THE EU-RUSSIA COMMON SPACE ON EXTERNAL SECURITY: PROSPECTS FOR COOPERATION

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In 2008-2010 St. Petersburg State University funded a research project on the ongoing inter-paradigm debate in international relations theory on sovereignty, where a number of issues were related to the problem of national/state sovereignty in the EU-Russian interaction in the sphere of external security. I also take part in the ongoing research project on Russian policies in the Arctic region, which is funded by St. Petersburg State University. I am

\(^1\) Merged with the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) in 2003.
responsible for the study of Russia’s interaction with the European Union on ‘soft’ security issues in this attractive but highly vulnerable Northern region.

To sum up, this book is both an end result and a follow up of these research projects.

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me with an excellent research environment and warm hospitality. Without their liberal support and help this work would not be possible.

Alexander Sergunin
St. Petersburg State University, Russia
September 2011
Acronyms

ABM  Anti-ballistic missile
ACV  Armoured combat vehicle
BEAC  Barents-Euro-Arctic Council
BTWC  Biological & Tocsin Weapons Convention
CBSM  Confidence and security-building measure
CBSS  Council of the Baltic Sea States
CFE  Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CFSP  Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIS  Commonwealth of Independent States
COCOM  Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls
CoE  Council of Europe
COPRI  Copenhagen Peace Research Institute
CSTO  Collective Security Treaty Organization
CTBT  Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
CW  Chemical weapons
CWC  Chemical Weapons Convention
DIIS  Danish Institute for International Studies
EaP  Eastern Partnership
ECHO  Directorate-General for
EMERCOM: Humanitarian Aid of the European Commission (Russia)

ENP: European Neighbourhood Policy

ENPI: European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument

ESDP: European Security and Defence Policy

EST: European Security Treaty

EU: European Union

EU NAVFOR: European Union Naval Force

FOA: National Defence Research Establishment (Sweden)

FSC: Forum for Security Co-operation

FSU: Former Soviet Union

G8: Group of Eight

GUAM: Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova

HCOC: Hague International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation

IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency

IDP: Internally displaced person

INTAS: International Technical Assistance (to the C.I.S. countries), EU programme
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ISTC</td>
<td>International Science and Technology Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>MD</td>
<td>Military District</td>
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<td>MFN</td>
<td>Most favoured nation</td>
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<td>MTCR</td>
<td>Missile Technology Control Regime</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>NDI</td>
<td>Northern Dimension Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
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<td>NIF</td>
<td>Neighbourhood Investment Facility</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIS</td>
<td>New Independent State</td>
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<tr>
<td>NNWS</td>
<td>Non-nuclear weapon state</td>
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<td>NPT</td>
<td>Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty</td>
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<td>NSG</td>
<td>Nuclear Suppliers Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>OBSEC</td>
<td>Organisation of Black Sea Economic Cooperation</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWS</td>
<td>Nuclear weapons state</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCA</td>
<td>Partnership and Co-operation Agreement</td>
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<td>PPC</td>
<td>Permanent Partnership Council</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Political and Security Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIPRI</td>
<td>Stockholm International Peace Research Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Small and medium enterprises</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations International Children</td>
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and Education Fund

UNSC United Nations Security Council
US United States
WA Wassenaar Arrangement
WEU Western European Union
WMD Weapons of mass destruction
WTO World Trade Organisation
Introduction

The EU-Russia cooperation on external security is a relatively new theme in the Russian and European political discourses. In the 1990s, both the EU and Russia focused primarily on economy, trade, environment, home and justice affairs and research/education/culture issues. The external security problematique was, more or less, left aside. There were a few activities under the Western European Union (WEU) aegis, including some development of joint military technologies, space research, and arms coproduction, but nothing really impressive. Moreover, by the beginning of the current decade the WEU, in fact, transferred its functions and personnel to other EU-related security institutions and arrangements.

For various reasons – political, ideological and institutional – neither the EU nor Russia were ready for cooperation in such a delicate sphere. For example, the EU simply did not have a proper institutional setting for the development of security cooperation with either individual foreign countries or international security organisations (such as NATO, OSCE, etc.). The EU security-related arrangements – Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), launched on the threshold of the 21st century, – experienced numerous problems of political, administrative and financial nature and were unable to serve as proper venues for security cooperation with Russia. It took several years for them to shape their strategic vision and solve the above-mentioned problems.

Another problem was the lack of a proper conceptual/doctrinal basis for the EU-Russia security cooperation. While collaborative priorities in such spheres as economy, energy, transportation, environment, and education were more or less clearly defined, security cooperation remained in the ‘grey zone’ of the EU-Russia bilateral relations.
In 1997, the EU and Russia committed to a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), to run for an initial period of ten years. The Agreement established the institutional framework for bilateral relations, and set out the principal common objectives for trade and economic cooperation across a range of sectors, for political dialogue, and, to a limited extent, for cooperation in justice and home affairs. However, it said nothing about external security challenges. At that time neither the EU nor Russia saw each other as potential (or promising) partners in the field of international security.

In June 1999, the Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia was adopted by the European Council in Cologne. Again, the document was mainly devoted to other (non-security-related) issues. The EU preferred to limit itself to some general declarations on its intention to strengthen the strategic partnership between Russia and the European Union in various respects. Among the common challenges to the European continent the document emphasised the soft security problematique: environmental issues (air and water pollution, nuclear waste and nuclear reactors safety), organised crime, money-laundering, human trafficking, and drug trafficking. The only exception was a rather vague mention of possible collaboration with Moscow in the field of the so-called ‘preventive diplomacy’,² which presupposed the following priorities:

- Enhancement of the EU-Russia cooperation to foster conflict prevention, crisis management, and conflict resolution, both within the OSCE and the UN.
- Promotion of arms control and disarmament and implementation of existing agreements, reinforcing export controls, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and supporting nuclear disarmament and chemical weapons (CW) destruction (European Council, 1999).

² It was unclear why arms control was categorized as preventive diplomacy.
Other priorities for the EU-Russia dialogue on international security cooperation were not specified. However, it should be noted, that since that time these two areas for cooperation have been firmly established as part of the EU-Russia collaborative agenda.

On the other hand, it must be said that, while the second item on the EU-Russia security cooperation agenda (arms control and disarmament) had already somewhat materialized (bilateral and multilateral consultations, discussions, mutual coordination of activities through various international forums, etc.) by the late 1990s, the first item (crisis management and conflict resolution) was almost fully neglected. Along with Russia, the EU had taken part in some consultative/mediating bodies, that dealt with local conflicts in the post-Soviet space (Transnistria, South Ossetia, and Nagorny Karabakh), but it had never been a key player in conflict management processes, usually limiting its participation to the role of an observer (Popesku, 2006). Moreover, in the 1990s the EU simply did not have adequate peace keeping capabilities, which started to develop only in the post-Kosovo period. Even by now the plan to form a 60,000-strong rapid reaction corps for peace-keeping and peace-enforcement operations has not been fulfilled.

Russia’s response⁴ to the EU Common Strategy on Russia, presented by the then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin at the EU/Russia summit in Helsinki in October 1999, merely echoed Brussels’s initiatives and basically described Russia’s concerns in view of the proposed EU enlargement (The Government of the Russian Federation, 1999). External security issues were completely ignored.


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⁴ The document was titled “Medium Term Strategy for development of Relations Between the Russian Federation and the EU (2000-2010)".
2003), outlining the basic principles of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The purpose of the ENP was to build friendly relations with the EU’s new neighbours in the post-enlargement era. In October 2003 the European Council welcomed this initiative and urged the Commission and the Council to take it forward. Since then, the Commission has also held exploratory talks with partners in Eastern Europe and the Southern Mediterranean, which already had Partnership and Cooperation Agreements or Association Agreements in force.

Russia was also eligible for participation in the ENP project. However, Moscow declined the proposal for various reasons. The main reason for Russia’s discontent was that the ENP concept did not provide Moscow with a special status in its relations with Brussels. Russia felt that, because of its previous intense cooperation with the EU and its geo-economic and geopolitical role in Europe, it deserved more than the position of just one of many neighbours of the Union (Sergunin, 2005).

In response to Russia’s concerns about the ENP, the EU proposed a different model of bilateral relations. The Joint Statement, adopted at the St. Petersburg EU-Russia Summit in May 2003, agreed to introduce four common spaces, including one on external security cooperation. The Rome Summit in November 2003 endorsed the idea, although no details were provided for at that time. Finally, Road Maps to four common spaces (including the common space of external security) were adopted at the May 2005 EU-Russia Summit (Commission of the European Communities, 2005) (see Table 1). The Road Map on External Security serves as the only systematic document for the EU-Russia dialogue in this area, even though it has no binding legal force. The common spaces concept became, on the one hand, a substitute for and, on the other hand, a complement to the ENP in the EU-Russia relations. In fact, Road

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4 EU-Russia common spaces on economy, trade, environment; freedom, security, justice (internal security); external security; research, education, culture.
Maps are designed in the same way as Action Plans that were signed by the ENP participants. Moreover, Russia (formally not a member of the ENP) has joined the financial instrument of the programme, the European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument (ENPI).

Table 1. The EU-Russia Four Common Spaces

This study aims at two main research objectives: *First*, to examine how the current EU-Russia agenda on external security cooperation meets the existing security challenges (regionally and globally), and, *second*, what should be done to improve the EU-Russia external security dialogue. A special section is devoted to case studies on evolution of Russia’s threat perceptions, the EU-Russia relations on the so-called Eastern Partnership programme, and President Dmitry Medvedev’s plan to establish a new European security architecture.
Past Research

The EU-Russia cooperation on external security is a ‘missing link’ in the existing body of scholarship. The Russian and international academic community has focused primarily on other dimensions of the EU-Russia cooperation, such as economy and trade, transportation, civil society, health care, environment, education and culture, etc., with external security remaining a sort of a taboo field, cautiously avoided by experts.

Partially, it can be explained by a lack of factual material, since the EU-Russia security cooperation was (and pretty much still remains) in embryo. But the main reason why both Russian and international experts refrained from this theme was that it represented a major clash between European and Russian political philosophies, including their approaches, both theoretical and operational, to the very notion of security. While European experts tried to address security challenges of the post-modern époque and, accordingly, suggested brand new security theories, Russian specialists dealt with traditionalist/modernist security threats and risks, and preferred theories such as geopolitics, or Morgenthau-type political realism (Sergunin, 2007). The two sides’ language, terminology and theoretical approaches were different to such an extent, that they simply did not understand (or did not want to understand) each other.

However, the 9/11 attacks, Madrid-2004, Beslan-2004 and other dramatic developments of the current decade have made these ideological differences irrelevant, calling for a pragmatic agenda for the EU-Russia cooperation on external security. Now both decision-makers and security experts understand
that the EU and Russia simply can not avoid dialogue in this area any longer and that such cooperation could be beneficial to both sides⁵.

Unfortunately, despite the obvious importance of the issue, there is still very little research done on this problematique. Some general studies of the EU-Russian relations occasionally mention security cooperation between Brussels and Moscow [Allison, Light and White, 2006; Gower and Timmins, 2007; Hopf, 2008]. Other researchers focus on single issues and do not cover the whole range of problems [e.g. Averre, 2005; Forsberg, 2004; Joenniemi & Sergunin, 2003; Makarychev and Sergunin, 2011; Medvedev, 2005; Popesku, 2006; Sergunin, 2010a and 2010b; Øberg, 2006]. Yet other research studies are of theoretical rather than policy-relevant nature [Makarychev, 2008; Postnikov, 2008]. These authors treat the EU-Russia cooperation on international security as merely a case study for testing broader security concepts and theories, and are not interested in analyzing concrete aspects of such cooperation. A few authors have tried to explore the problem from a broader perspective [Zhurkin, 2007; Danilov, 2008; Sergunin, 2008].

The ambition of this study is to suggest a comprehensive approach to the issue, leaning on a multidisciplinary understanding of the problem, and a holistic treatment of the problematique.

**Data and Method**

Even though a student of contemporary world politics always feels a lack of sources (especially reliable ones), some such sources are available. The data for the study have been drawn from the following sources:

- The search on Internet.

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⁵ On evolution of Russian security thinking in the post-Soviet era see Sergunin 2007.
- Governmental/official publications and materials (Russian and EU-related).
- Published interviews with officials, politicians, NGO leaders, and experts.
- Statistical information, yearbooks, handbooks, and reference books.
- Periodicals.
- Research literature: monographs, analytical papers, and articles.

As with any study of ‘hot’ political issues, it’s difficult to compile a set of reliable data. Information is often classified, misleading, or not fully reported. A scholar has to examine numerous unconfirmed media reports to select solid data. Research is further complicated by differences of opinion between experts as regards methods of assessing statistics. Moreover, research techniques and terminology also vary. Therefore, exercise of critical judgment and careful comparison of sources have been important factors in compiling the database for this research.

Since the study entails not only data collection but also data assessment, I have established three main principles with regard to selecting and interpreting sources:

- **Validity.** Data must represent the most important and typical trends rather than occasional or irregular developments.
- **Informativeness.** Sources that provide valuable and timely information are given priority.
- **Innovativeness.** Preference is given to sources that offer original data, fresh ideas, and non-traditional approaches.

These research techniques have helped me to overcome the limitations of available sources and compile substantial and sufficient data for the study.
PART I
EU-RUSSIA COOPERATION ON EXTERNAL SECURITY:
A GENERAL OUTLINE
Chapter 1

The Co-operative Problematique/Priorities

According to the road map for the EU-Russia common space on external security (Commission of the European Communities, 2005), the EU and Russia will strengthen cooperation and dialogue on security and crisis management in order to address the global and regional challenges and key threats of today, notably terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and existing and potential conflicts, both regional and local.

In particular, the cooperative agenda includes five priority areas (see Table 2):

- **Strengthened dialogue and co-operation on the international scene**

  Both Moscow and Brussels believe that multilateral diplomacy is one of the most important resources for solving the existing local, regional, and global problems. For this reason, they have sought to coordinate their activities in international organisations and various forums on the regular basis. According to the 2005 road map on external security cooperation, the EU and Russia decided to enhance cooperation in the following priority areas:

  - Strengthening and deepening of the EU-Russia bilateral dialogue on political and security issues and on human rights.
  - Strengthening of the international order based on effective multilateralism in support of the UN (United Nations) playing the central role, and of other relevant international and regional organisations, in particular the OSCE (Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe) and the Council of Europe. This will include full implementation of all international commitments, including the OSCE commitments. It should be noted that in this case Russia
differentiates between the EU, on the one hand, and the US and NATO, on the other. In contrast with the EU, which is seen as an important supporter of international law and order, Moscow treats the US and NATO as major ‘spoilers’ and ‘troublemakers’ in international relations, who regularly breach international law and undermine the role of international institutions and multilateral diplomacy. In all the most problematic cases (Kosovo, Iraq and South Ossetia) Russia appealed to the EU as a strong proponent of international law and a preferable mediator.

Table 2. Priorities for the EU-Russia cooperation on external security

- Promoting conflict prevention and settlement through mutual result-oriented co-operation, including through joint initiatives. The EU and Russia expressed their will in consulting, on a regular basis, on early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management actions and post-conflict rehabilitation.
- Exchange of views on new initiatives and on possible use of instruments related to security and stability.
- Strengthened political dialogue on all levels of the EU and Russian security and foreign policy strategies and concepts, and academic cooperation in this field.
- Exchange of information on relevant major international contacts of the EU and Russian officials with respect to the space of external security.
- Development of contacts between the EU and Russian military structures, including the European Defence Agency.
- Optimisation of agenda and parameters of the EU-Russia political dialogue to make it more effective.
- Cooperation between the EU Institute for Security Studies\(^6\) and the network of Russian academic bodies, including possible joint research projects on European security.

The EU and Russia have decided to conclude an agreement on protection of classified information, which will allow for exchange of classified information in the context of EU-Russia cooperation on any matter of common interest. Negotiations on technical arrangements are still ongoing (European External Action Service, 2011).

*Fight against terrorism*

In this field, the EU and Russia have agreed to develop cooperation in the following priority areas:
- Implementation of the Joint Statement on the fight against terrorism, adopted in November 2002;

\[^6\] Former WEU Research Institute.
• Intensification and enhancement of co-operation between the EU and Russia on all relevant international and regional forums (including, *inter alia*, the UN Security Council Counter-terrorism Committee), and building capacity of third countries to fight terrorism;
• Co-operation within the UN in implementing UN Security Council resolutions, in particular 1373 and 1566, to improve and strengthen international efforts in the fight against terrorism;
• Co-operation between the EU and Russia, in accordance with their obligations under international law, in order to find, deny safe haven and bring to justice, on the basis of the principle to extradite or prosecute, any person who supports, facilitates, participates or attempts to participate in the financing, planning, preparation or commission of terrorist acts or provides safe havens;
• Co-operation within the UN on elaborating under UN aegis an integrated strategy to respond to global threats and challenges of the 21st century in the context of advancing towards the goals approved in the UN Millennium Declaration;
• Becoming party to all 12 UN counter-terrorism conventions and protocols and implementing fully their provisions;
• Promotion of the early signature and ratification of the UN International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism;
• Promotion of the early finalisation of the UN Comprehensive Convention Against International Terrorism;
• Co-operation within the Council of Europe for developing and adopting instruments in the fight against terrorism;
• Co-operation within the OSCE as a forum for the promotion of international norms and standards, and taking collective decisions on crucial matters of European security in order to strengthen its antiterrorist efforts, as well as promoting implementation of the OSCE commitments in this field;
Developing co-operation to strengthen the fight against the financing of terrorism, including freezing of funds and other terrorist assets, in accordance with the relevant international instruments.

