Vladimir Zinchenko, Boris Pruzhinin, and Tat’iana Shchedrina

“Another Consciousness” as the Horizon of Cultural-Historical Psychology

The article reveals the historical debate between Russian psychologist-philosophers (Lossky and Shpet) in relation to Husserlian phenomenology at the beginning of the twentieth century. The debate is relevant in today’s interpretation of the social world and its place in cultural-historical psychology. The article reveals Vygotsky’s problematic choice on this fundamental issue.

Russian philosophy of the early twentieth century goes beyond the bounds of phenomenology in its “classical” (Husserlian) version perhaps because “the level of its questions,” as Stepun noted, “is infinitely higher than the level of its answers. . . . It reveals an almost prophetic alarm over the future of mankind and an exceptionally keen ear for truly big and significant questions.” Moreover, even in its direct use of Husserlian phenomenology (including communication with Husserl, Shpet, Shestov, and others) Russian philosophy did not copy its intellectual approaches, but attempted creatively to rework phenomenological problems by proceeding from its own cultural-historical context and the context of


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the historical tradition of inquiry into communication, conciliarity, and sociality in the broad sense. This position of the specific “externality” of Russian philosophy with respect to phenomenological inquiry turns out to be highly promising for us today and makes it possible to identify new aspects in studying the problem of “another consciousness” as one of the fundamental problems of philosophy. Furthermore, the productivity of Russian epistemological inquiry for a contemporary understanding of the human origins of cultural-historical psychology stems from its critical attitude toward Husserlian phenomenology, where the antinomy between psychologism and antipsychologism persists. Russian philosophers have their own interpretation of the problem of the cognitive source, the problem of the irreducible semantic core in the context of the problem of “another consciousness” and the Self-Other relation.

At the same time, we are already clearly aware today that the Self–Other relationship of general cultural universalities became the central problem of the philosophical and humanities-science meditations of the entire twentieth century. The cultural-historical experience of human existence in the world is crystallized in these concepts, so a determination of the semantic structure of the Self–Other relationship is fundamentally important for discovering the specific nature of various types of culture.\(^2\)

For psychology the problem of “another consciousness,” as was discussed in the preceding chapter [not translated here], has been one of the central issues throughout the history of this science. It concerns the potential for generalizing psychological data and the methods of penetrating into the realm of the psyche. Cultural-historical psychology has contributed a different shading to this problem that involves the possibility of investigating these problems by way of verbal expression.

In this instance, we turn to the epistemological experience of Nikolai Onufrievich Lossky and Gustav Gustavovich Shpet. The choice of these thinkers to clarify the configuration of the problem of “another consciousness” is based primarily on the fact that their philosophical explorations clearly defined its extreme points.\(^3\)

Lossky, “with a well-rounded education, encyclopedically well read, endowed with an excellent memory, a clear intellect, and a taste for sequentially logical development of thought and its clear-cut exposition . . . had a rare talent for synthesis.”\(^4\) He had a supremely developed ability to embrace the whole, and perhaps that was why he tended to justify intuitivism. All of these characteristics may also be applied to Gustav Gustavovich Shpet.
But, unlike Lossky, who directed his talent for synthesis at creating a unified philosophical system, Shpet, who possessed powerful analytical abilities, concentrated his synthesizing talent on the “positive criticism” that was required to test the established systems for viability and intellectual productivity.

We should also note that both Lossky and Shpet began their ascendancy to philosophy from psychology. As E.G. Osovskii points out:

The beginning of N.O. Lossky’s scholarly background is directly associated with psychology. A fascination with the problems of gnoseology, an acquaintance with P.F. Lesgaft, the teaching of psychology and sessions in the psychological laboratories of W. Wundt and G. Miller, and so on, laid the foundation for his philosophical-psychological master’s dissertation, “The Basic Teachings of Psychology from the Perspective of Voluntarism” (1903), which attempted to unify voluntarism and intuitivism.

