerusalem, just as the Russian monarch could be called the “second” Constantine or the “new” David. What is at stake is the identification that reveals the underlying ontological essence of what or who is named in this way. Naturally in such a system of views the title “Peter the First” must have been interpreted as the unlawful pretension of being a point of departure, or origin, a status only applicable in general to the sacred sphere. The fact that Peter began calling himself “the Great” was far less immodest in the eyes of his contemporaries than his naming himself “the First”. If Peter had been a Roman emperor he could have been called “Petrus primus, pater patriae”, but he was not—he was a Russian tsar...