It was proposed that co-operation should be intensified through dialogue at both political and expert level between the relevant EU and Russian bodies *inter alia* by:

- Information exchange on the issues of the fight against terrorism through consultations in Brussels and in Moscow or by other means;
- Consultations on the eve of major antiterrorist meetings to exchange views on positions and possible joint actions;
- Consultations during such events to co-ordinate positions and activities.

*Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery, strengthening of export control regimes and disarmament*

As mentioned, the EU-Russian cooperation in this sphere already started in the 1990s. For example, in 1999 the EU Council launched a “European Union Cooperation Programme for Non-proliferation and Disarmament in the Russian Federation.” The objective of the programme was to support Russia in its efforts towards arms control and disarmament. The programme was supposed to:

- cooperate with the Russian Federation in its pursuit of a safe, secure and environmentally sound dismantlement and/or reconversion of infrastructure and equipment linked to its WMD;
- provide a legal and operational framework for an enhanced European Union role in cooperative risk reduction activities in the Russian Federation through project-orientated cooperation, and
• promote coordination as appropriate of programmes and projects in this field at Community, Member State and international level. In its first phase the programme was supposed to contribute to:
• a chemical weapons destruction pilot plant in Gorny, Saratov region, Russia;\(^7\)
• a set studies and experimental studies on plutonium transport, storage and disposition (Council of the European Union, 1999).

In June 2001, the EU took a decision to provide Gosatomnadzor, the Russian nuclear safety authority, with €6,080,000 to develop the regulatory basis and documents for the disposition of weapons grade plutonium (Council of the European Union, 2001).

According to the 2005 road map, the priority areas for the EU-Russia cooperation should include the following areas:
• Dialogue on non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control, including regional aspects, for further convergence of positions and possible coordination of activities within existing international mechanisms, including relevant international and regional forums;
• Promotion of universal adherence to and greater effectiveness of the relevant international instruments (such as NPT,\(^8\) CWC,\(^9\) BTWC,\(^10\) CTBT,\(^11\)

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\(^7\) In the framework of the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Russian Federation was committed to construct an industrial pilot chemical weapons destruction facility at Gorny. The facility at Gorny (Saratov region) was one out of seven sites in the Russian Federation, earmarked for the destruction of chemical weapons. It was estimated that the Gorny facility would process (destroy or recycle) 225 tons of lewisite, 690 tons of yperite and 210 tons of a lewisite-yperite mixture (Council of the European Union, 1999). This represented about 2.9 % of total stocks, earmarked by Russia for destruction under the CWC. The CWC stipulated the total elimination of chemical weapons by 2007. However, against the background of financial and economic problems the Russian Federation faced, this task was very complex and surely required expanded international support in view of meeting the commitments taken under the convention.

\(^8\) Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The NPT was concluded in 1968 under the UN aegis. It came into force in 1970 (after its ratification by forty crucial signatories). The NPT is regularly revised at the special UN review conferences (the last one was held in 2005).
IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) Comprehensive Safeguards\textsuperscript{12} and Additional Protocol,\textsuperscript{13} HCOC\textsuperscript{14}), enhancement and, where relevant, enlargement

\textsuperscript{9} Chemical Weapons Convention. The CWC was signed in 1993. The Russian Federation ratified it in 1997. The implementation of the Convention by Moscow was postponed because of the lack of finances.

\textsuperscript{10} Biological & Tocsin Weapons Convention. The BTWC was signed in 1972 and came into force in 1975. However, it still faces numerous problems with the universality and compliance to the Convention. The EU and Russia are two major driving forces in strengthening the BTWC regime.

\textsuperscript{11} Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The Treaty was opened for signing in 1996. It did not come into force because forty-four so-called ‘critical’ states either did not sign or ratify the document. Both Russia and the EU member-states signed and ratified the CTBT.

\textsuperscript{12} Each non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS) party to the NPT is required by the treaty to conclude a ‘comprehensive’ or ‘full-scope’ safeguards agreement with the IAEA. As of July 2004, forty-two out of 189 states parties did not have such agreements in force. (The non-NPT states parties, India, Israel and Pakistan, all have non-comprehensive safeguards agreements that apply only to certain facilities and/or materials). Under such agreements, NNWS parties declare to the IAEA all their nuclear facilities (which, by definition, are assumed to be for peaceful purposes) and inventories of all nuclear materials. These are subject to verification (‘safeguarded’) by the IAEA to ensure timely detection of the diversion to non-peaceful purposes of a ‘significant quantity’ of nuclear material. Traditional safeguards focus on accountancy and control of nuclear materials, through which the IAEA confirms that quantities of declared nuclear materials remain at safeguarded sites or can otherwise be accounted for. In addition to nuclear accountancy, the Agency uses routine on-site inspections and passive ‘containment and surveillance’ measures such as tamper-resistant seals and surveillance cameras. States parties recognised as nuclear weapon states (NWS) by the NPT (China, France, Russia, the UK and US) are not required to accept comprehensive safeguards, but all have made ‘voluntary offers’, accepting safeguards on certain facilities as a token of goodwill <http://www.dfait-mae.gc.ca/arms/isrop/research/compl_verif_2005/section04-en.asp>

\textsuperscript{13} In May 1997 the IAEA Board of Governors agreed a Model Additional Protocol to Safeguards Agreements. The Protocol provides for increased transparency by extending states parties’ declaration and reporting obligations to the entire life cycle of a state’s nuclear industries. This stretches all the way from nuclear mining and processing to the storage of nuclear waste, including the activities of private firms involved in the nuclear fuel cycle, as well as sites that house nuclear material intended for non-nuclear purposes. The Additional Protocol requires states parties to report on the production of nuclear-related equipment, nuclear-related imports and exports, nuclear fuel cycle-related research and development, and future plans for nuclear facilities. The Additional Protocol also expands the IAEA’s rights to conduct inspections of states parties’ nuclear industries, most importantly through ‘complementary access’. This permits the Agency to inspect any part of a declared nuclear facility, instead of only designated ‘strategic points’ accessible under full-scope safeguards. This can also be applied to nuclear-related sites, such as those that use unsafeguarded nuclear materials. Complementary access may be coupled with short-notice access to all facilities at a nuclear site and with the possibility of collecting environmental samples outside declared locations. The Additional Protocol increases the IAEA’s capacity to ensure that states parties’
of export control regimes (MTCR, NSG, WA), promotion of a policy of reinforcing compliance with multilateral treaty regimes and other international obligations such as UN Security Council resolution 1540, as well as strengthening of export controls for WMD, their means of delivery, conventional weapons, and related goods and technologies;

- Enhancement of ongoing work, including that in the context of the G8 Global Partnership in accordance with the Kananaskis documents, including new projects in the priority areas identified at Kananaskis;

- Strengthening of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament activities (e.g. co-ordination of the EU and Russian positions at the 2005 NPT Review Conference, promotion of earliest entry into force of CTBT, contribution to early commencement of negotiations on a Treaty banning the production of

declarations are complete, as well as significantly improving its prospects for detecting undeclared nuclear material and activities. This offers a vastly improved basis for deterring a state from engaging in prohibited activities <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/arms/isrop/research/compl_verif_2005/section04-en.asp>

14 Hague International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation was signed in 2002 to control the spread of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction.

15 Missile Technology Control Regime. The MTCR is an informal voluntary association of countries acting to limit trade in unmanned delivery systems that can deliver weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It seeks to coordinate national export licensing to prevent the spread of WMD. Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States established the MTCR in 1987. The number of MTCR partners has since increased to 34. Russia has joined the MTCR in 1995 <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/arms/missile-mtcr-en.asp>

16 The Nuclear Suppliers Group was formed in 1974 (after India’s 1974 nuclear test explosion) with the purpose of strengthening the NPT regime with broader multilateral export controls. As of 1 January 2006, 45 states (and the European Commission as a permanent observer) participate in the NSG, which operates on the basis of consensus (SIPRI 2006: 679).

17 The Wassenaar Arrangement was established in July 1995 to promote transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, thus preventing destabilizing accumulations. It replaced the voluntary Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), established in the 1950s and directed against Communist states. The participants in the Wassenaar Arrangement exchange information in confidence on the export of 7 categories of major conventional weapon to non-participating states (Antony and Bauer 2004: 744-747).

18 The G-8 Kananaskis summit was held in June 2002.
fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices) and arms control;

- Strengthening of chemical and biological non-proliferation activities (e.g. co-operation on implementing action plans of promoting the CWC universality and national implementation, strengthening of BTWC through promoting its universality and implementation as well as developing adequate measures to verify compliance with the BTWC;

- Co-operation on further universalisation of the HCOC in facilitating subscription in particular of countries possessing missile technology or capability to develop it and on furthering implementation of the Code’s confidence building measures;

- Dialogue on the opportunity of developing a legally binding arrangement for a global system of control for the non-proliferation of missiles and their related technology, taking into account the wide subscription to the HCOC and efforts on establishing a link with the UN;

- Active support through the UN and the Conference on Disarmament to the goal of preventing an arms race in outer space as an essential condition for the strengthening of strategic stability and for the promotion of international co-operation in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes;

- Comparative analysis of EU’s and Russian approaches to non-proliferation with a view to elaborating a joint document on strategic partnership in this area;

- Enhancement of ongoing work on threats posed by old ammunition, including anti-personnel land-mines, and explosive remnants of war;

- Strengthening co-operation to resume substantial work of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva;

- Establishment of a channel for regular exchange of views within existing formats on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons;
• Dialogue on the implementation of the UN Programme of Action on the illicit trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its aspects.

• Co-operation should be intensified through dialogue at both political and expert level between relevant EU and Russian bodies by:
  
  • Information exchange on the issues of non-proliferation through consultations in Brussels and in Moscow or by other means;
  
  • Consultations on the eve of major non-proliferation or disarmament events to exchange views on positions and possible joint activities;
  
  • Consultations during such events to exchange views on positions and to co-ordinate activities;
  
  • Paying special attention to co-operation and regular consultations between the EU and Russia in the context of the G8 Global Partnership.

Co-operation in crisis management

The EU and Russia have also agreed to strengthen dialogue on co-operation in crisis management in order to prepare the ground for joint initiatives, including in support of on-going efforts to settle regional conflicts, particularly in regions adjacent to the EU and Russian borders:

• Exchange of views at expert level on matters related to the EU’s and Russia’s procedures in response to crisis situations, including exchange of views on lessons learnt, in order to improve mutual understanding and explore possibilities for joint approaches. This exchange of views could lead to the development of principles and modalities for joint approaches in crisis management;

• Conclusion of a standing framework on legal and financial aspects in order to facilitate possible co-operation in crisis management operations;

• Conclusion of an agreement on information protection;
Experts’ exchange of views on specific areas like logistical aspects of crisis management operations, naval forces co-operation in the sphere of navigation and hydrography, underwater exploration with a view of ensuring navigation safety, hydrometeorology and early warning of disasters, co-operation of the EU Satellite Centre with Russia;

- Consideration of possibilities for co-operation in the field of long-haul air transport;

- Co-operation in the field of training and exercises which could include observation and participation in exercises organized by either Russia or the EU and participation in training courses;

- Strengthening of the EU-Russia academic networking in the field of crisis management through exchange of research fellows between the EU Institute for Security Studies and the network of Russian academic bodies for the purpose of joint studies;

- Promotion of contacts between the EU and Russian military and civilian crisis management structures.

It is well-known that the number of conflicts (some of them frozen) in the EU-Russian neighbourhood remains high: Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, the Middle East, and Western Sahara. Both Russia and the EU have direct interest in working with partners to promote resolution of these conflicts’, as they undermine EU’s efforts to promote political reform and economic development in the neighbourhood and could affect EU’s own security through regional escalation, unmanageable migratory flows, disruption of energy supply and trade routes, or the creation of breeding grounds for terrorist and criminal activity of all kinds.

The EU is already active in preventing and resolving conflicts but, as many European experts believe, more should be done. A number of CFSP and ESDP measures have been launched. EU Special Representatives have been
appointed, and police, border control and border assistance missions are developing their activities. According to some experts, however, these actions need to be planned and coordinated with longer-term EC policies, which address the overall institutional and governance context and thus favour stabilisation (Popesku, 2006). The deployment of all available tools, whether first, second or third pillar, would increase EU influence and avoid the limitations of short-term crisis management. Both Moscow and Brussels believe that the EU can make an important contribution by working around the conflict issues, promoting similar reforms on both sides of the boundary lines, and to foster convergence between political, economic and legal systems, enabling greater social inclusion and contributing to confidence building. The example of the EU Border Assistance Mission to Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova integrating European Council and CFSP instruments in one approach shows how this can work. In other cases, depending on the nature of the conflict, increasing the capacities of ministries dealing with refugees, promoting the integration of minorities through language instruction, supporting post-conflict infrastructure rehabilitation, including cultural heritage, or implementing local income generation projects can constitute appropriate confidence-building measures.

The EU’s institutional involvement in conflict settlement mechanisms in the pre-war 2008 (South Ossetia) period varied widely. It was a full participant in the Quartet (Middle East Peace Process) and participates as an observer in the 5+2 talks (Transnistria), while the Commission was an observer in the Joint Control Commission (South Ossetia). Only individual member states participated in the Minsk Group (Nagorno-Karabakh) and the UN Friends of Georgia (Abkhazia). According to the European views, given the EU’s history of peace and stability through regional integration, the EU has added value to bring to the efforts of individual member states and must be prepared to assume a greater role in the resolution of conflicts in the neighbourhood.
As far as the Transnistria conflict is concerned, the negotiation format is most active at the level of bilaterals between Chisinau, Tiraspol and Moscow, with less activity so far in the 5+2 format (Russia, Ukraine, OSCE, EU, US + Moldova and Transnistria). While Russia believes that the bilateral format is more efficient, the EU pushes forcefully for the 5+2 format to be the principal negotiating forum. According to the European experts, the EU should do this with the aid of a high-level political representative for Moldova and with the professional support of the existing EU special representative (Emerson 2009b: 76).

Regarding the situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the EU – both institutionally and at the level of individual member states – was involved in mediating these conflicts from the early 1990s. Along with the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, the French President Nicola Sarkozy, who chaired the European Council in the second half of 2008, was a key figure in the ceasefire and post-conflict settlement negotiations in August 2008. He also played a crucial role in launching of the Geneva talks on security arrangements and IDP (internally displaced persons) return issues in the region, which began on 15 October 2008, with the participation of Russia, Georgia, EU, US, OSCE, and UN. The non-recognition of the independence of these two entities by all parties except Russia has presented difficulties from the start.

According to one scenario (designed by European experts), it is possible to have a functional cooperation with both Abkhazia and South Ossetia by all parties, including the EU, but without formal recognition of these new *de facto* states. As specialists note, there will be political reluctance to grant even this degree of implicit partial recognition, given that it may be perceived as a concession to Russia, which is seen by many Europeans as a revisionist power. On the other hand, some European experts believe that Abkhazia (more so than South Ossetia) is reluctant to become part of the Russian Federation, but rather
wants to start developing as part of modern Europe. Analysts advise that this ambition should be met with an open EU position for economic relations and people contacts. They also suggest that a move by the EU to cooperate functionally with Abkhazia and South Ossetia without recognition could be reciprocated by Russia over Kosovo, with it moving to a position of abstention, rather than seeking constantly in UNSC meetings to block EU actions there (Emerson 2009b: 76-77).

As for the Nagorny Karabakh problem, there have been years of attempts by the OSCE-sponsored Minsk Group co-chairs (France as the only representative from the EU, Russia, the USA) to mediate a settlement in this region. The proposed settlement included such elements as cession by Armenia of the occupied territories surrounding Nagorny Karabakh, guaranteed transport corridors for both Nagorny Karabakh into Armenia and for Nakichevan into Azerbaijan-proper, and deferral of a final status agreement for Nagorny Karabakh. Ideas for settlement of the constitutional regime have included a special status for Nagorny Karabakh with links to both Armenia and Azerbaijan. According to these proposals, Nagorny Karabakh could be open to the economies of both Armenia and Azerbaijan, with a provision for refugee return, notably to the former Azeri-majority town of Sushi.

Because the Minsk group is seen by many negotiating parties as inefficient, now both Russia and Turkey seek to take the initiative over Nagorny Karabakh unilaterally. Moscow and Ankara have initiated a series of meetings with both Armenian and Azeri leaders. The two countries’ proposals suggest that the conflict resolution process might start with an opening of the Turkish-Armenian frontier for normal trade and movement of people, the removal of remaining Armenian claims (e.g. implicit in its constitution) to its earlier territorial frontiers, and moves in favour of historic reconciliation.
The European experts believe that the EU could (and should) join with Turkey and Russia in taking a lead to get a settlement. Another formula might see a reconfiguration of the Minsk Group to include Turkey with France’s role converted into an EU role (Emerson 2009b: 77-78).