Shpet was a student of the prominent psychologist G.I. Chelpanov, under whose guidance he wrote his first scholarly work, “Memory in Experimental Psychology” (1905), as well as “A Paper on Psychology,” which contained criticism of physiological psychology (1907). Shpet and Chelpanov established the Institute of Psychology in Moscow. In the summer of 1910 they visited virtually every European psychology school and became acquainted with the plans and areas of their work. Finally, both Lossky and Shpet were “interlocutors” of L.S. Vygotsky. Shpet delivered lectures to him at the Institute of Psychology, and Lossky commented on his book *Thinking and Speech* (Myshlenie i rech’) (Russkaia shkola, 1940, no. 4, Prague).

Lossky was one of the few Russian philosophers whose ideas came under the direct attention of Gustav Shpet. The latter analyzed Lossky’s article “Reforming the Concept of Consciousness” (“Reforma poniatiiia soznaniia”) (in Lossky’s book *An Introduction to Philosophy* [Vvedenie v filosofiiu], 1911) and examined Lossky’s book *Matter in the System of an Organic Worldview* [Materiia v sisteme organicheskogo mirovozzreniia] (the annual *Thought and Language* [Mysl’ i Slovo], 1917). In addition, in the process of working on the annual *Thought and Language*, Shpet invited Lossky to participate and asked him to write articles on the topics of “immanent philosophers” and Mach’s theory of knowledge. Lossky, as far as we know, did not engage in open polemics with Shpet, although in one letter he did remark that Shpet’s criticism of him had upset him: “I read your article about me. The phrase in it, ‘a world perception that goes back to God is a worldview that goes back to whimsy,’ upset me
very much: for me, as for any person who believes in God and knows that He exists, it leaves the impression of something blasphemous.”

The above letter defines the boundary with respect to which Shpet proves to be outside Lossky’s position, but then it is unclear why, in speaking about their sources, both Lossky and Shpet call the same tradition of Russian-based philosophy “concrete” (Lossky) and “positive” (Shpet). Furthermore, in defining the specific characteristics of this tradition, both of them single out, above all, its “unified quality” as one such characteristic. We have already cited Shpet’s reflections in another chapter. What interests us here is how Lossky interprets this tradition. He addresses this question in the article “The Idea of Concreteness in Russian Philosophy” [Ideia konkretnosti v russkoi filosofii] (Prague, 1933). Here, just as Shpet did, he refers to unified quality and concreteness as the basic characteristics of the Russian philosophical tradition. Moreover, he is similar in his choice of philosophical personalities of this tradition, which dates from V. Solov’ev and the Slavophiles. Lossky, nevertheless, expands the circle of the tradition and brings it up to date, incorporating into it the conceptual tenets of S.L. Frank, P.A. Florensky, N.A. Berdiaev and others. In addition to Solov’ev, Shpet points to the systems of L.M. Lopatin, S.N. Trubetskoi, and P.D. Iurkevich. It would seem that the intellectual similarity between Lossky and Shpet regarding the tradition of Russian philosophy is clear. Yet when we begin to analyze the meaning of the concepts, that is, to clarify what Shpet and Lossky actually meant by concrete and unified, this is where the conceptual differences begin, which do not prevent Lossky and Shpet, however, from understanding both each other and the philosophical problems that make up their discussion. But first, the differences.

Lossky defines a concrete being as unified: “an individual whole that contains an infinite multitude of certainties susceptible to abstraction, which are based on a metalogical, supertemporal, and superspatial foundation as an inexhaustible creative source for them.” And he goes on to formulate the most important corollaries of this definition of concrete being:

(1) The theory that the concrete takes precedence over the abstract; (2) the theory that the individual takes precedence over the general—(a) over generic and species-related existence; (b) over laws and rules; and (c) instead of the priority of genus and species, the priority of the whole, of the organic entirety is recognized; and (3) within the entire philosophical
worldview, the dominance of the idea of life as creative activity: will and strength are thought of not as a law of change but as creative activity.\textsuperscript{13}

Lossky also formulated all of these principles in his early works.\textsuperscript{14} In this case he was interested in the idea of concreteness as a specific theme of Russian philosophy, where the problem of self is best illuminated.

Where is the point of difference between Shpet and Lossky? It is at the intersection of their gnoseological comments about how we arrive at this concept of the concrete. In other words, how is the world possible as an organic whole? Lossky argued that these questions do not receive an answer from theories according to which knowledge is a reflection (a copying) of things in our mind that forms through our accumulation of impressions from things; nor are these questions resolved by the theories according to which nature, as a system of phenomena, is built by our intellect itself, based on categories and sensory data that in themselves are disparate.\textsuperscript{15}

But before reconstructing Lossky’s exposition, which makes rationalist arguments in favor of intuitivism, we will make a brief digression. When Lossky enumerates the Russian philosophers who had “a proclivity for the concrete,” he mentions, among others, the study by I.A. Il’in “Hegel’s Philosophy as a Concrete Doctrine of God and Man” [Filosofiia Gegelia kak konkretnoe uchenie o Boge i cheloveke] (1918). This work also attracted Shpet’s attention. He discussed it in a long article, the rough draft of which survives in the archives. Shpet took a critical view of Il’in’s conceptual tenets. Il’in, in Shpet’s view, interpreted Hegel’s concept of the concrete outside his system, that is, as a separate whole, and hence abstractly. Shpet says that the concrete for Hegel is not only a whole that is more than the sum of its parts but also one that is realized in the experience of history. Shpet notes:

Genuine “experience” is historical. And I reduce the entire question to the place of Hegel’s Philosophy of History. It is clearly articulated by Gans: Vorrede\textsuperscript{16} XIII: “Sie bei aller speculativen Kraft doch der Empirie und Erscheinung ihr Recht widerfahren lassen, . . .”\textsuperscript{17} . . . This is Hegel’s greatest accomplishment: showing reality as historical! Through him, “history” did away with “nature.” All subsequent materialism and psychologism fought not against history, as was the case in the eighteenth century, where the mechanism wanted to kill the infant history, which some even saw as a sign of the times—it fought, as did historicism, which, however, was misunderstood, against the realization of the absolute! That is why they used
to proceed under the sign of *positivism* and later modified themselves into positive phenomenalism! Their philosophical lie is to deny the absolute, while their historical truth is to deny the reality of the absolute.”

It is clear from this comment by Shpet exactly what does not suit him in Il’in’s interpretation that is aimed at clarifying Hegel’s term of “the concrete”—the absence of a historical causality of knowledge with all of its corollaries. Shpet also directs these criticisms at Lossky.

The most interesting aspect, however, is that both Lossky and Shpet, in the process of analyzing “concreteness,” proceed from the same source—Husserlian phenomenology. Husserl’s *Logical Investigations* had already had a fairly strong impact on the Russian philosophical community, based on the fact that, as Lossky summarized,

> this book sets forth in an especially thorough way a description of psychologism and, by clearly distinguishing between an act of judgment (which is a psychic process) and the content (meaning) of a judgment (which is not a psychic process), points out the path of liberation from psychologism. Based on this distinction, Husserl, in the second volume of *Logical Investigations*, constructs his intentionalism (the theory that an act of knowledge does not contain the object of knowledge but has it in view, intends it).

We should note that what is important for us today is not even so much to state that Lossky and Shpet had a common (phenomenological) point of reference as the difference in where they proceeded from. Lossky, as we have seen, proceeds from Husserl at the time of *Logical Investigations*, while Shpet proceeds from *Ideas I*. And this difference in the points from where they proceeded had a significant influence on the subsequent trajectories of the progress of Lossky and Shpet. Despite the fact that both Lossky and Shpet recognized, in the wake of Husserl, “the actuality of human inner experiences that are concretely given to consciousness,” they accentuated different aspects in this recognition. What Lossky found important were Husserl’s logical innovations in *Logical Investigations*, which refers to “grounding philosophy in judgments whose validity cannot be questioned,” that is, he is more interested in the Husserlian judgments regarding the authenticity and self-evidentness of objective acts of consciousness that are given in intuition. It is precisely this aspect—“the presence of the object in intuition by itself, that is, “in the original,” that Lossky singles out in Husserl’s *Ideas I* as well, without asking himself whether Husserl’s issues may have evolved from 1900 to 1913 (from *Logical Investigations* to *Ideas I*).
Shpet’s reaction to Husserl had a different trajectory. His treatment of Husserl dates from *Ideas I*. And already in his *Phenomenon and Meaning* [*Iavlenie i smysl*], which was written literally right after *Ideas I*, Shpet found a vast domain that was not yet a focus for Husserl at that time. In addition to the sciences of facts and the sciences of essences, a division that Husserl used as a basis for distinguishing among types of objective experience, there is yet another existential layer—the *social*, which presupposes its own specific type of experience, its own source of knowledge, and its own mode of understanding and subsequent expression. In fact, he did not stop at merely extracting the *social* into a separate existential layer that exists alongside the *factual* and the *ideal*; he postulates that it (this layer) is primary with respect to them. This “discovery” by Shpet also led to his different attitude toward *Logical Investigations*, where the problem of the unifying principle is formulated in the most pointed way. It is here that Husserl “rejects the Kantian pure apperception as a unifying principle, . . . and attempts to resolve the dilemma between Brentano’s and Kant’s understanding of the unity of consciousness.”