The EU-Russian joint peace-keeping operations in various parts of the world present another promising venue for security cooperation between Brussels and Moscow. At the EU-Russian Nice summit (November 2008) Moscow and Brussels decided to launch a series of joint peace-keeping operations in Africa. For example, the Russian helicopter groups participated in the EU-led peace-keeping operations in Chad and Central African Republic. This experience was positively assessed by both sides (Terekhov 2009).

As follows from the European External Action Service’s report, good cooperation continued between EU NAVFOR Atalanta\(^{19}\) and the Russian naval mission deployed off the Somali coast, enhancing the levels of protection provided to merchant shipping (European External Action Service, 2011).

Russia and the EU agreed to move forward on a framework agreement in the field of crisis management operations. First expert talks have taken place in 2010 and continued in 2011 (European External Action Service, 2011).

\(^{19}\) EU NAVFOR Operation Atalanta acts in accordance with United Nations Security Councils resolutions. The military operation was launched 8 December and has been extended by the European Council until December 2012. The EU NAVFOR Operation Atalanta pursues the following objectives:

- protect vessels of the World Food Programme, humanitarian aid and African Union Mission in Somalia shipping
- help deter, prevent and repress acts of piracy and armed robbery
- protect vulnerable shipping
- monitor fishing activities off the coast of Somalia

The EU NAVFOR Operation Atalanta consists of units from Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Spain and Sweden. Contributions from third countries such as Norway are participating as well. Also, a number of Cypriot, Irish, Maltese and Finnish military personnel supplement the team at the Northwood Operation Headquarters (http://www.eunavfor.eu/about-us/).
According to some European experts, the EU’s pro-active position on conflict resolution is predetermined by the Union’s nature as a ‘normative power’ (Romanova, 2011; Tocci et al., 2008; Tocci, 2009). Adherence to democratic norms has resulted in the EU’s desire to establish a zone of peace and stability in Europe’s neighbourhood. And here the EU can meet Russia’s interest in having a more secure and stable neighbourhood as well. Moreover, as some Russian experts believe (Makarychev, 2009), Russia itself is increasingly becoming a ‘normative power,’ and this can be helpful in bridging mental ‘gaps’ and facilitating mutual understanding between Moscow and Brussels.

**Co-operation in the field of civil protection**

One more strategic objective of Brussels-Moscow co-operation is to strengthen the EU-Russia dialogue on promoting common ability to respond to disaster and emergencies, including in specific crisis management situations:

- Strengthening of co-ordination on the most effective use of available capabilities in the field of civil protection;
- Work on implementation of the administrative arrangement between the EU Monitoring and Information Centre and the Operations Centre of Russia’s EMERCOM (Emergency Committee)\(^{20}\), signed on 19 May 2004. In particular, to exchange contact details to keep in touch on a 24-hour basis; to exchange templates for early warnings and requests/offers for assistance; to exchange information during an emergency, where appropriate; to conduct communication exercises on an agreed basis; and to enable operation staff to spend one week a year in the operational centre of the other service in order to gain practical experience;

\(^{20}\) Now the Ministry for Emergency Situations.
Continued discussion on concrete areas of EU-Russia co-operation, including civil protection and assistance in response to natural disasters and crisis situations.

- Exchange of information on lessons learnt from terrorist attacks;
- Invitation, on a case-by-case basis, of experts to specific technical workshops and symposiums on civil protection issues;
- Invitation, on a case-by-case basis, of observers to specific exercises organized by the EU or Russia;
- Facilitating mutual assistance in search and rescue operations for submarines, ships, and aircraft in emergency situations.

Many European experts believe that civil protection is a non-controversial field, in which there could be established a coordination framework, bringing in also the Eastern partner states and Central Asia. Some specialists suggest establishing a Pan-European Civil Emergencies Facility, which would develop operational procedures for common actions, and coordinate supply capabilities and logistics (Emerson 2009b: 78).

Such an ambitious agenda calls for a close co-operation between the EU and Russia and presupposes the engagement of significant material and financial resources on both sides. A number of questions come up on the research agenda: Is such co-operation feasible? Does this list of priorities adequately reflect a real EU-Russia external security agenda? These (and related) issues should be thoroughly discussed both by practitioners and academics.
Chapter 2
Problems and Solutions

Although Russia has increasingly embraced the growing number of cooperative projects with Europe over the last decade, there have also been a number of limitations restricting Russia’s engagement and the success of different projects. Therefore, when thinking about the future of external security co-operation with the EU, it is important to note, that in the current situation both challenges to and opportunities for such a co-operation can be identified. Therefore, the research objective of this study is to highlight a number of the most serious challenges and obstacles to enhancing effective security co-operation, and to suggest a number of possible solutions to those problems.

Problems and obstacles to Brussels-Moscow co-operation can be identified on both the EU and Russian sides:

- The roots of these issues go back to the very basics, e.g. to a different understanding of the notion of security by the EU and Russia. While the European Union supports a comprehensive/multidimensional understanding of security – not only ‘hard’ but also ‘soft’ security problematique (and the road map on external security suggests this perspective), official Moscow still prefers a traditional vision of the concept, concentrating on its military/‘hard’ security aspects. Few Russian experts profess and promote views that are close to the European vision of security.\(^{21}\)

- There was also a fundamental difference between the EU and Russia in understanding another area of the EU-Russia common space on external security, namely: the struggle against international terrorism. For example, while

\(^{21}\) One of the few efforts to bridge the gap between the European and Russian ways of security thinking was the work of the EU-Russia Human Security Study Group, that was established in 2009. See its first report: Helsinki Plus: Towards a Human Security Architecture for Europe. May 2010. London-Madrid: LSE Global Governance-CIDOB, 2010.
Europeans have viewed the Chechen rebels as “freedom-fighters”, Moscow has seen them as terrorists, and while for Moscow the Hamas has been a radical organisation, yet still eligible for further political dialogue, the EU has basically perceived this Palestinian grouping as a purely terrorist movement.

• In contrast with the EU that prefers multilateral diplomacy and approaches, Moscow still emphases bilateral (state-to-state) relations (such as ‘special relationships’ with Germany, France, Italy, etc.) instead of the EU-Russia dialogue, displaying a certain mistrust of supranational institutions. Moscow believes that bilateral contacts are more efficient that multilateral politics. In practical terms, it means that from the very beginning Moscow has not perceived the EU as a reliable security provider.

• The current economic and political climate both in Russia and Europe has also created some difficulties in the EU-Russia relations. Increases in oil prices made Russia stronger in the beginning of previous decade, while the EU seemed a great deal weaker as a result of its constitutional and monetary crises (it is already clear that the Kremlin considers Berlin, London, Paris and Rome of more significance than Brussels). As the European Commission concluded, the EU could not take Russia for granted (Commission of the European Communities 2006).

• Some experts believe that the EU-Russia co-operation on external security will be complicated by their diminishing strategic role in the world: they are no longer seen as important security providers; other centres of power (such as the US, China, Japan, etc.) will play a major role in the emerging world security order in the foreseeable future (Karaganov, 2010). On the other hand, the same experts point out, that common security threats and the need for survival can push the EU and Russia to create some new security arrangements and even establish a Union of Europe.
Moscow is also unhappy with the universalist approach of the ENP\textsuperscript{22} concept and the EU’s current way of thinking about co-operation with its neighbours. The point is that Russia does not want to be treated in the same way as Belarus or Morocco and rather claims a special status and special relationship with Brussels. Likewise, Moscow is also discontented with the ENP concept in that, in contrast with other regional co-operation projects (e.g. the Northern Dimension Initiative (NDI) launched in late 1990s), it leaves almost no room for Russia in setting the bilateral co-operative agenda. The concept seems to be based on the assumption, that the EU’s neighbours should simply accept its rules of play and upgrade their legislation in accordance with European standards, rather than the EU developing specific models for each country.

One possible solution to this problem can be to make the ENP more differentiated in order to take into account the peculiarities of each neighbouring country (including Russia) and also of particular regions (e.g., Eastern and Northern Europe). In short, in putting forward the ENP, the more innovative elements of existing projects (such as the NDI) should not be discarded.

It should be also noted that, along with Moscow’s discontent with the EU universalism, Russia remains very suspicious of any attempt to put regional ‘soft’ security initiatives (such as the NDI, Eastern Partnership, Black Sea Synergy and other projects) in the context of region-in-the-making processes in Europe (especially in the Baltic/Nordic area) and has been keen to ensure its control over the Russian regional authorities involved (Kaliningrad, Karelia, Murmansk, Pskov, etc.). This reflects Moscow’s concerns over regional separatism and the possible (but unlikely) disintegration of the Russian

\textsuperscript{22} The ENP was officially launched in May 2004 to replace the EU’s old neighbourhood policy after the Union’s next round of enlargement. It suggested single standards for co-operation with neighbouring countries. This universalist approach has evoked a fierce reaction from some countries, including Russia, Israel, Norway, etc., that wanted special relationships with the EU. The EU-Russia common spaces concept was partially designed to replace the ENP doctrine and appease Moscow.
Federation. However, such actions may well have an adverse impact on the very spirit of regional co-operation projects.

- Notably, however, on the EU side of things similar ‘soft’ security concerns exist in connection with a fear of decentralisation. For example, the bureaucracy in Brussels has also been unenthusiastic about the decentralising impact of regional collaborative initiatives. The EU Commission appears to be unwilling to delegate responsibility to any particular group of countries for region-specific policies. Just as noteworthy is that the ENP initiative is basically centralist in nature, and, as such, if understood narrowly, it may restrict region-to-region and cross-border co-operation in other contexts as well, by indicating that there are limits to such developments. The emphasis in the ENP is clearly on the involvement of the EU at large, and in a similar fashion Russian representatives have underlined, that the partnership is constituted by Russia as a whole, and not just its individual regions.

In this context, it is important to observe that regional co-operation in Europe should not be interpreted as an artificial top-down project. Instead, it should be understood as a bottom-up process with very lively grass roots, and it is this that centralizing tendencies in Russia and the EU threaten to undermine. In contrast, therefore, it can be argued that the best way to make a contribution to European regional co-operation is precisely that: to use the full potential of the existing international networks of sub-national and non-governmental actors, rather than bypass them via centralizing initiatives such as the ENP. Thus, bottom-up actors should have access to decision-making processes in the regional context and be treated in inclusive terms.

However, it is also suggested that, to maintain the regionalist nature of the existing and future projects, Moscow and Brussels should give their local and regional entities the necessary leverage and means in order to enable their full-fledged participation in interregional and cross-border activities, including
(mainly ‘soft’) security issues. These should not be seen as hampering, but as enriching national security policies. On the positive side, it seems that, to some extent, Moscow recognises the need to further encourage Russia’s regional authorities to actively participate in collaborative regional projects. At the same time, along with providing the regions with a certain amount of autonomy, Moscow requires assurance that regional initiatives – in creating stability and well-being by mobilising resources across borders and in previously somewhat isolated regions – will not entail Russia’s disintegration.

- The lack of a proper legal base in the EU-Russia relations is also a serious barrier to further security co-operation. The old Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA)\(^{23}\) between the EU and Russia expired on 30 November 2007. Both Brussels and Moscow have agreed to prolong the PCA on the annual basis until the conclusion of a new agreement. However, firstly, this agreement is inadequate for the existing level of the EU-Russia security co-operation, since it was concluded at the time, when the very idea of the EU-Russia security co-operation was at a very rudimentary stage. Secondly, because of certain problems in Russia’s bilateral relations with new EU member-states (such as Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, etc.), the EU-Russia negotiations on a new agreement haven’t seen any substantial progress.\(^{24}\) Thirdly, both Brussels and Moscow have only a rather vague idea of what the new co-operative agreement should look like. While Brussels does not completely dismiss the idea of bringing Moscow to the ENP framework, Russia wants, on the one hand, something very special, and, on the other, something comprehensive/global. In

\(^{23}\) The EU-Russia PCA was concluded in 1994 and came into force in 1997 (after the end of the first Chechen war). It was designed for a 10-year period.

\(^{24}\) However, according to the Russian Foreign Ministry’s report, there was substantial progress in drafting a chapter on the EU-Russia common space on external security, and the whole section was almost ready in 2010 (http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/D06A2EC53A78065BC32576E200570DCA).
any case, the lack of a proper legal framework remains an impediment to the EU-Russia external security co-operation.

- The EU-Russian dialogue on external security lacks a proper institutional basis. To provide this dialogue with some institutional support, Germany and Russia suggested establishing a Committee on Foreign and Security Policy at the ministerial level (June 2010) (Memorandum 2010; http://www.bigness.ru/news/2011-02-07/politika/121650/). France and Poland have recently supported this idea. The suggested agenda for future discussions in the committee is the Transnistrian conflict resolution and creation of a European missile defence system (http://inotv.rt.com/2011-05-24/Rossiya-vbivaet-klin-mezhdu-Centralnoj). Similar committees on foreign and security policy already exist at the bilateral level (for example, in Russia’s relations with Germany and France) and have proved to be efficient. This experience can be successfully used in the framework of a similar EU-Russia institution. To date, however, such a committee is still in its formative phase.

- EU projects within specific areas should be better co-ordinated with activities of other regional and sub-regional institutions – NATO, OSCE, Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), Barents-Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), Arctic Council, Nordic Council, etc., and the Commission should be granted with sufficient powers to be able to co-operate with such bodies. The EU also emphasizes the need to use the experience and know-how of regional bodies as well as to establish an efficient division of labour among them, building on their respective competencies and geographical coverage, although in practice the implementation of such a stance has turned out to be difficult. Instead of contributing to discord between the Nordic countries (as was the case with the BEAC), new regional projects need to function as a unifying element among the EU countries. A division of labour is called for among these countries. It is also
obvious that the projects’ financial conditions and administrative procedures should be transparent.

- The series of so-called ‘colour’ revolutions in the post-Soviet space (Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan) have also contributed to the deterioration of the EU-Russia relations. Moscow was suspicious about Brussels’ involvement in these events and did not trust it as a security partner. To reassure Moscow and develop trust with Russia, the EU should be more transparent and cautious in its politics in the CIS space and should not challenge Moscow’s (legitimate) geopolitical ambitions in this area.

- Arms control regime in Europe is another problematic (and very complicated) issue on the EU-Russia agenda. It is especially important for the Baltic Sea area because, in contrast with Europe as a whole, the Baltic Sea region lacks a proper arms control regime.

The only international arms control agreement, applicable to the Baltic Sea area, is the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty\(^\text{25}\), concluded between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in 1990. At that stage the EU did not play any significant role in negotiating and implementing this treaty. After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR, the OSCE has been basically taking care of the CFE monitoring and revision process.

Four Baltic Rim countries – Denmark, Germany, Poland and Russia – are states parties to this agreement. The Baltic States refused to abide by the Treaty, because it was concluded when they were still part of the Soviet Union. Since the CFE Treaty aims to reduce excess military equipment, deemed essential for launching surprise attacks and initiating large-scale offensive operations, it has

\(^{25}\) The CFE Treaty was signed by NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation in November 1990 in Paris. It came into force in November 1992. Due to the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact, the treaty needed serious modifications, which were made in the second half of the 1990s.
played a positive role in the prevention of military confrontation and conflict in the area.

The implementation of the CFE Treaty was complicated by a number of post-Cold War developments, with the so-called ‘flank issue’ as the main area of contention between Russia and most of the other parties. However, this issue was resolved by the Russian and American Defence Ministers in the ‘Perry-Grachev compromise’, which was later approved at the CFE First Review Conference in Vienna in May 1996. Along with some southern regions of Russia, the Pskov Region was excluded from the ‘flank zone’, while other parts of the Leningrad Military District (MD) were included in this area (SIPRI Yearbook 1996, 724). The Vienna compromise took Estonia and Latvia by surprise, because they, apparently, had not been consulted beforehand. They stressed that a reduction agreement permitted an increased military presence near their borders, in turn leading to a decrease in their sub-regional security (SIPRI Yearbook 1996, 479). It was, probably, the first time that the Baltic States regretted not being members of the CFE and not being able to influence decision-making in this sphere.

In 1995-1997 the CFE Treaty also became the subject of an indirect dialogue between Russia and NATO in relation to the enlargement issue. Russia complained that the ratio of its conventional forces to those of NATO would worsen to, approximately, 7:10 in the event of NATO extension. At the same time, the introduction of NATO’s newcomers into the CFE Central Zone could affect Germany, if the treaty’s “groups of states” balance was to be retained. Therefore, virtually no equipment could be based in Germany, which appeared unrealistic. As an aside, Russia could, therefore, have chosen a strategy of insisting on the limits, imposed by the CFE Treaty, to put NATO into an awkward position after its next expansion. This problem, however, has been
solved by the CFE Treaty revision conference of 1996, the Russia-NATO Paris charter (May 1997), and the 1999 Agreement on Adaptation.