But what is important for Shpet, unlike Lossky, is not so much actually raising the problem of the gnoseological unity of the source of knowledge as the mode of its phenomenological development. And in Shpet’s view it was the realization of the idea of phenomenology in its fully defined form that was the basis of Husserl’s evolution from *Logical Investigations*, where “the idea of phenomenology was not yet realized in all of its fully defined and finished form,” to *Ideas I*, where the gnoseological formulation of the problem of the unity of consciousness assumed strong phenomenological contours. In *Ideas I*—“in the experience of substantiating phenomenology,” Husserl confronts the fact that the self is fundamentally irreducible, that it “acts as a kind of ‘transcendentality in immanence’”—and as such (i.e., being in the immanent itself), it obviously can no longer be subject to phenomenological reduction, but is part of the content of phenomenology, since in substance it must also be ‘directed at something,’ ‘be engaged in something,’ experience something, suffer, and so on, and so forth, and needs to emanate from the Self or be directed toward it.”

This is a fundamental issue for Shpet; that is why he recognizes the “actuality of inner experiences” as the starting point of the problem of the unity of consciousness—the problem of the Self.

In effect, Shpet, unlike Lossky, managed to capture the meaning of Husserl’s “drift” toward the transcendental focus of subsequent phenomenological
research into the problem of the self. After all, it is one thing to recognize the “actuality of inner experiences” and another to regard it as the basis for a gnoseological strategy. And while for Shpet the recognition of the “actuality of inner experiences” is a fundamental problem that opens new horizons to human science for understanding human subjectivity, for Lossky it is the starting point for substantiating intuitivism.25

Thus, Lossky contends that intuitivism can solve the problems of the theory of knowledge, including the problems of the self, by combining elements of the “theory of reflection” (naive realism) and elements of “idealism,” which constructs a system of phenomena with the aid of reason. He bases his reasoning on the principle of immanence.26 Therefore,

in order to understand an object, one must have it in one’s consciousness, that is, make sure it has come within the range of the cognitive subject’s consciousness, has become immanent to consciousness. . . . The consciousness of an object is the result of a peculiar (not causal) relationship between the perceiving subject and the perceptual object: when this relationship is present, the subject contemplates the object directly, “has it in view” in the original.27

In effect Lossky postulates that “the whole world, including nature, other people, and even God, is perceived by us just as directly as the subjective world, the world of our Self.”28 However, the question arises, how is it possible to have such intuitive knowledge of the world in all of its fullness, including “another’s emotional life?” In order to answer this question, we must introduce an ontological assumption, and Lossky’s thesis that “everything is immanent to everything” is, in effect, just that. Lossky goes further along the metaphysical path, declaring that the gnoseological theory called intuitivism “has the goal of reviving the right of metaphysics to exist”29 and considering from all angles the question of the world as an organic whole.

We will not reproduce Lossky’s entire exposition here. It is more important to trace the configuration of the development of the problem of the self. How does the self perceive the nonself? Does Lossky remain within the framework of the gnoseological formulation of the problem of the self or does he depart from it into the domain of ontology? And if he does depart, what is the specific nature of his departure? Lossky introduces a second ontological assumption by identifying the concepts of the “nonself” and the transsubjective world and, in so doing, effectively reverting to Leibniz and his theory of the self as monad-substances
closed in on themselves. But only in part, because based on his theory of universal immanentism he contends that the self is fundamentally open to others. Lossky distinguishes not only between the self and the nonself but also singles out cognitive processes in the perceiving self as objects of knowledge and as functions of the perceiving subject. This division enabled him to demonstrate that the nonself transcends the self when the self perceives the world. But at the same time, the nonself remains immanent to the very process of knowledge. Consequently, knowledge of the nonself is a process that unfolds both in the material of knowledge and in the world of the self. But this presupposes “a consummated unification of the self and the nonself (similar to the unification that exists between various emotional processes in the actual self), thanks to which the life of the external world is given to the perceiving subject just as directly as the process of his own inner life.”

This is why Lossky, unlike Leibniz, recognizes the fundamental openness of the self.

Shpet asks Lossky a fundamental question. What, then, is the difference between “transcendental metaphysics” and “immanent philosophy” if in both cases everything boils down to the “pure ego” (according to Husserl) or, as Lossky calls it, the “substantive agent?” If the aforementioned metaphysical assumptions on which Lossky constructed his immanent philosophy are taken into account, the difference in the interpretation of the self in the two cases is not great. Shpet writes: “Lossky’s ‘self’ is supposed to go on playing the role of ‘gnoseological subject,’ hence the role of the subject that is supposed to correlate with the ‘object’ or, in Lossky’s own terminology, that is in ‘gnoseological coordination’ with the ‘object.’” Shpet notes in passing here that Lossky in this discussion makes a leap from a fundamental analysis of consciousness (consciousness as a concrete entity) to the domain of the theory of knowledge, from which Lossky specifically wants to escape. Shpet returns to this criticism in his review of Lossky’s book *Matter in the System of an Organic Worldview* (1916). Here he now consistently pursues the thought that Lossky’s theory of the world as an organic whole based on intuitivism is fundamentally mythological, since it “proceeds from a recognition of the authenticity of the explanatory factor outside—actually or nonactually—the given reality.” Shpet makes this critical comment because his mode of examination of the self is different. In Lossky’s language, however, this assertion by Shpet makes no sense, since he himself feels that ontological assumptions enable him to escape from the gnoseological dead ends, that is, the self in the theory of intuitivism is
fundamentally “ontological.” But Shpet disagrees with this interpretation of “ontological.” He counts more than five ontological assumptions on Lossky’s part and insists that they are mythological in nature. Among them: “any human self is a substantive agent that carries out material processes of pushing off and directs at least some of them according to his own wishes (p. 21).” 34 Could Shpet have accepted this interpretation of the self? Of course not, since what was important for him, as it was for Husserl, was that the self cannot be a source of knowledge, that the self is a problem, a unity in plurality, and the self can perceive itself and others not in an act of a special mystical intuition but through the verbal expression by other selves of their attitude toward this self.

Only in one place in his article “The Perception of Another’s Emotional Life” [Vospriiatie chuzhoi dushevnoi zhizni] does Lossky touch on the problem of verbal expression, but only in terms of the perception of another’s speech. Lossky’s entire comment, however, fits in a single paragraph, where he touches “in passing” on the highly complex problem of implication (having in mind), the problem of ambiguousness/nonambiguousness of word meanings, and so forth. But regretfully, he curtails this discussion by asserting that “the problem of understanding speech is complicated to such a degree by these factors that it would be inappropriate in this article to digress into a further discussion of it.” 35 Lossky views the problem of communication between the self and the nonself in terms of a problem of interaction between the self and the nonself at the level of perception of each other through intuition, by which he means “close communication”—that is, “direct contemplation by some of the being of others.” 36 However, the problem of verbal expression, as the most important element of communication, is not raised in general by Lossky, either. What is more important to him is not the directedness of the self to the other, but the self’s own action and own manifestation. Lossky emphasizes that, although many manifestations of the self arise based on communication with the external world, the events of the external world are not the cause of such manifestations but serve merely as a trigger for them.