The 1999 Agreement on Adaptation introduced a new regime for arms control, which discards the bipolar concept of power balance. Instead of the group structure (North Atlantic Group, Budapest/Tashkent Group), it is based on national and territorial ceilings, codified in the agreement’s protocols as binding limits. This opens the CFE Treaty up to European countries which are not yet parties, including the Baltic States, Finland and Sweden (SIPRI 2000: 627-42). The agreement has not yet come into force, mainly because of the refusal of NATO and other states to ratify it in view of Russia’s non-compliance with the provisions of the treaty, first in Moldova and Georgia, then in the North Caucasus. Once the problem of Russian armaments in Moldova and Georgia was solved, and Moscow reduced its troops and armaments to the CFE Treaty’s ceilings in the North Caucasus, the chance of getting the agreement ratified began to look promising.

However, in view of a possible second round of NATO enlargement, the future of the CFE Treaty again became a highly debatable question. At the second CFE review conference in 2001, Russia cautioned against admitting the Baltic States into NATO because of the potential adverse effect on the key provisions of the CFE Treaty, especially those concerning the flank and the Central European stability zone (SIPRI 2002, 715). To avoid potential damage to the regional arms control regime after NATO enlargement, the CFE Treaty needed further revisions. To promote the disarmament process in the region, further cuts had to be envisioned, probably somewhere between 15-20 per cent below the current CFE levels. A new treaty needed to include all OSCE states, i.e. the Baltic States, Finland and Sweden. Unfortunately, the Baltic States and the non-aligned countries of Finland and Sweden chose to abide by their opt-out policies. The EU and NATO also continued to insist that no formal linkage
could exist between NATO enlargement and the CFE Treaty, although they did not oppose the idea of the Baltic States joining the treaty. As mentioned above, both the EU and NATO could put pressure on candidate countries to join the CFE.

Finally, in 2007, Russia, having exhausted its patience in waiting for the CFE Treaty ratification by the EU/NATO nations, made a decision to suspend its participation in the Treaty. Although both the EU and NATO expressed their regret with regard to the Russian decision, in reality they did not take any concrete steps to revive the CFE Treaty ratification/modification process. The future of the Treaty remains unclear.

- It should also be noted that the CFE Treaty is applicable only to land forces. Naval armaments are mainly excluded from the negotiation processes. Unilateral measures were taken for the reduction of naval armaments and naval activities, but they related only to obsolete weapons and cannot be a substitute for a real arms control regime. According to Volker Heise, the basic hesitancy of some EU and NATO nations regarding naval armaments limitations in the Baltic Sea region seems to be that, if you initiate naval arms control in one of the seven seas, this could lead to restrictions on maritime flexibility in other seas as well (Heise 1996, 219). However, given the changing nature of Russia/EU/NATO relations, these parties could initiate negotiations on naval arms control to further improve the security environment in the region.

- Along with the arms control regime, confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs) are a very important element of any regional security system. Confidence-building processes contribute to changing perceptions of security, and information is critical in this regard. Transparency, or access to accurate information, can provide reliable evidence that certain behaviour and actions do not constitute a threat, and help to reduce mistrust and misperception. Another positive implication of such a process is that debating, developing,
negotiating and implementing CSBMs brings the parties into a dialogue and needs interaction. This enables the parties involved to be present and to explain their views, discuss their positions, expose their goals and motives, and discover each other’s perceptions and interpretations. The result of these activities is a transformation not only in thinking and perceptions but also in behaviour and policies. Implementation of CSBMs results in establishing principles, rules, and norms, or standards, of conduct for regulating the behaviour of states. Moreover, CSBMs strengthen existing, or encourage the creation of new, multilateral mechanisms and institutions to serve as a solid basis for security and stability in a region.

According to the OSCE Vienna Document on CSBMs (1994), the participating states should notify each other 42 days in advance of military activities involving the following personnel and equipment:

— More than 9,000 troops or 250 battle tanks, 500 ACVs (armoured carrier vehicles), or 250 self-propelled and towed artillery pieces, mortars and multiple-rocket launchers (100-mm calibre and above).
— More than 3,000 troops in amphibious landings, heliborne landings or parachute drops.
— Sorties flown by at least 200 aircraft, excluding helicopters.

Military observers can be sent to exercises involving more than 13,000 troops, 300 tanks, 500 ACVs or 250 artillery pieces, mortars and multiple rocket launchers (100-mm and above), or manoeuvres that include more than 3,500 troops in an airborne landing, heliborne landing or parachute drop (SIPRI Yearbook 1996, 742). In 1999, another Vienna Document has been adopted to develop new CSBMs in this area.

Since Russia complied with the requirements of the 1994 and 1999 Vienna documents, no complains from the neighbouring states or the OSCE have been registered. However, the fact that these documents are not applicable
to naval military activities has occasionally led to tension in the Baltic Sea region – for example, with the Latvian Foreign Ministry in October 1996, when a flotilla of Russian vessels, led by the Peter the Great cruiser, on their way from the Baltic Sea to Barents Sea crossed its economic zone (Diplomaticheskiy Vestnik, November 1996, 63-64). Some Russian and Western experts believe that extension of CSBMs to the sea could be a useful addition to the Vienna Documents regime in the region (Goodby and Morel 1993, 262; Krohn 1993, 114-117).

In the case of NATO/EU military conduct in East and Central Europe (including the Baltic Sea area), they could refrain from military exercises on the territory of newcomers, especially near the Russian borders, including the Kaliningrad Region. Along with spatial limitations, temporal limitations on Russian and NATO and EU military activities in the region could also be established. Military-to-military contacts, joint exercises, exchanges and visits should be encouraged. The countries of the region should exchange information on their military doctrines, defence budgets and spending as well as on major arms export or import programmes.

The Vienna Document 1999 encouraged the participating states to hold periodic high-level military doctrine seminars. For example, the fourth Vienna seminar on military doctrines (June 2001) insisted that the discussions on the following topics should be continued:

— The evolution of military doctrines by states at the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) plenaries should be continued;
— Further clarification on the nature and objectives of military doctrines and defence policies;
— The FSC contribution to the process of bringing military doctrines and the existing arms control regimes closer;
— The impact of the military and technological revolution on the possible use of force;
— Strategic stability and arms control prospects;
— The elaboration of a unified technology for the OSCE states used in their military doctrines (SIPRI 2002, 721).

The development of bilateral CSBMs has become an important priority for the countries of the Baltic Sea rim. Russia was initially reluctant to respond positively to the 1998 Finnish-Swedish proposal to adopt the bilateral CSBMs arrangements agreed by the other eight states of the Baltic region. However, the Vienna Document 1999 committed the participating states to pursue regional CSBM arrangements. As a result of this, Russia implemented bilateral CSBM accords with Estonia and Finland, which included clauses on an extra evaluation visit and information exchanges, in 2000. In 2001, a CSBM agreement was concluded between Lithuania and Russia. It provides for one additional evaluation visit to units in Lithuania and the Kaliningrad Region and an annual exchange of additional information about military forces on Lithuania territory and in the Kaliningrad Region (SIPRI 2002, 721). This accord was warmly received not only in Vilnius but also in other neighbouring states, as they interpreted this step as Russia’s willingness to further open up the Kaliningrad Region for international co-operation. As far as the future of bilateral CSBM arrangements is concerned, they could expand their scope and include new areas of possible co-operation.

To conclude, the above recommendations, if implemented, could not only significantly strengthen military security in the region but also create a favourable atmosphere for co-operation on ‘soft’ security issues (both in the Baltic Sea area and in entire Europe).

— Among other ‘hard’ security problems the issue of military transit between Russia and Lithuania has also caused a great deal of political
controversy over the last fifteen years. On 18 November 1993, Russia and Lithuania signed an agreement regulating the use of Lithuania’s railway system and other transportation facilities for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Germany, valid until 1995. Since concluding this agreement, Lithuania has tried to tighten its control over transit and avoid a formal agreement with Russia on this issue. Moscow, however, wanted a new accord on military transit and a comprehensive political agreement. In an effort to force Lithuania to sign new documents on this issue, Russia doubled import duties on Lithuanian goods in 1994, and postponed the 1993 trade agreement, which contained a clause granting Lithuania most favoured nation (MFN) status.

Finally, a compromise was reached. In January 1995, Moscow and Vilnius exchanged diplomatic notes whereby Lithuania agreed to extend the current rules for Russian military transit to the Kaliningrad Region until the end of 1995. In turn, Russia stated that the agreement giving Lithuania MFN status, signed in November 1993, had come into force (Jane’s Defence Weekly, 16 December 1995, 9). The agreement on military transit has since been extended on an annual basis.

However, not one of the regional players is satisfied with the status of Russian military transit. The issue has become especially complicated in light of the EU enlargement. Russia has made it quite clear that military transit is beyond the EU acquis and thus may be regulated with Lithuania on a bilateral basis. Moreover, in 2001 Russia voiced the desire to review the existing agreement (Chauveau 2001). Vilnius argued that it was impossible to satisfy the Russian demands, because Lithuania had to co-ordinate its policies with the EU (Kurbanova 2001, 7). Brussels supported Lithuania’s position. According to the European Commission’s Communication (17 January 2001), Russian-Lithuanian arrangements “need to be examined in the context of enlargement” (Commission of the European Communities 2001). However, the issue of
military transit has not yet been solved and still is pending on the EU-Russia security agenda.

Therefore, it seems expedient to form a joint Russia-Lithuania working group, with observers from the EU, to discuss the issue of Russian military transit and draft a new Russian-Lithuanian agreement. Consultations on the expert level could also be held in one of the committees under the EU-Russia PCA (or its successor’s) aegis. Such an agreement should adapt the existing document to the new reality and be very specific as regards intensity and conditions of military transit. This agreement should be seen as part of the whole EU-Russia package on the Kaliningrad issue.

- Joint peace-keeping activities and crisis management is one more disputable question between Moscow and Brussels. For example, the issue of the division of labour in peace-keeping operations in the post-Soviet space has been left aside by both partners. The EU has sought to replace the Russian peace-keeping forces in Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The EU has also tried to mediate in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict on Nagorny Karabakh. However, Moscow looks at these activities with suspicion, and the EU-Russian road map to the common space on external security limits itself to some rather vague declarations and does not provide any details on these issues, which continue to be a source of instability in the CIS space.

The 2008 South Caucasian war triggered a serious crisis in the EU-Russia relations. On the one hand, the EU (led by the French presidency) was helpful in striking a compromise on cease-fire and post-conflict settlement (Medvedev-Sarkozy plan). The EU Observer Mission in Georgia was established. As mentioned above, the Geneva group for consultations between Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia was created under the auspices of the EU and Russia.
On the other hand, Brussels condemned Russia’s ‘disproportional’ response to the Georgian invasion of South Ossetia and Russia providing Abkhazia and South Ossetia with state independence. For example, in July 2009 the EU noted that Russian President Dmitry Medvedev had paid a visit to South Ossetia (which Brussels considers to be a Georgian region) without the prior consent of the government of Georgia. The EU claimed this visit to be incompatible with the principle of territorial integrity and expressed its concerns about its effects on the international efforts to stabilise the region. In the same statement the EU reiterated its support for Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity (Council of the European Union, 2009a). The EU exhibited the same reaction to Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s visit to Abkhazia in August 2009 (Council of the European Union, 2009b), and the EU observers in Georgia have complained that the Russian side created numerous technical problems for them.

For these reasons, the EU-Russian cooperation on crisis management in the post-Soviet space remains, in fact, blocked. Both sides believe that the lack of progress in this area is explained by the EU-Russia fundamental differences in understanding of such basic categories as international security, conflict resolution, and peace-keeping. Since 2008 Moscow has heavily lobbied the idea of a treaty on comprehensive European security to establish a sort of a new code of conduct for all international actors on the European continent. The Medvedev initiative, however, met a cool reception on the EU side (not to mention Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, etc.) (see Part II, Chapter 2).

- The conflict in Chechnya is another source of tensions between the EU and Russia. This conflict has provoked widespread humanitarian problems, and the continuing crisis has threatened to tip the wider Northern Caucasus into disarray and conflict. The EU is thus concerned to support the stabilisation, recovery, and, ultimately, the development of the North Caucasus (http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/russia/csp/index.htm).
According to the EU assessments, the North Caucasus region is characterised by flagrant socio-economic inequality, massive unemployment, and a general breakdown of education and social services, in turn provoking general disaffection and disorder. A decade of conflict and instability has largely destroyed civilian infrastructure in Chechnya itself, while oil and chemical pollution and general environmental degradation pose a serious threat to human health (Commission of the European Communities 2006).

According to the EU assessments, low-intensity armed conflict and inter-communal tensions persist, rights violations are commonplace, and the application of the rule of law is heavily restricted. Small arms and landmines will continue to pose a formidable threat to human security, life and livelihood for some time to come; civilian casualty rates are higher than in Afghanistan or Cambodia, and around a third of agricultural land is affected. There has still been no effort to date to comprehensively survey the mine problem, let alone start clearance. UNICEF estimates that 500,000 landmines have been planted in Chechnya, making it one of the most landmine polluted zones in the world; some estimates put the number of mines at six times this amount (Commission of the European Communities 2006).

The EU has signalled its intention to play a beneficial role (e.g., through the 2005 commitment of €20 million from the EC budget to contribute to economic and social recovery), while recognising that the Russian government must play the leading part in bringing about the peaceful and durable settlement of the conflict and regional socio-economic recovery. The Kremlin claims to have invested some €2 billion in Chechnya alone over the past five years.

Yet, for the EU, it is far from clear that instability can be contained; there have been a number of terrorist incidents throughout Russia in recent years, notably the bombing of apartment blocks in Moscow (1999), the notorious Dubrovka theatre (2002) and Beslan (2004) sieges, a series of bombings on the
Moscow – St. Petersburg railway and Domodedovo airport (2011). The EU has been particularly concerned, especially since the Nalchik events of autumn 2005 that instability is threatening to spread to other parts of the North Caucasus. Given the relatively fragile hold exercised by the Russian authorities on the multi-ethnic Federation, some European experts believe that further regional or sub-regional conflict cannot be ruled out (Commission of the European Communities 2006).
PART II

CASE STUDIES
Chapter 1
The Evolution of the Russian National Security Threat Perceptions in the Post-Soviet Era

Introduction
To understand the nature and orientation of Russia’s foreign policy it is very important to examine how the country identifies challenges to its security. This is also helpful for explaining how the national security discourse and ideas, developed by various foreign policy schools, are translated into concrete political initiatives and implemented by practitioners.

In defining its national security doctrine (including threat perceptions) in the 1990s, Russian policy makers and analysts faced numerous problems. One of them was lack of a point of departure, because there hadn’t been a pre-existing doctrine (at least, not in the formal sense). What had been called the Soviet national security doctrine, in reality, was a mixture of ideological dogma and real political considerations, typically camouflaged by peaceful rhetoric (Kremenyuk 1994: 88). The very notion of ‘national interests’ or ‘national security’ was rejected because of the dominance of cosmopolitan ideas. At the same time, the concept of security was interpreted in purely military terms. Other (the so-called ‘soft’) aspects of security (such as economic, societal, environmental, information, and other dimensions) were nearly completely ignored. For all these reasons, the Russian post-Communist theorists and practitioners had to start from scratch.

Drafting of the security concept began in the late Soviet period, but was never completed due to, firstly, rapid changes in the international environment and political upheavals, and, secondly, the related political infighting between competing interest groups, both factors remaining a regular feature of the Russian political scene. The persistent failure of the country’s political elite to
reach a consensus on the security concept further complicated attempts at drafting a series of other documents, including Russia’s military and foreign policy doctrines, which, logically, had to be built on the security concept.

This chapter examines the evolution of Russian military threat perceptions over the last two decades as well as various factors contributing to this process. Since some issues of the ‘soft’ security problematique are discussed in other parts of this volume, this chapter will examine primarily traditional ‘hard’ or military aspects of Russian threat perceptions that still play a significant role in Russian strategic thinking. The analysis below focuses primarily on the official Russian documents, but informal discussions among Russian strategic experts and academics are also taken into consideration.

The evolution of the Russian post-Soviet military or national security doctrines and strategies evolved in several phases.

- The first, formative, period took place in 1991 – 1993, when the new Russian politico-military elites tried to apprehend new domestic and international realities and formulate the country’s national interests and relevant strategies. First national security-related documents were adopted.

- The second period (1994 – 1999) was characterized by attempts to define more precisely Russia’s threat perceptions and national security interests (on the one hand) and develop a more coherent and integrative national security strategy (on the other). Particularly, a national security doctrine, that integrated previous similar documents, was adopted in 1997.

- The third period (2000 – 2006) was related to Russia’s efforts to re-assess its national security strategy because of the second Chechen war, NATO military intervention in Kosovo, NATO’s eastward enlargement, and wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. A new set of military and national security
doctrines was adopted in 2000, and the military reform that aimed at radical restructuring of the Russian armed forces was speeded up.

- **The fourth period** that started in 2007 and continues to the present day is marked by Russia’s more assertive foreign and security policies both in the ‘near’ and ‘far’ abroad, Moscow’s growing anti-NATO, and, especially, anti-American sentiments, and attempts to restore its former military strength (albeit for different purposes and on a different basis).

There was some rapprochement between Moscow and Washington, when the Obama administration launched its ‘restart’ policy on Russia (early 2009). However, as basic Russian national security documents demonstrate, Moscow’s threat perceptions still have a strong anti-NATO/U.S. flavour.