In his work “The Transcendental-Phenomenological Idealism of Husserl” [Transtsendental’no-fenomenologicheskii idealizm Gusserlia] Lossky ponders the productivity of Husserl’s way of framing the problem of the perception of another’s subjectivity. Running ahead of ourselves, we can say that he does not accept Husserl’s idea of intersubjectivity, just as he did not accept Shpet’s idea. Husserl, in his Cartesian Medita-
tions, tries to find “a path to the transcendental Ego,” that is, as N.V. Motroshilova formulates it, Husserl, “in ‘bracketing’ and reducing the world and my own self as a naturally historical being, stored up a ‘return’ to them on a new, cogital-transcendental basis,” that is, he returned to the problems that Shpet saw in phenomenology in 1914 and advanced even further in 1916. But Lossky’s context for discussing this problem is different. He is interested in the problem of the truth of the judgment, the problem of the criterion of objectivity. Husserl associates this criterion with the concept of intersubjectivity, which presupposes the presence of an alter ego in the world, without which a true judgment about the world is in itself impossible for the self. Lossky, for whom the world is a multitude of substantive agents that do not depend on one another and at the same time penetrate one another through intuition, proceeds from the internal nature of this criterion of truth. This criterion cannot be social (in fact, Lossky reduces all forms of social criteria, in effect, to conventionalism), but must be based on self-evidentness. Lossky maintains that in affirming the givenness of an object in the original, Husserl contradicts himself by “piling” intersubjective criteria of truth onto this. What is intersubjectivity needed for when the self exists independently and dependently at the same time, and what is given to one self in intuition is seen the same way by another person?

To answer this question, it is important for us to hear Shpet’s voice with its aspiration to the sociality and historicality of reality. It is also essential to take into account that Shpet’s concept of “sociality” develops, in a certain sense, in the same domain of phenomenological exploration as Husserl’s “life-world.” Why is Shpet so insistent on the problem of the expression of thought (including a judgment) in verbal form? Why are language and hermeneutic methods of inquiry so important for Shpet? Shpet was clearly aware that, although two people look at the same object, they may see different things by virtue of the fact that their social world (the horizon of understanding) will be different. After all, there are situations in life in which a “sympathetic understanding” (i.e., communication without words that assumes a common context) turns out to be impotent, and then work begins on a mutual translation of different conceptual languages and different contexts. But this means that Lossky’s idea of intuitive penetration as the communication by substantive agents with each other—an idea that is based on the possibility of reducing oneself to another self—is inadequate. The cultural and historical context of their communication must be taken into account—which is what Husserl and Shpet insist.
But Lossky is not satisfied with this answer and the criterion of truth that corresponds to it, since it opens the way to the relativization of the classical idea of the objectivity of knowledge. Lossky cannot accept any truth that arises at the intersection of many opinions or any intersubjective verifiability as a condition for the idea of objectivity. This criterion is an external one, so Lossky concludes: “Husserl’s philosophy is not based on self-evidentness and does not contain a rigorous theory that consists of truly clear and well-defined concepts.”

Instead, Lossky postulates a metaphysical assumption of the openness of substantive agents, who are subject to the will of the Creator. In effect he bypassed Husserl’s *Cartesian Meditations.*

But Lossky did not even want to constrict himself with the intersubjective criteria of cognitive activity. Paradoxical as it may seem, in this regard, Lossky’s views turn out to be similar to certain themes and intentions of Vygotsky—which was clearly manifested in his review of the book *Thinking and Speech.* Lossky does not at all prioritize the theoretical aspect of the book. He is interested in Vygotsky the experimenter, who confronted children “with an impediment in carrying out some activities” and who tried to prove that in the process of the formation of concepts as a synthesis of abstract attributes, apart from the factors of association, attention, representation, and judgment, “it is not these processes that are of central importance, but a new factor that combines them into a qualitatively new structural whole; this factor is ‘the functional use of a sign or word as a means by which an adolescent subjugates his own psychological operations, takes over the expression of his own psychological processes, and directs their activity toward accomplishing the task that confronts him.’”

Shpet also refers to the sign-based nature of consciousness, but while Lossky is interested in the consciousness of the subject who is perceiving his own activity and a sign only as a means, Shpet is interested in all of the possible functions of a sign (both as a means and an end) in the intersubjective relationship between the Self and the Other.

Notes


2. In antiquity the “Self–Other” relation was expressed in the opposition “Hellenes–barbarians,” where Greek culture is contrposed to the “uncultured” world. In the Middle Ages the “Self–Other” relation was expressed in the opposition “paganism–Christianity,” which was rooted in religious experience. The Renaissance produced a new perception of the “Other”: as part of a unified and potentially infinite world; a new understanding of the problem of the “Other” emerged—as a problem of
a different corporeality—an understanding that in many ways foreshadowed modern anthropology. During the Enlightenment the “Other” was regarded from the perspective of the development and movement toward higher levels of cognitive activity. The philosophers of the Enlightenment (Descartes, Locke, Leibniz) maintained that the Other could be made into One of Us by teaching him. In the nineteenth century, the Self–Other problem was viewed primarily in a sociopolitical context, and its semantic structure was expressed most clearly in the concept of “alienation.” Marx saw alienation as an extreme form of the social degeneration of man, the loss of his patrimonial essence and, as a result, man’s alienation from his fellow human being. The two most influential philosophical theories to consider the Self–Other problem took shape in the twentieth century: the existential-phenomenological and the dialogical theories. The existential-phenomenological interpretation is represented in the works of E. Husserl, M. Heidegger, J.-P. Sartre, and E. Levinas. The dialogical analysis of the Self–Other relation appears in the works of F. Rosenzweig, F. Ebner, M. Buber, and M.M. Bakhtin.

3. Another reason these figures were selected was that Shpet and Lossky personify in their ideological tenets two different versions of the synthesis of the intellectual and the existential that is characteristic of Russian philosophy. “His [Lossky’s] thought moved in . . . a circle of concepts and was expressed . . . in a language that came from Neo-Kantianism, immanent philosophy, Husserl’s phenomenology and Bergson’s philosophy. At the same time, in terms of their orientation and key ideas . . . Lossky’s gnoseological and metaphysical constructs echoed the main tradition of Russian philosophy.” V.P. Filatov, “Predislovie k publikatsii stat’i N.O. Losskogo ‘Idea konkretnosti v russkoi filosofii,’” Voprosy filosofii, 1991, no. 2, p. 126. “A unique instance of the intersection of three . . . paradigms [the Kantian and phenomenological paradigms and the paradigm of consciousness in Russian philosophy] is the worldview of Gustav Shpet. A study of its philosophical roots is what opens up access to the paradigm of consciousness in Russian philosophy, which until now has been hidden behind religious and moral problems.” V.I. Molchanov, “Paradigmy soznaniia i struktury opyta,” Logos, 1992, no. 3, p. 8.


5. Shpet argues: “Positive criticism always presupposes a certain foundation as a regulatory idea for one’s own work, otherwise it risks degenerating into a simple and exhausting casting about for small errors and contradictions in words and expressions, and so forth.” G.G. Shpet, Istoriaia kak problema logiki. Kriticheskie i metodologicheskie issledovaniia (Moscow, 2002), pp. 47–48.


8. Besides him, we can mention Zen’kovskii and Ern, to whom Shpet dedicated his reviews.


10. “Pis’mo N.O. Losskogo k G.G. Shpetu ot 26 marta 1918,” in ibid., p. 446.
11. See this volume, p. 237 [not translated here].


13. Ibid.

14. In fact, it was in the Russian philosophical realm of the discussion that the crystallization of these problems became possible. In his “Reminiscences” [“Vospominaniiia”] he wrote: “In November 1913 Father Pavel Florensky sent me his just-published book The Pillar and Ground of the Truth [Stolp i utverzhdenie istiny], which gave me the impetus to complete the theory of the organic connection of agents with one another. . . . I picked up Florensky’s thought regarding the consubstantiality of created persons and, after pondering the difference between the consubstantiality of the Persons of the Holy Trinity and the consubstantiality of created beings, arrived at a differentiation between the concepts of concrete and abstract consubstantiality.” Quoted from Voprosy filosofii, 1991, no. 11, p. 173.