**Early concepts**

Immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Yeltsin government, surprisingly, found itself as the only relevant military successor of the USSR. For the period of several months the Russian leadership simply did not have a coherent and clear vision of its future security strategy. The new Russian government was hesitating between the desire to keep a unified control over the military structures of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), – especially of its nuclear forces that were based not only in Russia but also in Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, – and the plans to create national armed forces.

Initially, the new Russian leadership pushed the idea of creating collective armed forces of the CIS with a command centre in Moscow (without national armies). However, this idea very soon failed because, for various reasons (civil or inter-state wars, nationalistic/anti-Russian sentiments among the local elites, etc), CIS member states started to form their national armies. By spring 1992
President Yeltsin had to abandon the idea of keeping a unified CIS military structure and decided to create independent Russian armed forces and develop Russia’s national security strategy.

**Russia’s Law on Security of 1992.** On 5 March 1992 President Boris Yeltsin signed “*The Law on Security of the Russian Federation,*” which the Supreme Soviet (the then Russian Parliament) had initiated. The Law established some legal and institutional frameworks for Russia’s security policy. It was a rather interesting document from both the theoretical and the practical points of view. First of all, it defined the very notion of security: “Security is freedom from internal and external threats to vital interests of the individual, society and state” (Yeltsin 1992: 5). In line with the foreign political thought, the authors of the document singled out not only state and military security but also economic, social, information, and ecological aspects of security. Contrary to the Soviet legislation, which had focused on state or party interests, this document declared priority of interests of the individual and society. It also established a national security system of the newly born Russian Federation. Along with already existing bodies such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Security, Foreign Intelligence Service, Ministry of Environment, the Law recommended setting up the Security Council, the Ministry of Defence, and several committees including the Border Guards Committee and so on.

However, this document was too abstract and vague to design a coherent national security strategy. It mainly focused on domestic issues and lacked proper legal and conceptual grounds for a number of important areas such as foreign policy and military reform. A special section on threat perceptions was lacking as well. Moreover, in adopting this legislation the leadership of the Supreme Soviet was eager to use it as a tool in the power struggle with the President. With the adoption of the new Russian Constitution in December
1993, which established a new system of government, some provisions of the Law became outdated.

**Russia’s foreign policy concept of 1993.** In early 1993, the Foreign Ministry presented a foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation that was consequently approved by the Supreme Soviet (the then Russian Parliament) and President Boris Yeltsin (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 1993: 3 – 23). It was the first time that post-Soviet Russia adopted a comprehensive foreign policy doctrine. Despite numerous inconsistencies and shortcomings, this document clearly described Russian national interests and foreign policy priorities. Its basic premise was that Russia’s foreign policy must meet fundamental national interests, primarily the need to preserve the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the country, strengthen its security in every respect, revive Russia as a free and democratic country, and provide favourable conditions for the formation of an efficient market economy, in keeping with the status of a great power, and for the entry of the Russian Federation into the world community.

The document suggested a greater emphasis on the economic aspect of foreign policy in order to mobilize international support for Russian economic reforms, integrate the national economy into world economic relations in competitive forms, ease the burden of military spending, solve the problem of foreign debt, support Russian business, and carry out conversion projects. It called for giving priority to the interests of the individual, and to human and minority rights.

According to this concept, Russia was to exercise its responsibility as a great power to maintain global and regional stability, contribute to conflict prevention, and promote democratic principles such as rule of law and human and minority rights protection. The document emphasized Russia’s commitment to political and diplomatic methods and negotiation rather than to the use of
military force, the admissibility of the limited use of force in strict accordance with international law to ensure national and international security and stability. The aims of the military strategy were outlined as follows: a) transformation of the international relations system from a bipolar, bloc-based model into one of co-operation; facilitating the arms control and disarmament process; b) bringing the military potential in line with a new pattern of challenges and threats and in accordance with the principle of reasonable defence sufficiency; c) a military reform should be conducted on the basis of a national security concept, and it should take into consideration the economic and social potential of the country.

The concept did not see any serious threats to Russia’s security. Even the Baltic States, that discriminated against Russian-speaking minorities and pushed the Russian Federation to withdraw its armed forces from their territory, were seen as promising international partners. The only exception was the Third World that had initially been characterized as the main source of threats to regional and global security. However, in the document’s sections dealing with regional issues developing countries were depicted as an important resource for Russia’s successful global strategy. In general, the document can be characterized as liberal and pro-Western in its spirit. This did not come as a surprise because the concept was prepared by the team of the so-called ‘Atlanticists’ – a group of Russian liberal-minded pro-Western politicians and experts (led by the then Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev).

The Russian Military Doctrine of 1993

The new military doctrine was approved by the Russian Security Council on 2 November 1993 and made public. According to the document, “‘The Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation’ are part and parcel of the security concept of the Russian Federation and represent a document covering Russia’s transitional period – the period of the establishment
of statehood, implementation of democratic reform, and formation of a new system of international relations. They represent a system of views, officially accepted by the state, on the prevention of wars and armed conflicts, on the development of the armed forces, on the country’s preparations to defend itself, on the organization of actions to ward off threats to the military security of the state, and on the use of the armed forces and other troops of the Russian Federation to defend the vital interests of Russia” (Yeltsin 1994: 6).

In contrast with the earlier versions of the military doctrine and the foreign policy concept of 1993, this document clearly defined both external and internal sources of military threats. The doctrine singled out ten major external challenges to Russia’s military security:

1) territorial claims of other states on the Russian Federation and its allies;
2) existing and potential seats of local wars and armed conflicts, above all in the direct proximity of the Russian borders (there was a special section on the attitude of Russia to armed conflicts);
3) the potential use (including the unsanctioned use) of nuclear and other mass destruction weapons owned by some states;
4) the proliferation of nuclear and other mass destruction weapons, their delivery vehicles and latest military technologies, coupled with the attempts of certain states, organizations and terrorist groups to achieve their military and political ambitions;
5) the potential undermining of strategic stability by violations of international agreements in the sphere of arms control and reductions and the qualitative and quantitative arms build-up by other countries;
6) attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of and destabilize the internal political situation in Russia;
7) the suppression of the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of citizens of the Russian Federation in foreign states;
8) attacks on military facilities of the Russian armed forces situated on the territory of foreign states;
9) expansion of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of the interests of Russia’s military security; and
10) international terrorism.

In a separate section, the document highlighted five crucial factors facilitating the escalation of a military danger into a direct military threat to the Russian Federation:
1) the build-up of forces on the Russian borders to limits which upset the existing balance of forces;
2) attacks on the facilities and structures on the Russian border and the borders of its allies, border conflicts and armed provocations;
3) the training of armed formations and groups on the territory of other states for dispatch to the territory of the Russian Federation and its allies;
4) the actions of other countries which hinder the operation of the logistics system of the Russian strategic nuclear forces and of state and military control of, above all, their space components; and
5) the deployment of foreign troops on the territory of states adjacent to the Russian Federation unless this is done to restore or maintain peace, in accordance with the decision of the UN Security Council or a regional agency of collective security, by agreement with Russia.

Along with the external threats the new doctrine identified seven major internal threats against which the armed forces and other services may be used:
1) illegal activity of nationalist, secessionist and other organizations, designed to destabilize the internal situation in Russia and violate its territorial integrity and carried out with the use of armed force;
2) attempts to overthrow the constitutional regime and disorganize the operation of bodies of state power and administration;
3) attacks on the facilities of nuclear engineering, chemical and biological industries, and other potentially dangerous facilities;
4) the creation of illegal armed formations;
5) the growth of organized crime and smuggling on a scale where they threaten the security of citizens and society;
6) attacks on arsenals, arms depots, enterprises producing weapons, military and specialized equipment, and organizations, establishments and structures which have weapons, with the aim of capturing them; and
7) illegal proliferation of weapons, munitions, explosives and other means used for subversion and terrorist acts on the territory of the Russian Federation, as well as illegal drug trafficking.

The section on threat perceptions had many important implications. Along with the systematic description of these threats, it demonstrated rather substantial changes in Russia’s strategic thinking. In contrast with the Soviet strategic thinking, the new doctrine did not identify the USA and NATO as a primary source of military danger. Rather, they were warned not to provoke a new confrontation by violating the strategic balance, military build-up in the regions adjacent to Russia, NATO expansion, and so on. This implied that Russia also would refrain from any destabilizing actions.

Instead of the traditional threat from the West, other challenges such as armed conflicts, subversive activities and territorial disputes in the post-Soviet space were seen to be a major danger. This was understandable because, by the time the document was adopted, all but two FSU (former Soviet Union) inter-state borders were disputed, and 164 different territorial-ethnic disputes were identified in this region (Dick 1994: 3). The doctrine, however, did not specify what kinds of territorial claims and local conflicts really threatened Russia’s security, and which ones might be potentially dangerous. For example, the Russian-Japanese dispute on the Kuriles goes back to WWII, and Russian-
Norwegian disputes on economic zones and maritime borders in the Barents and North Seas date back to the 1920s. However, these conflicts do not create an immediate military threat to the Russian Federation. Moreover, most of the countries in dispute with Russia are simply unable to pose a military threat for lack of sufficient capacity. Conversely, these countries fear the potential use of military force by Russia in pursuit of her interests.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism, which have been on the periphery of the Russian strategic priorities in the previous doctrines and drafts, were given a rather important status in the new concept. Above all, this brought Russia closer to leading Western countries, which also consider these phenomena to be the most dangerous international developments.

Identifying violations of own citizens’ rights in foreign states and attacks on own military facilities in foreign countries as potential sources of military threat is a rather common stance for security doctrines not only in Russia but also in other world powers. However, from a legal point of view, it was not clear who could be considered Russian citizens in the FSU countries, and what was, at the time, the status of the Russian military bases in these republics. The Russian foreign policy concept of 1993 acknowledged, that Russia was only beginning the process of negotiating and concluding relevant agreements with the former Soviet republics. In fact, the lack of a legal framework for the relations with the FSU countries gave Russia a certain number of excuses for interventions in the ‘near abroad’ (Ra’anani 1995: 21 – 22).

The most significant change in the Russian threat perceptions occurred with regard to internal threats. The Law on Security of 1992 only mentioned that some of these might exist. The General Staff draft of the military doctrine (1992) simply ignored the very possibility of internal threats to Russia’s security and therefore did not foresee any internal mission for the armed forces. This
view was a result of the military elite’s belief, that the armed forces should protect the country only from external enemies, not internal ones. The latter should be the business of the Ministry of the Interior and security services. However, accepting reality, the military doctrine of 1993 acknowledged that there were many dangers stemming from domestic developments. This inevitably led to a commitment of the military to an internal role. As the failed coup of August 1991 and the attack on the Russian parliament in October 1993 demonstrated, the armed forces had already been involved in domestic power struggles.

The new reading of military threats has led to new approaches to military strategy, as well as to an appropriate organization and training of the armed forces.

Since the main threat to stability and peace in the post-Cold War period comes from local wars and armed conflicts, the document called for a re-targeting of the Russian armed forces from large-scale war to low intensity conflicts. The main aim of the use of the armed forces and other services in armed conflicts and local wars, the doctrine said, was “to localize the seat of tensions and stop hostilities at the earliest possible stage, in the interests of creating conditions for a peaceful settlement of the conflict on conditions suiting the interests of the Russian Federation” (Yeltsin 1994: 9). Military operation in armed conflicts and local wars should be carried out by peacetime groups of forces (those which organized for peace-time conditions, i.e. have incomplete personnel and arsenals; in the war-time period they are reorganized to be full-fledged military units), deployed in the conflict area. In case of need, they might be strengthened by a partial deployment and re-deployment of forces from other regions.

According to the document, the priority was to develop the armed forces and other services designed to deter aggression, as well as mobile elements,
which can be quickly delivered and deployed in the required area and can carry out mobile operations in any region where the security of Russia might be threatened.

When faced with conventional war, the armed forces must act decisively, using both defensive and offensive methods to destroy the enemy. The armed forces should

1) repel enemy attacks in the air, on land and at sea;
2) defeat the enemy and create conditions for ending hostilities at the earliest possible stage, and for signing a peace treaty on conditions suiting Russia; and
3) carry out military operations together with the armed forces of allied states, in accordance with international obligations of the Russian Federation.

A number of tasks have been set up by the doctrine for other services:

1) to ensure a stable operation of intelligence, control and communication systems, and to seize and keep the initiative in different spheres;
2) to isolate the intruding groups of forces of the aggressor;
3) to flexibly combine firepower and manoeuvre;
4) to ensure close co-operation of the arms and services, including special services of the armed forces and to co-ordinate the plans of using the armed forces and other services in armed conflicts and wars, and in performing joint tasks;
5) to hit the facilities of the enemy’s troop and weapon control systems.

This combination of defensive and offensive methods was an important distinction from Gorbachev’s military concept that had been oriented only at defensive operations.

Some military experts were concerned with the fact that the doctrine said nothing about the country’s role in regional security systems; this omission
could be interpreted as an intention to ensure Russia’s security by unilateral, purely national efforts (Davydov 1996: 267). Despite the focus on local conflicts, the military doctrine of 1993, however, said nothing about the need for a different force structuring, equipping and training for low intensity operations. Besides, as some military experts noted, the emphasis on mobile forces could be seen as a preparation for an intervention in the ‘near abroad’ (Dick 1994: 4; Grigoriev 1995: 6). In the document, the requirement to deploy troops outside the Russian territory is specifically stated. This resulted both from threat perceptions and Russia’s international obligations (peacekeeping operations, military bases, joint groups of forces, etc.). It was underlined that, irrespective of the terms of deployment, Russian military formations, deployed on the territory of other states, remain a part of the armed forces and should act in accordance with the procedure, established for the Russian armed forces on the basis of bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements. However, some specialists believed that, despite the reference to international agreements and commitments, the document left open the possibility that such agreements could be imposed by Russia on weaker states (Davydov 1996: 267).

The doctrine did not exclude the possibility of large-scale war. It mentioned that, under certain conditions, armed conflicts and local wars can develop into an all-out war. Factors, which increase the danger of a conventional war escalating into a nuclear war, can be deliberate actions of an aggressor, designed to destroy or undermine the operation of strategic nuclear forces, early warning systems, and nuclear and chemical facilities. The document also included a provision according to which any, including limited, use of nuclear weapons even by one of the sides can provoke a mass use of nuclear weapons, with catastrophic consequences.

The doctrine clarified Russia’s nuclear policy, which had not been updated since the Gorbachev period. It was declared that the goal of the Russian
Federation’s nuclear policy is to avert the threat of a nuclear war by deterring aggression against Russia and its allies. Therefore, nuclear weapons were no longer regarded by the Russian strategic planners primarily as war fighting means. Instead, their main use was seen as a political deterrent to nuclear or conventional aggression. This marked the shift in Russian strategic thinking to a Western-like concept of deterrence, compensating for conventional weakness.

The most distinct departure of the new Russian nuclear doctrine from the Soviet one was Russia’s abandonment of the principle of no-first-use (introduced by Leoinid Brezhnev in 1982). At the same time, the document promised that Russia would never use its nuclear weapons against any state party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968), which does not possess nuclear weapons, unless: “(a) such a state, which is connected by an alliance agreement with a nuclear state attacks the Russian Federation, its territory, Armed Forces and other services or its allies; (b) such a state collaborates with a nuclear power in carrying out, or supporting, an invasion or an armed aggression against the Russian Federation, its territory, armed forces and other services or its allies” (Yeltsin 1994: 6).

In one way or another, all NATO members, China and Japan as nuclear states or the allies of nuclear powers, the Baltic states, and Central and Eastern European countries, should they join NATO or WEU (Western European Union), fell under these categories.

The reaction of Russia’s international partners to the repeal of the no-first-use principle was rather contradictory (Davydov 1996: 267). On the one hand, they considered this shift to a Western concept of deterrence as evidence of a greater inclination towards openness and frankness in military matters on Russia’s part: few people in the West took the old Soviet doctrine of ‘no-first-use’ seriously. They understood that Russia’s new nuclear doctrine reflected Moscow’s intention to rely mainly upon nuclear deterrence in order to
compensate for its conventional weakness and keep its status of a world power. On the other hand, they perceived this change as a clear message to them, especially to the Baltic states and the Visegrad countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) that they would become exceptions if they joined NATO, or the WEU, or supported any Western intervention in Russia or the ‘near abroad’ – for instance, by giving rights of passage or providing bases. This also put pressure on Ukraine, which was delaying the transfer to Russia of the nuclear weapons, deployed on its territory during Soviet times (Dick 1994: 2; Lockwood 1994: 648).

Along with these innovations, the document confirmed Russia’s long-standing interest in (a) a comprehensive nuclear weapon test ban; (b) reduction of nuclear forces to a minimum, which would guarantee against a large-scale war and maintain strategic stability, and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons; and (c) strengthening of the non-proliferation regime and making it universal.