16. Vorrede—foreword (Germ.)

17. Gans writes: “The main contribution of the lectures currently being delivered is precisely the fact that, despite all of the ability to speculate that is displayed in them, they give empiria and phenomenon their due. . . . that they capture the idea both in logical development and in a historical narrative, which seems disconnected, but in such a way that it is not noticed in the latter” (see E. Gans, “Predislovie k ‘Filosofii istorii’ Hegelia.” See G.V.F. Hegel’, G.V.F. [G.W.F. Hegel], Sochinenia. T. VIII. Filosofiia istorii (Moscow, 1935), p. 429).


19. Shpet studied under Husserl and was the first in Russia to present Ideas Pertainning to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy in the book Iavlenie i smysl (1914). Lossky remained interested in Husserl’s inquiries throughout his life: from a review of the Russian translation of the first volume of Logical Investigations to the critical article “The Transcendental-Phenomenological Ideal of Husserl” (Transtsendental’no-fenomenologicheskii idealizm Gusserlia) (Put’, 1939). The phenomenological trajectories of each of them are subjects for a separate discussion.


22. Ibid., p. 134.


25. The same may be said of Il’in. Shpet, incidentally, recounted in one of his letters to Husserl how he prepared a paper on phenomenology at the Psychological Society. And although he noted that “phenomenology is given a high and favorable assessment everywhere” and “phenomenology is regarded as a serious and new step in philosophy,” there were criticisms as well. Their essence boiled down to the fact that the majority of Russian philosophers at that time saw phenomenology as a new “theory of knowledge.” See “Pismo G.G. Shpeta E. Gusserliu ot 26 fevralia 1914 goda.”

26. Lossky formulated this principle for himself back in his youth. He wrote: “One foggy day (around 1898), when all objects were merging with one another in the St. Petersburg mist, I was riding . . . a horse cab and was immersed in my usual reflections: ‘I only know what is immanent to my consciousness, but only psychic states are immanent to my consciousness, therefore I know only my psychic life.’ I looked ahead of me at the foggy street and mused that there were no sharp boundaries between things, and suddenly a thought flashed before me: ‘Everything is immanent to everything.’” See N.O. Losskii, Chuvstvennaja, intellektual’naia i misticheskaja intuitsiia (Paris, 1938), pp. 156–57.

31. Shpet poses the same question in a somewhat different form to Husserl, who regarded the “pure Ego” as objective transcendality, that is, as transcendence in immanence. Shpet formulates the question as follows: “Does this fancy combination of Latinate words clarify the issue at all? And if we are convinced that I, a nameless individual, am specifically a social thing, then it is only a question of generalization for us: isn’t any social thing a transcendality in immanence?” See G.G. Shpet, “Soznanie i ego sobstvennik,” in Shpet, Philosophia Natalis, p. 298.
32. Ibid., pp. 283–84.
34. Ibid., p. 369.
36. N.O. Losskii, “Svoboda voli,” in Losskii, Izbrannoe, p. 526. He goes on to develop this proposition by defining the interaction of the self with the world and God as a necessary element of the existence of the self as a personality, since the alienation of the self from this interaction changes the ontological structure of the actual self (see ibid., p. 541). Cf. the statement by Gadamer: “What was a conversation for us was something that later left some imprint on us. A conversation did not become a conversation because we learned something new—no, something happened to us that we had never encountered in our life experience. . . . Conversation is capable of transforming man” [emphasis added—Au.]. See G.-G. Gadamer [H.-G.], “Nesposobnost’ k razgovoru,” in Gadamer, Aktual’nost’ prekrasnogo (Moscow, 1991), p. 87.
38. Although the concept of “life-world” has significant possibilities for various
philosophical interpretations, what is important for us here is the following: “The life-world is interpreted [by Husserl] as the universally primordial one—as one that is permanently ‘pregiven’ to people and to everything that at any given moment they have already done, are doing, or may still do.” Quoted from N.V. Motroshilova. “Poniatie i kontseptsiia zhiznennogo mira v pozdnei filosofii Edmunda Gusserlia,” Voprosy filosofii, 2007, no. 7, p. 110. For the conclusion of the article see Voprosy filosofii, 2007, no. 9, pp. 134–44.


40. Although if Lossky had been able at the time to read the German-language version of Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations, which was not published until 1950, he may have taken a different view of the phenomenological explorations of his colleagues (Husserl and Shpet).