Since internal armed conflicts were now also regarded as a considerable threat to the vital interests of the country, the objectives of using armed forces and troops for domestic purposes were described as follows: to localize and blockade the conflict zone; to suppress armed clashes and disengage the warring sides; to take measures to disarm and eliminate illegal armed forces and confiscate weapons from the population in the conflict zone; to carry out operational and investigative operations in order to remove the threat to internal security; to normalize the situation as soon as possible; to restore law and order; to ensure social security; to render the requisite assistance to the population; and to create conditions for a political settlement of conflicts. These functions had to be fulfilled mainly by the Interior Troops. However, as the document prescribed, separate elements of the armed forces and other services (the border guards and counter-intelligence) might be used to help law-enforcement bodies and Interior
Ministry troops to localize and blockade the conflict zone, preclude armed clashes and disengage the warring sides, and protect strategic facilities. Remembering the general military dislike of internal missions, General Manilov of the Security Council explained, that the armed forces could only be used “when nationalist or separatist groups are active, using armed violence and posing a threat to Russia and its integrity, or when attempts are made to use force to overthrow the constitutional system, or when nuclear facilities are attacked, and also when illegal armed formations are being created” (Dick 1994: 4).

Thus, the new doctrine laid a legal foundation for the use of the armed forces in internal conflicts such as Chechnya (Davydov 1996: 267). And since the interior troops were insufficiently manned and equipped, the use of the armed forces in internal operations was inevitable, – which has been amply confirmed by the two subsequent Chechen wars.

On 17 December 1997 President Yeltsin signed Decree No. 1300, approving a new Russian national security concept. It outlined Russian national interests and the major threats to the country’s security, and established a set of domestic and foreign policy goals, aimed at strengthening Russia’s statehood and geopolitical position. As the document emphasized, the concept was “a political document, reflecting the officially accepted views of the goals and state strategy in ensuring the security of the individual, society and the state against external and internal threats of a political, economic, social, military, technogenic, ecological, information and other character with account of available resources and opportunities” (Yeltsin 1997: 4).

Similar to the Law on Security (1992) and the Duma draft of the Law on National Security (1995), the new doctrine departed from the broad
understanding of security and focused not only on the interests of the state but also on the interests of the individual and the society. According to one of the authors of the concept, Deputy Secretary of the Security Council Leonid Mayorov, this document, which had been in the works for several years, comprehensively reflected, for the first time in Russian history, the system of views on the security of the individual, the society and the state (Chugayev 1997).

In fact, the concept was more like guidelines, or a theoretical foundation, on which one could build such essential programme documents as the military doctrine and the economic security doctrine. This was also the basis for military reform. At least, now it was much clearer what sort of armed forces Russia must have, and which conflicts these forces should prepare for. It was specified in the preamble, that “The Concept is the basis for the development of concrete programmes and organizational documents, related to the national security of the Russian Federation” (Yeltsin 1997: 4).

The paper described the global situation and Russia’s place in the world. Similar to the foreign policy concept of 1993, the paper saw the rise of a multipolar world as the most important characteristic of contemporary world dynamics. According to the doctrine, Russia should find its own ‘niche’ in this complex world structure and even become one of its ‘poles’.

Even though the document still mentioned, *en passant*, the need for Russia to retain its status of a world power, it did not insist on Russia’s global responsibilities and interests (as some previous doctrines had done). On the contrary, the paper acknowledged that Russia’s capacity to influence the solution of cardinal issues of international life was greatly diminished.

The document singled out both positive and negative factors affecting the country’s position in the world system. Interestingly, the paper pointed to the changing nature of world power in the post-Cold War period. “While military
force remains a significant factor in international relations, economic, political, scientific-technical, ecological and information factors play a growing role” (Yeltsin, 1997: 4).

The document noted that some prerequisites had been created for the demilitarization of international relations, strengthening the role of law in conflict resolution, and that the danger of a direct aggression against Russia had diminished. There were some prospects for Russia’s greater integration into the world economy, including some Western economic and financial institutions. Russia shared common security interests with many states in areas such as nuclear non-proliferation, conflict resolution, combating international terrorism, environmental problems, and so on. At that point, the paper arrived at an important conclusion that Russia’s national security may be ensured by non-military means.

At the same time, a number of international and, especially, domestic processes undermined Russia’s international positions. The shift of world power from military-strategic parameters to economic, technological and information dimensions intensified international competition for natural, financial, technological, and information resources as well as for markets. Some states did not accept a multipolar world model. In some regions, traditions of the ‘bloc politics’ were still strong, and attempts to isolate Russia could be identified (the document referred to NATO’s enlargement and to the Asia Pacific). The document stated that the Russian domestic environment was not very conducive to developing an active foreign policy. Russia had yet to develop a unifying national idea, which would not only determine its view of the world but also transform the society. The country’s economic, scientific and demographic potentials were shrinking. The former defence system had been disrupted and the new one was yet to be created.
However, the concept was quite optimistic with regard to the country’s prospects. It stated that Russia had all the prerequisites for maintaining and strengthening its position in the world. Russia possessed a sizeable economic, scientific and technical potential as well as natural resources. It occupied a unique strategic position in Eurasia. The country had created a democratic system of government and a mixed economy. The paper also mentioned Russia’s century-old history, culture and traditions which could be an important spiritual resource for rebuilding the country.

The new national security concept asserted that Russia faced no immediate danger of large-scale aggression, and that, because the country was beset with a myriad of debilitating domestic problems, the greatest threat to Russia’s security was now an internal one. The document said: “An analysis of the threats to the national security of the Russian Federation shows that the main threats at present and in the foreseeable future will not be military, but predominantly internal in character and will focus on the internal political, economic, social, ecological, information, and spiritual spheres” (Yeltsin 1997: 4). This was a distinct departure from previous doctrines. Even the military doctrine of 1993 was based on the assumption that the main threat to Russia’s security was posed by external factors such as local conflicts or territorial claims.

As some analysts emphasized, no less important was the fact that for the first time it was substantiated at such a high official level (the President, Security Council, and Parliament) that there was no external military threat to Russia (The Jamestown Foundation Prism, 9 January 1998). The concept clearly suggested that the current relatively benign international climate afforded Russia the opportunity to direct resources away from the defence sector and toward the rebuilding of the Russian economy (Yeltsin 1997:4).
In general, it placed this rebuilding effort in the context of continued democratization and marketization. In particular, the document focused on the dangers posed by Russia’s economic woes, which were described frankly and at length. The concept highlighted a number of major threats to economic security such as a substantial drop of production and investments; destruction of the scientific and technical potential; disarray in the financial and monetary systems; shrinkage of the federal revenues; growing national debt; Russia’s overdependence on export of raw materials and import of equipment, consumer goods and foodstuff; ‘brain drain’, and uncontrolled flight of capital.

The document also pointed to internal social, political, ethnic and cultural tensions that threatened to undermine both the viability and the territorial integrity of the Russian state. Among these it singled out social polarization, demographic problems (in particular, decline in birth rates, average life expectancy, and population), corruption, organized crime, drug trade, terrorism, virulent nationalism, separatism, deterioration of the health system, ecological catastrophes, and disintegration of the ‘common spiritual space.’

Along with the major internal threats to Russia’s security, the document identified a number of dangers stemming from international dynamics. The doctrine highlighted the following sources of external threat: territorial claims; attempts of foreign countries to use Russia’s domestic problems for weakening its international positions or challenging its territorial integrity; local conflicts and military build-up in the country’s vicinity; mass migration from the troubled CIS countries; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; international terrorism and drug-trafficking, and growing activity of foreign intelligence services. These, however, were of less significance than internal threats.

In general, this shift in Russia’s threat perceptions can be evaluated as a positive move with three main advantages. Firstly, this was a step to a more realistic estimation of Russia’s domestic and international problems. Secondly,
given Russia’s limited resources, the doctrine helped to establish a proper system of political priorities. Finally, it almost eliminated xenophobia in Russia’s relations with the West and, thus, laid foundations for a more intense international co-operation.

As for the documents’ drawbacks, two minor comments can be made. Firstly, some threats (environmental, information, spiritual, etc.) were merely mentioned but not substantiated. Some of them, however, were described implicitly in the section on the national security strategy. Secondly, there were some grounds for concern that ‘securitization’ of Russian domestic politics, i.e., identification of main security threats inside rather than outside the country, under certain circumstances might result in a sort of a ‘witch hunt’. To prevent this, some analysts believed, individuals and the civil society should serve as a check on the state and should not allow the state to be the sole agency in national security matters (Chugayev 1997; Sergunin 1998).

Along with explaining Russia’s national interests and threat perceptions, the doctrine determined ways and means of the country’s security policy. According to the document, “the chief purpose of ensuring national security of the Russian Federation is to create and maintain such an economic, political, international and military-strategic position of the country, which would provide favourable conditions for the development of the individual, the society and the state, and preclude a danger of weakening the role and significance of the Russian Federation as a subject of international law, and of undermining the capability of the state to meet its national interests on the international scene” (Yeltsin 1997: 4).

The document set up a number of particular objectives in the task of ensuring the national security of the Russian Federation: a) to develop the country’s economy and pursue an independent and socially oriented economic course; b) to further improve the legislation and strengthen law and order as well
as the social and political stability of Russia’s society, statehood, federalism, and local self-government; c) to shape harmonious inter-ethnic relations; d) to ensure Russia’s international security by establishing equal partnerships with leading countries of the world; e) to strengthen state security in the defence and information spheres; f) to ensure the vital activity of the population in a technogenically safe and environmentally clean world.

With regard to Russia’s military policy, the national security concept served as a post-facto justification for the downsizing of Russia’s armed forces that had occurred since the Soviet Union’s dissolution, and for the continued restructuring, envisioned in the Kremlin’s still evolving military reform programme. By emphasizing domestic rather than foreign threats to Russia’s security, it seemed also to justify the rapid strengthening of the country’s internal security forces, relative to the regular army during the past ten years, even if defence reform plans aimed to moderate that policy somewhat. In a related fashion, the document described an alleged threat to Russian economic interests posed by foreign competitors, and underscored the importance of the role played by Russia’s intelligence services in countering it.

The document also emphasized the overriding importance of Russia’s strategic forces to the country’s security and again disavowed the no-first-use principle. With regard to conventional weapons, the concept proclaimed a policy of ‘realistic deterrence’ in discarding officially any effort to maintain parity with the armed forces of the world’s leading states. The concept highlighted the importance of Russian participation in international peacekeeping missions as a means of maintaining Russia’s influence abroad.

The document declared that, in preventing war and armed conflicts, Russia preferred political, economic and other non-military means. However, as the “non-use of force” (Art. 2,7 of the UN Charter) had not yet been fully implemented as a norm of international relations, the national interests of the
Russian Federation required sufficient military might for its defence. The document said that Russia might use military force for ensuring its national security, proceeding from the following principles:

- Russia reserved the right to use all the forces and systems at its disposal, including nuclear weapons, if the unleashing of armed aggression results in a threat to the actual existence of the Russian Federation as an independent sovereign state.
- The armed forces of the Russian Federation should be used resolutely, consistently up to the point when conditions for making peace which are favourable to the Russian Federation have been created.
- The armed forces should be used on a legal basis and only when all other non-military possibilities of settling a crisis situation have been exhausted or proved to be ineffective.
- The use of the armed forces against peaceful civilians or for attaining domestic political aims shall not be permitted. However, it was permitted to use individual units of the armed forces for joint operation with other services against illegal armed formations that present a threat to the national interests of Russia.
- The participation of the Russian armed forces in wars and armed conflicts of different intensity and scope shall be aimed at accomplishing the priority military-political and military-strategic tasks meeting Russia’s national interests and its allied obligations.

The doctrine underlined that Russia had no intention of entering into confrontation with any state or alliance of states, nor did it pursue hegemonic or expansionist objectives; it would maintain relations of partnership with all interested countries of the world community.

The concept reiterated Russia’s opposition to NATO enlargement and called for multilateral collective security organizations such as the UN and the
OSCE to play a greater role in ensuring international security. The paper called
on the international community to create a new Euro-Atlantic security system on
the basis of the OSCE as well as to strengthen (with Russian participation)
multilateralism in the Asia Pacific.

The national security concept formally stated what had long been a
cornerstone of Russian declared foreign policy: i.e., that the rebuilding of Russia
is best served not by a passive diplomatic posture, but rather by an aggressive
and multi-faceted diplomacy, aimed at winning membership, or increasing
Russia’s influence, in various international organizations, while simultaneously
striving to make Russia an important global player.

The Putin Era

Late in Yeltsin’s last and early in Putin’s first term, three major factors
changed Russia’s threat perceptions: the financial collapse of 1998, NATO
military intervention in Kosovo (1999), and the second Chechen war (started in
1999 as well).

The August 1998 crisis, to an extent, undermined the popularity of liberal
concepts (including a positive attitude to globalization) in the country by
exposing Russia’s vulnerability to the international economy and financial
markets. Some specialists believe that the fundamental sources of the crisis were
internal policy failures and economic weakness, but it was precipitated by the
vulnerability of the rouble to speculative international financial markets
(Wallander, 2000: 2). Moreover, because Russia’s economy began to recover in
the aftermath of the decision to devalue the rouble and implement limited debt
defaults, the crisis reinforced statist arguments, that a less Western-dependent,
more state-directed policy of economic reform could be Russia’s path to
stability and eventual prosperity. One of the lessons of the 1998 financial
meltdown was that globalisation may be a source of threat to Russia’s economic security.

As a result of the Kosovo war in 1999, Russia again became suspicious of NATO’s real character and its future plans. In the Russian view, in the case of Kosovo NATO – contrary to previous declarations of its intentions to be transformed from a military-political to a political-military organisation – demonstrated, that the Alliance still chose to remain a ‘hard’ security organization and continued to reproduce a Cold War-type logic and policies. Moreover, NATO demonstrated its ambitions to be a major (if not the sole) security provider in Europe, trying to sideline other regional organisations, such as OSCE, the EU, the Council of Europe, the Council of the Baltic Sea States, etc. In addition, the Kosovo war coincided with adoption of a new NATO strategic doctrine that turned out much more expansionist than the previous ones (Wallander, 1999: 4). In particular, the new doctrine envisaged NATO’s further eastward enlargement, redeployment of its military infrastructure closer to the Russian borders, and even military operations beyond its traditional ‘zone of responsibility’ (in fact, globally). Finally, the Kosovo crisis gave the Russian military the much needed argumentation to force through its view, that a large-scale conventional war was not nearly so remote a possibility as stated in the national security concept-1997 (Ball, 1999: 2).

The second Chechen war affected Russian threat perceptions as well. First of all, it demonstrated that in the modern era international and domestic terrorisms are intertwined, and it is impossible to fight them separately. In addition, it turned out that the financial, military and technical base of terrorism on the North Caucasus was so strong that it was unrealistic to wage the war only by special forces and internal troops (without the help of regular armed forces). As mentioned, Russia’s previous military and security doctrines allowed only limited and short-term involvement of the regular army. It should be also noted
that Moscow was both disappointed and irritated by what it called a Western ‘policy of double standards’ with regard to Chechnya. On the one hand, Western countries called on Russia to join a ‘global war on terror’ after 9/11, and Moscow responded in a positive way. But, on the other hand, the West treated Chechen rebels as ‘freedom-fighters’ rather than terrorists, providing Chechen leaders with political asylum, allowing Chechen representative missions to wage anti-Russian propaganda in Europe and the US, and heavily criticising Russia for human rights violations in the region. Such a policy contributed to the rise of new mutual suspicions and mistrust in Russia’s relations with its Western partners.

In 2000, under the new President Vladimir Putin, a series of new security-related documents was adopted: the national security concept, the military doctrine, the foreign policy concept, and a brand new information security concept. The national security concept-2000 was the most significant document for understanding Russia’s new approaches to its security policies.

There was a difference between the concepts of 1997 and 2000. The most important aspect of the 2000 concept was that it elevated the importance and expanded the types of external threats to Russian security. The concept no longer stated that there were no external threats arising from deliberate actions or aggression. It provided a substantial list of external threats, including: the weakening of the OSCE and the UN; weakening Russian political, economic, and military influence in the world; the consolidation of military-political blocs and alliances (particularly further eastward expansion of NATO), including the possibility of foreign military bases or deployment of forces on Russian borders; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of their delivery; weakening of the CIS, and escalation of conflicts on CIS members’ borders; and territorial claims against Russia (Putin, 2000a: 4).
In several places the 2000 concept emphasised, that the natural tendency of international relations after the Cold-War confrontation was toward the development of a multi-polar world, in which relations should be based upon international law, with a proper role for Russia. It argued that, contrary to this tendency, the United States and its allies under the guise of multilateralism had sought to establish a uni-polar world outside of international law. The document warned that NATO’s policy transition to the use of military force outside its alliance territory without UN Security Council approval was a major threat to world stability, and that these trends could create the potential for a new era of arms races among the world’s great powers. The concept-2000 links the internal threat of terrorism and separatism (clearly with Chechnya in mind) to external threats: it argues that international terrorism involves efforts to undermine the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia, with a possibility of direct military aggression. However, in dealing with these threats the document calls for international cooperation (Putin 2000a: 4).

Threats to Russia’s security, listed in the military doctrine of 2000, were virtually the same (Putin, 2000b). Perhaps there was only one exception: in addition to the threats, mentioned in the national security concept of 2000 and in the military doctrine of 1993, the new document points to a new threat of an information war against Russia as an important factor of the contemporary security environment in the world.

The military doctrine of 2000 describes in detail the nature of contemporary and future wars, distinguishing the following trends:

- The use of high-precision and non-contact weapons (with a minimal involvement of ground forces);
- An emphasis on the predominant use of air/space and mobile forces;
• An aspiration to destroy an enemy’s military and administrative command structures; making strikes on military, administrative, economic and infrastructure objects throughout the whole enemy’s territory;
• Widespread use of methods of information war – both world-wide and inside the enemy’s country;
• Potential technical catastrophes as a result of strikes on nuclear, chemical and industrial installations and communications;
• Involvement of irregular/paramilitary formations in waging war (along with regular armed forces);
• The high risk of escalation of an armed conflict to a large-scale war in terms of a number of participants and the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Depending on the level of confrontation, the doctrine singles out the following types of armed conflicts:
• Armed conflict – intra-state (Chechnya, Transnistria, Georgia-Abkhazia, Georgia-South Ossetia, the civil war in Tajikistan) or inter-state (Russia-Georgia);
• Local war (Iran-Iraq in the 1980s, Armenia-Azerbaijan: Nagorny Karabakh);
• Regional war with the participation of a group of states (Afghanistan, both Iraq wars);
• Large-scale war (both world wars). Russian strategists see the possibility of a large-scale war as purely theoretical.

With political and economic stabilisation and subsequent economic growth in Russia under President Putin, Russia’s foreign and security policies became more assertive. President Putin’s ‘Munich speech’ of 10 February 2007
exemplified a new Russian stance (Putin 2007). Although there were no radical changes in Russia’s basic threat perceptions, President Putin emphasised some interesting nuances in Russia’s approaches to international security. Moscow’s security concerns were related to the following recent developments:

- The unilateral use of military force by the U.S. and its allies (in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq). The Russian Federation was also discontent with regular U.S. military threats to Iran, Syria and North Korea.
- The weakening of traditional international security institutions such as the UN (Security Council) and the OSCE where Russia is represented on an equal footing with other countries. President Putin said that the crisis of these organisations was a result of a deliberate strategy, conducted by a small group of states, interested in creation of a uni- rather than a multi-polar world.
- NATO’s eastward extension and the growth of its military infrastructure on the Russian borders.
- The U.S. plans to deploy elements of the ABM defence system in East and Central Europe (in Poland and in the Czech Republic).
- Lack of progress in arms control and disarmament. In particular, Putin criticised other nuclear powers for their reluctance to join existing arms control regimes and to reduce their nuclear arsenals. The Russian President also criticised NATO for its unwillingness to ratify the 1999 Adaptation Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe that aimed at significant force reductions and development of confidence-building and security measures in Europe. In protest against NATO’s position, Putin suspended Russia’s participation in the CFE Treaty in 2007.

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• Lack of efficient cooperation between Russia and its Western partners in fighting international terrorism. Putin reiterated Russia’s famous stance on the Western ‘policy of double standards’ and proposed that the international community pursue a more intense cooperation in this sphere.

Russian security thinking under Putin was also deeply affected by a series of the so-called colour revolutions (Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan). It has resulted in a certain re-assessment of Russian security perception regarding the ‘near’ abroad, particularly in implementing ‘tightening of the screw’ policies. The Russian leadership now believes, that Russia cannot be a great power in the region (and a pole of the world multi-polar system) if it cannot keep its central position in the former Soviet space. Along the same lines, Putin has tried to re-animate the CIS collective security structures such as the protection of the common CIS borders, a single air defence system, and the creation of the collective rapid reaction forces.

The Medvedev Era

The new Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, elected in 2008, has repeatedly stated that his foreign and security policy course will continue the strategy of his predecessor, and that there should be no expectations of major changes in Russia’s threat perceptions and security policies.

However, the beginning of his presidency was marked by two security challenges that had previously been seen as highly hypothetical: the inter-state military conflict with Russia’s participation (South Ossetia) and ‘energy wars’ (the Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict).

When in August 2008 Georgia attacked South Ossetia and the Russian peacekeepers located there, the Russian government, for the first time in its post-Soviet history, had to execute a full-fledged peace-enforcement operation,
forcing Georgia to return to a status-quo situation. It was made clear that the Russian armed forces were ill-prepared for such an operation (although the Russian military doctrine had foreseen the possibility of a limited armed conflict). It took a long time to re-deploy forces from North to South Ossetia. The mobile forces were almost not engaged in the operation. The air and electronic intelligence were inadequate, and this inevitably led to failures in the chain of command and losses in manpower and military equipment. It has been reported that the Russian General Staff has initiated a special investigation to draw lessons from the South Ossetian conflict.

The ‘gas war’ with Ukraine, with its rather serious repercussions for Europe, has demonstrated Russia’s vulnerability in the energy sector, and its dependence on the transition countries, and challenged its credibility as a reliable energy supplier.

In both cases (South Ossetia and Ukraine) Russia called for multilateral decisions. To avoid conflicts similar to that between Russia and Georgia, President Medvedev proposed a new Trans-Atlantic Security Charter (June 2008), that was later transformed into the draft of the European Security treaty (29 November 2009). The proposed document purported to lay the foundation for a new international security architecture in this huge region. A multilateral mechanism to prevent and solve local conflicts was proposed (Medvedev, 2009). Although the US and EU reaction to Medvedev’s proposal was cautious, the proposal itself was not completely rejected, and further discussions were suggested (Cartwright, 2009; Champion, 2009; Emerson, 2009a). In addition, at the EU-Russia summit in November 2008 the EU and Russia decided to intensify their cooperation on external security, including conflict management and joint peacekeeping operations throughout the world (http://www.infox.ru/authority/foreign/2008/10/28/document2001.phtml). As mentioned, in 2010 Russia and Germany launched the initiative to establish an
EU-Russia Committee on Foreign and Security Policy to discuss the most important issues pertaining to European security. The EU-Russian discussions on the local conflicts such as Transdnistria and Nagorny Karabakh resumed in 2010 (http://news.kremlin.ru/transcripts/9730).

As far as the problem of reliable energy supply to Europe is concerned, President Medvedev has also proposed to create an international control mechanism that could monitor the supply process. It was presumed that the issue of energy security would become an important part of a new EU-Russian cooperation agreement that is now under negotiation. In addition, President Medvedev invited European energy companies to actively invest in the construction of alternative gas pipelines that could be independent of transit countries (the so-called ‘Nord Stream’ and ‘South Stream’ projects).

Medvedev has continued Putin’s course on strengthening the CIS collective security system (i.e. the Tashkent Treaty of 1992). In 2009 he signed an agreement with President Alexander Lukashenko on the creation of a single Russian-Belarussian air defence system, and completed the creation of collective rapid reaction forces of the CIS (mainly consisting of the Russian airborne troops) (Rossiyskaya gazeta, 5 February 2009: 1–2).

The new version of the Russian foreign policy concept was adopted by President Medvedev a month before the military clash with Georgia, in July 2008 (Kontseptsiya Vneshney Politiki Rossiyskoi Federatsii 2008). In line with the liberal IR paradigm, the new concept ascertained that there was no clear border between internal and external means to ensure national security. For this reason, Russia’s international course should be subordinated to more general – primarily domestic – needs, such as help in completing socio-economic reforms and making Russia a competitive actor in the globalising world.

According to the new foreign policy doctrine, Russia’s global priorities include:
• *New world order* that should be based on principles of equality, mutual respect, mutually beneficial cooperation, and international law. Again, in line with liberal thought, the primacy of multilateral diplomacy was underlined. The UN should be a centrepiece of the new world order but other multilateral arrangements, such as G-8, ‘big troika’ (or RIC) and BRIC, could be helpful as well.

• *The supremacy of international law,* which should be, on the one hand, protected from any efforts to undermine its principles and, on the other hand, further developed within the framework of the UN, the CIS and the Council of Europe.

• *Ensuring international security,* which was interpreted in a broader sense, including not only ‘hard’ (arms control, non-proliferation of WMD, conflict resolution, peace-keeping, etc.) but also ‘soft’ security problematique (fighting international terrorism and trans-national organised crime, solving environmental problems, mass diseases, information security, natural and technogenic catastrophes, etc.).

• *International economic and ecological cooperation,* that should be oriented to the protection of Russian national interests (particularly, in the energy sector) and based on the principle of sustainable development.

• *International humanitarian cooperation and human rights protection.* Along with the development of people-to-people contacts, the document called for popularisation of the Russian culture and language as well as a more active participation of civil society institutions in international activities.

• *Public diplomacy,* that should aim at explaining Russia’s national interests and foreign policy objectives as well as at creating a positive image of Russia on the international arena.
Among the regional priorities the following areas were identified as the most important:

- The CIS geopolitical space. The document put forward the task of reviving the CIS and further developing the related organisations (such as the Eurasian Economic Cooperation, Customs Union, CSTO and the Shanghai Organisation of Cooperation).
- **Europe.** The new concept aimed at creating a new – safer and more stable – European security architecture by concluding a European Security Treaty and reviving Russia’s cooperation with regional and sub-regional organisations, such as the Council of Europe, the OSCE, NATO, CBSS, BEAC, the Arctic Council, etc.
- **North America,** including the US and Canada.
- **Asia-Pacific,** including ASEAN, China, Japan, both Koreas, India and the Middle Eastern countries.
- **Africa.**
- **Latin America.**

The document also contained a special section, describing the Russian foreign policy-making mechanism and procedures. Similar to the foreign policy concept of 2000, the new doctrine was a rather short and general document. The paper did not contain any particular details; rather, its basic goal was to define the principal/conceptual foundations of Russia’s international strategy.

The new Russian National Security Strategy (NSS), adopted by Presidential Decree No. 537 on 12 May 2009, incorporated the recent developments into the Russian strategic thinking (Strategia Natsionalnoi Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoi Federatsii do 2020 goda). In comparison with preceding documents, the NSS is more strategic and forward-looking. In particular, the NSS is oriented to mid- and long- rather than short-term security needs. It is also harmonised with other Russian strategic documents such as, for
instance, the Concept of the Long-Term Socio-Economic Development of the Russian Federation for the Period up to 2020.

The NSS paid much more attention to human (individual) security than previous national security doctrines. The document interpreted human security in terms of ‘soft’ rather than ‘hard’ security problematique. This type of security was treated as the need to improve the quality of life of Russian citizens, economic growth, development of science, high tech, education, health care system, culture, and environmental improvement.

The list of military threats remained almost unchanged (compared to the 2000 documents), but they were presented in a slightly different way. For example, the doctrine distinguished between threats to the state and society, on the one hand, and to the individual, on the other. It was a bit more detailed than preceding documents in the description of the sources of military threats to Russia. According to the NSS, the Russian nuclear doctrine remained intact, although the paper emphasised (at least at the level of a political declaration) Moscow’s loyalty to its strategic aim of comprehensive nuclear disarmament.

The novelty of the NSS was its introduction of the system of indicators to characterise the state of affairs in the field of national security. This system of indicators included the following parameters:

- The level of unemployment.
- The decile coefficient.\(^{27}\)
- Consumer price increase rates.
- External and national debt as a percentage in the GDP (%).

\(^{27}\) The decile coefficient (DC) is a correlation between the incomes of 10% of the wealthiest and 10% of the poorest population (Coefficient Decilny 2011). This coefficient reflects the level of income disparity and social differentiation. The DC varies from 5 to 15. Experts believe that if the country’s DC is more than 10, there are grounds for social instability and even an uprising. According to the Russian Committee on Statistics, the Russian DC for 2010 was 14 <http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/population/urov/urov_32kv.htm >.
• Governmental spending on health care, culture, education and research as a percentage in the GDP.
• Rates of annual modernisation of weapons as well as military and special equipment.
• Supply rates for the country’s demand for military and engineering personnel.

Although these indicators were incomplete, the very idea of using them to monitor the national security system was innovative and relevant. The NSS foresaw the possibility of regular renovation of the indicator system.

The new Russian military doctrine was adopted by President Medvedev on 5 February 2010 (Medvedev, 2010). Similar to the NSS, it was designed, in a way, to take into account the latest developments in the world strategic situation, including the post-Russia-Georgia military conflict realities. As compared with the military doctrine of 2000, the new document pays more attention to the socio-economic aspects of the Russian military strategy as well as to the defence diplomacy (with special emphasis on security cooperation with Belarus, CSTO and Shanghai Organisation for Cooperation).

Conclusions
Six conclusions emerge from this review of the evolution of Russia’s national security threat perceptions and national security doctrines:

• Firstly, over the past two decades Russia has managed to formulate its national interests, threat perceptions and work out a more or less coherent national security strategy.
• Secondly, Russian national security doctrines define both national interests and security threats quite realistically. They are based on the assumption that there are no major external threats to its security, and that internal sources of threats should be given more attention. Logically, Russian
security concerns have shifted from the ‘hard’ to the ‘soft’ security domain.

- **Thirdly**, Russian national security doctrines are based on a broader understanding of the notion of security, in which the non-military issues such as the economy, social problems, environment, demography, information, culture and religion are included.

- **Fourthly**, in line with democratic principles, these concepts acknowledge the need for ensuring national security at three levels (of the individual, the society, and the state), although the state ‘bias’ still remains (particularly in the field of implementation of the national security strategy).

- **Fifthly**, with the adoption of a non-aggressive military strategy and clarification of Russia’s national security interests, Russia becomes a more attractive and predictable international partner.

- **Sixthly**, the national security debate seems to have been a rather effective way of nation-building and constructing a new Russian identity. The national security concepts claim that they are based on national values and traditions and aim at the search for a national consensus and a unifying national idea.
Chapter 2
Towards a Pan-European Security System?
The Russian Draft of a New European Security Treaty

On 29 November 2009, RF President Dmitry Medvedev proposed a draft of a European Security Treaty (EST) (Medvedev, 2009). This initiative followed the so-called Medvedev Plan, suggested by the Russian leader in his June 2008 speech in Berlin. The plan outlined the contours of a new European security architecture and proposed the idea of a special security treaty of binding nature (Dmitry Medvedev proposed to convene a pan-European summit to produce a new European security treaty, 2008). Afterwards the Medvedev Plan was discussed with international leaders at different levels and at the UN General Assembly (September 2008). The August 2008 Russian-Georgian military conflict impeded the EST promotion process, but since late 2008, when Russia’s relations with NATO and the EU were re-established, Moscow has managed to reanimate the EST idea and bring it back onto the international agenda.

The Medvedev initiative produces a rather mixed impression. Its positive aspects include the following:

- The very idea of a regional security pact has been long overdue and so, whoever the initiator may be, deserves a positive attitude. The European continent needs a security arrangement of binding rather than declaratory nature. The previous documents (for example, the European Security Charter of 1999) outlined the principles of regional security but didn’t provide an implementation mechanism. A new security agreement could make states and international organisations’ behaviour much more responsible than before.

- The EST draft has a rather detailed description of an early warning and conflict prevention mechanism. The latter includes three levels:
consultations between treaty signatories, treaty participants’ conference, and emergency conference (if a conflict is about to happen or has already started) (articles 4-8). The introduction of such a mechanism could be helpful for establishing an effective conflict prevention and management regime.

- The Medvedev initiative aims at revival of the OSCE as the only pan-European security organisation where all countries of the region (including Russia) act on the equal footing. Over the last decade (especially after the Kosovo war) the OSCE has been nearly paralysed, and other international organisations (NATO and, to some extent, the EU) have claimed the role of leading security guarantors on the continent. Russia has expressed discontent with this situation and aspires to a more equal position in the European security system.

Some European experts support Medvedev’s idea of the OSCE revival and suggest the EU take a more active role in this organisation. They point to the fact that the EU accounts for almost half the seats around the very large OSCE table, and the EU member states account for 70% of the OSCE’s budget. From all this a logical question emerges: is it not time now for the EU to contribute a serious rationalisation of its presence in the OSCE, given the advances of its foreign and security policies, and the needs that are now obvious in view of Europe’s dysfunctional security order?

According to some proposals, a first step would be for the EU to become a full member of the OSCE, which, together with the Lisbon Treaty innovations in the CFSP area, would be a catalyst for the EU member states to do better in arriving at common positions. Given the cumbersome workings of the OSCE at the level of all fifty-six member states, a further step would be to test recourse to restricted core group meetings, for example on a tripartite basis (EU-RUS-US), or on a wider basis, including other major countries such as Turkey and Ukraine.
There have been some examples of this practice already in the OSCE, but without being institutionalised.

As some experts suggest, at a later stage, as and when there would have been some successful confidence-building episodes, there might be consideration of a more ambitious and structured reform measure, creating a ‘European Security Council’, following, in some respects, the model of the UN Security Council. A permanent European Security Council could consist of major states including, for example Turkey and Ukraine, beyond G8 members with the EU, with further rotating places such as one for the rest of non-EU Europe and one for Central Asia (Emerson 2009b: 90). Russia has in the past made proposals for something like a European Security Council (Diplomatichesky vestnik 1994, 17-18: 13; Afanasievskiy 1997: 35; Arbatov 1996: 248-249), but these were interpreted as seeking to acquire a veto power over European security matters, and were therefore never pursued. However, the political role of such a body does not have to be formulated in such an obviously unacceptable form.

According to some European assessments, in due course, as and when some confidence between Russia and the West is restored, a new G4 summit format for pan-European security affairs, bringing together Russia, the US, NATO, represented by its secretary general, and the EU, represented by its post-Lisbon presidency and high representative. This G4 could be considered as an alternative or complement to the hypothesised OSCE European Security Council (Emerson 2009b: 92).

- The EST could be helpful in engaging the CIS and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) (which, at the present time, remain marginal and limit their activities only to a part of the post-Soviet space) in the process of building a new European security system.
• The EST draft also seeks to give the EU a more important role as a European security provider. Currently, the EU is unable to compete with NATO in this area, even though it has an ambition to create such a potential.

At the same time, there are some disputable points in the Medvedev initiative that provoke some critical comments:

• First of all, it is doubtful that the suggested approach to international security is of really innovative character. For example, the idea of indivisibility and equality of European security, which is of key importance to the Russian president, has featured in the CSCE/OSCE documents since the early 1970s. The most recent international security concepts (e.g., the ‘cooperative security’ doctrine), proposed by the world expert community during the post-Cold war era, have been basically ignored. Innovations that can be found in the document are of technical rather than conceptual nature (for example, the above-mentioned conflict early prevention mechanism).

• It is hard to ignore the obvious contradiction between the title of the proposed agreement (European Security Treaty) and its actual geographic framework: Eurasia and the North Atlantic space (“This Treaty shall be open for signature by all States of the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian space from Vancouver to Vladivostok”) (Medvedev, 2009). For instance, it is unclear whether China, Japan, or India, which are parts of Eurasia, can claim the EST membership, or only the Asian post-Soviet states are invited to join the new security regime.

• The very concept of ‘space from Vancouver to Vladivostok’ (Article 10 of the treaty draft) seems quite ambiguous and journalistic (Trenin, 2009). One can’t help drawing a historical analogy with the Gorbachevian period of perestroika and ‘New Political Thinking,’ when this idea was popular.
It is well known, that the Gorbachevian model of ‘security from Vancouver to Vladivostok’ resulted in a complete failure due to its internal inconsistence and irrelevance in terms of timing and the nature of international relations system of the late 1980s. Moreover, the geographic vector of this space remains unclear: it is possible to move from Vancouver to Vladivostok either eastward or westward. Respectively, two different security spaces are possible: North Atlantic/Eurasian (as proposed in the EST draft) and Asia-Pacific.

- Even though the document proposes a conflict prevention mechanism, it does not explain, which specific instruments (forces) can be used for peace-keeping and peace enforcement if a conflict does occur. According to the EST draft, it is the UN Security Council that must play a decisive role in conflict prevention, management, and resolution: “This Treaty shall not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for maintaining international peace and security, as well as rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations” (Article 9) (Medvedev, 2009). In practice, it leads to diminishing the status of the EST regime, limiting its sphere of authority to the domain of preventive diplomacy instead of facilitating comprehensive conflict resolution.

- According to some accounts, the EST draft’s enforcement mechanism is quite weak: the Extraordinary Conference of its members, called in case of a crisis, can make decisions only if more than four-fifths of the treaty signatories are present. This provision is, in fact, more favourable to NATO, which could, in a crisis, simply boycott the conference. Russia, which has no reliable allies, would have trouble doing likewise (Tsypkin, 2009).
Some experts believe that Article 2 of the EST draft has a debatable clause: “A Party to the Treaty shall not undertake, participate in, or support any actions or activities affecting significantly security of any other Party or Parties to the Treaty” (Medvedev, 2009). Analysts point out that the document lacks an exact definition of what can be considered as a ‘significant’ and ‘non-significant’ threat to security of a signatory state (Doctorow, 2009; Russia unveils European security treaty, 2009). Thus, any party to the treaty could complain about nearly anything. For instance, a country could assess as a ‘significant’ threat the decision of a neighbouring state to join a military alliance; any improvement in defence forces also might be construed to be a threat by one party. But, as one expert stresses, this is a highly subjective matter depending on supposed intentions, which can be open to all manner of suspicions or, indeed, paranoia (Emerson, 2009a). Thus, there is no clear-cut line between the sovereign right of one state to conduct independent domestic and foreign policies and the desire of another state to influence the political course of its neighbour (Sushko, 2009-2010). For this reason, the future EST (if the above-mentioned standard is adopted) will inevitably be dysfunctional and inefficient.

Article 7 is also considered quite ambiguous: “...every Party shall be entitled to consider an armed attack against any other Party an armed attack against itself. In exercising its right of self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, it shall be entitled to render the attacked Party, subject to its consent, the necessary assistance, including the military one, until the UN Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security” (Medvedev, 2009). On the one hand, each state has a right to protect a victim of aggression but, on the other hand, the EST is designed to unite states that
are not necessarily bound by collective defence agreements (only NATO and CSTO members have such obligations) (Emerson, 2009a). According to some assessments, if this clause is included in the text of the treaty, it could be a pseudo-legitimate ground for selective military interventions without the US Security Council’s sanction (Sushko, 2009-2010). As one analyst notes, under the terms of Article 7, the Kremlin could theoretically have demanded participation of other nations’ forces in its conflict with Georgia in August 2008 (Cartwright, 2009).

- Many experts doubt that it is possible to bring together such different international organizations as NATO, the EU, the OSCE, the CIS, and the CSTO to conclude the EST regime (Sushko, 2009-2010; Trenin, 2009). Even if it does happen, it would be very difficult (if at all possible) to coordinate their activities within the EST framework, since these bodies often have diverging or conflicting interests and different approaches to European security.

- Some analysts are puzzled by the fact that only two organizations from the post-Soviet space (the CIS and the CSTO) are invited to participate in the EST, while other authoritative sub-regional organizations such as, for instance, GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova) and OBSEC (Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation) are ignored (Sushko, 2009-2010). There are some well-grounded suspicions that Moscow seeks to promote Russia-controlled international organizations, all the while side-lining institutions where Russia does not participate or has no major say.

- It remains unclear how member states of the above-mentioned international organizations should accede to the EST regime: whether they should ratify the treaty individually, or a formal approval of the EST by the top bodies of these institutions would be enough. Certainly, in the latter case...
the agreement presupposes a very different kind of responsibility and loyalty of member states, rather than when they join the treaty on an individual basis. It is also clear that effectiveness of the future security regime will greatly depend on the manner of the EST’s ratification.

- Many Western and East European countries as well as Georgia and Ukraine (under Viktor Yushenko) were unhappy with the very fact, that the EST was initiated by Russia (Kerr, 2009). In their understanding, Moscow was far from being a responsible and peaceful international actor. On the contrary, they believed that Russia was a revisionist power seeking to restore its former status of a world leader, and thus often presented a source of instability in the Eurasian space (Tsypkin, 2009). Moreover, many European experts believe that in the August 2008 war with Georgia Russia breached Helsinki principles III (inviolability of frontiers) and IV (territorial integrity of states), although the EST proposal claims the revival of the ‘Helsinki spirit’ (Emerson 2009b: 88). Hence, Moscow simply had no moral right to generate that sort of initiative. That’s why both the Medvedev Plan of 2008 and the EST draft got a rather cold reception from key international players, including the US, the UK and NATO.

- Some experts interpret the EST initiative as Russia’s propagandist action rather than a sincere aspiration to peace and stability on the European continent. For them, the Medvedev initiative is a sort of a repetition of the Soviet-like ‘peaceful offensive,’ which was a popular diplomatic instrument of the Communist regime. They believe that now it is important for Moscow to demonstrate its peaceful intentions and shed the image of an ‘aggressive’ and ‘imperialistic’ power (especially after the Caucasian war of 2008) (Russia Unveils Proposal for European Security Treaty, 2009).
• According to some analysts, the EST can eventually lead to Russia’s veto on NATO decisions, even though Russia is not a member state of the Alliance. The concept is also intended to justify Russia’s intrusion into NATO’s decision-making processes, while at the same time maintaining a Russian-led Eurasian bloc and potential sphere of influence (Socor, 2009). It also could give Russia more leverage to block NATO activity on the territory of its members in Central and Eastern Europe (Champion, 2009).

Other experts believe that the ultimate goal of the Medvedev initiative is to replace NATO by a new pan-European security organization (probably on the basis of a transformed OSCE) (Cartwright, 2009; New Russian security treaty can replace NATO, 2009).

• Some analysts believe that Moscow’s demarche seeks to kindle a competition between NATO and the EU for being the principal European security provider. As it has been mentioned, the EU has an ambition to become the main security guarantor on the continent but still lacks proper resources. According to this group of experts, Moscow hopes that such a competition will result in weakening of both organizations and strengthening the alternative organizations, such as the OSCE, the CIS and the CSTO where Russia has a more authoritative say.

• Many analysts predict that the EST initiative will inevitably become a hostage to ‘horse trade’ policies and linkage tactics, because some international actors have unsolved problems in their bilateral relations with Russia. The first signal came immediately after the launch of the initiative, when Ottava tried to sabotage the NATO-Russian ministerial meeting by linking the EST discussion to the 2009 incident with the expulsion of two Canadian diplomats from Moscow and the Canadian-Russian dispute on the Arctic shelf (Kobzev, 2009). And this is only the very beginning of the ‘thorny road’ for the EST initiative.
In summary, it seems that there will be a long-term diplomatic struggle around the Russian initiative with an indefinite outcome. As of today, the initiative’s chances for success are not very high. As it has been mentioned, NATO, the United States, Britain and some Eastern European countries are opposed to the treaty. Russia’s traditional partners such as Germany, France, Italy and Finland have taken a cautious stance. So far Switzerland remains the only state that has voiced support for the treaty. Observers believe that CIS members also belong to the category of the treaty’s supporters.

At the same time, it is easy to predict that the Medvedev initiative will generate a new pan-European discussion on regional security, a discussion that may bring some positive results in terms of discovering fresh ideas and ways of solving existing security problems on the continent.
Chapter 3
EU and Russia: an Eastern Partnership Muddling On?

EU-Russian relations have developed quite dynamically over the last fifteen years. Despite some ups and downs, there has been obvious progress in various spheres of bilateral cooperation: energy, transportation, information technologies, telecommunications, environment protection, visa facilitation regime, education, research, and culture. The EU has become Russia’s largest trade partner and source of investment, while Moscow is one of Europe’s main energy suppliers. The two protagonists try to coordinate their global and regional strategies to make the world and their neighbourhood a safer place. For instance, since 2000 Moscow has taken an active part in the EU’s Northern Dimension Initiative. This involved north-western regions of Russia in quite intensive sub-regional cooperation with neighbouring countries. A solid legal and institutional basis for bilateral cooperation has been established, although the 1994 Partnership & Cooperation Agreement (PCA) expired in 2007 and has so far only been extended on an annual basis. As mentioned, in May 2005, the so-called roadmaps towards four EU-Russia common spaces were adopted.

Although Russia has embraced a growing number of cooperative projects with the EU, there have also been some limitations restricting both Russia’s engagement and the success of different projects. These include residual mistrust and prejudice, bureaucratic resistance in both Brussels and Moscow, authoritarian trends in Russia’s domestic policies, uneasy relations between ‘old’ and ‘new’ EU members, conflicting interests in the post-Soviet space and (as mentioned) the lack of an updated and revised Partnership & Cooperation Agreement. Therefore, when thinking about the future of EU-Russia cooperation, it is important to note that in the current situation both challenges
to, and opportunities for, such cooperation can be identified. And the Eastern Partnership (EaP) project is no exception.

In the 1990s Moscow was absolutely positive about EU regional and sub-regional initiatives and encouraged Russian border regions to participate in various trans- and cross-border collaborative projects. However, in 2002-2003 Poland (still a candidate country at the time) launched the Eastern Dimension initiative, aimed primarily at engaging Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova and, only in the second place, the Russian region of Kaliningrad (Kuznetsov, 2004). At that point Moscow became more suspicious of Brussels’ regionalist projects on its doorstep. Some Russian strategists tended to believe that such initiatives had the secret goal of undermining Russia’s geopolitical positions in its traditional sphere of influence.

For this reason, Moscow received the EU European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) of 2004 rather coldly, refusing to join the initiative and claiming special status in its relations with Brussels. For the same reason, Russia was quite suspicious of other EU regional/sub-regional projects such as the Black Sea Synergy (April 2007), the Central Asian Strategy for a New Partnership (June 2007), the Arctic Strategy (November 2008) and the Baltic Sea Strategy (June 2009).

The EaP was launched at the Prague summit (7 May 2009) and involved six post-Soviet states (Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia). According to the Prague declaration, “the main goal of the Eastern Partnership is to create the necessary conditions to accelerate political association and further economic integration between the European Union and interested partner countries… With this aim, the Eastern Partnership will seek to support political and socio-economic reforms of the partner countries, facilitating approximation towards the European Union” (Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit, 2009).
More specifically, the EaP has the following four concrete goals (policy platforms for cooperation):

- The further development of bilateral relations between the EU and the partner countries with the aim of providing a basis for Association Agreements between the EU and those partner countries who are willing and able to comply with the resulting commitments. New Association Agreements, in their turn, should stipulate the establishment of comprehensive free trade areas, where the positive effects of trade and investment liberalization will be strengthened by regulatory approximation leading to convergence with EU laws and standards.

- The European Union will develop Comprehensive Institution-Building Programmes individually with each partner country in order to improve their administrative capacity, including through training and technical assistance.

- Increased mobility for the citizens of the partner countries through visa facilitation and readmission agreements and, at the same time, fighting illegal migration and improving the border management system.

- The EaP also aims to strengthen energy security through cooperation with in the areas of long-term stable and secure energy supply and transit, including through better regulation, energy efficiency and more use of renewable energy sources (Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit, 2009).

Five high profile initiatives (flagship initiatives) should further specify the EaP programme:

- border management programme;
- integration of electricity markets, energy efficiency and renewable;
- an SME (small and medium enterprises) facility;
- Southern (energy supply) corridor, and
response to disasters (Commission of the European Communities, 2009a and 2009b).

According to the EU document, by effectively bringing Eastern partners closer to the EU, like the ENP, the EaP will contribute to the stability and security on the EU’s borders while enhancing good neighbourly relations and effective cooperation among partners. The EU insists that the EaP will also seek to promote confidence in the region by increasing political contacts between partners (including among administrations, members of parliaments, NGOs and citizens) as well as reducing trade barriers. In addition, the EaP foresees more cooperation on specific issues within the EU’s Common Foreign Security Policy and European Security Defence Policy, including the participation of partner countries in EU missions and exercises and the coordination of diplomatic activities. According to the EaP plans, security-related early-warning systems will be enhanced, with particular focus on conflict areas. Closer cooperation on arms-export practices and non-proliferation is also envisaged (Commission of the European Communities, 2009a).

Moscow reacted to the EaP with both caution and scepticism, because the Russian leadership was not sure about its real goals: is the EU serious about making its new neighbourhood a stable and safe place, or is it some kind of geopolitical drive to undermine Russia’s positions in the area? Moscow is particularly sensitive about the EaP programme because Russia has fundamental interests in the region that range from strategic and political (confederation with Belarus, military-technical cooperation with Belarus and Armenia, military conflict with Georgia, support of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia) to economic (investments, trade, energy supply, etc.) issues.

The Russian concerns regarding the EaP can be summarized in the following way:
• Moscow is puzzled by the motivation of some of the partner countries. While Georgia and Ukraine have clearly expressed their intention to join Western economic and security institutions (the EU and NATO), Armenia and Belarus are strategic allies of Russia, who depend on economic and military assistance from Moscow. Moldova and Azerbaijan also have huge economic and strategic interests in cooperating with Russia. Moscow does not understand why these countries have opted for a pro-EU orientation in a situation when Brussels is unable to offer them substantial financial aid or other tangible political or economic benefits. For example, soon after the Prague summit EU leaders sent a clear signal to the six partner countries that the EaP is not the way to either EU membership or substantial liberalization of the visa regime (at least in the near future) (The Finnish Prime-Minister: The Eastern Partnership does not open the door to the EU membership, and this is very important, 2009).

• Many Russian experts believe that the main EU interest in the EaP is the construction of alternative oil and gas pipelines bypassing Russia, e.g., Nabucco or White Stream (Shenin, 2008). Georgia and Ukraine are considered important transit countries, while Azerbaijan can serve both as a source of, and transit point for, energy supplies. Russian and some foreign specialists, however, doubt that these plans are realistic and believe that any new energy transport schemes without Russia’s participation are doomed to failure (Crooks, 2008: 7; Shenin, 2008).

• As already mentioned, some Russian specialists believe that the EaP’s ‘hidden agenda’ includes an EU plan to undermine Russia’s geopolitical dominance in Eastern Europe and Caucasus. The EU views Russia as a revisionist power trying to regain its former control over the post-Soviet space. Brussels interpreted the Russian-Georgian military conflict of 2008
and the ‘gas wars’ with Ukraine as evidence of Russian imperialist intentions. In this sense, the EaP is seen by some Russian experts as the EU’s attempt to withdraw six post-Soviet states from Russia’s sphere of influence and establish a sort of protectorate for these countries (Gorbunov, 2009; Malkov, 2009; Zhiltsov, 2009).

- A number of Russian experts have expressed profound doubts over the EU’s capability to effect serious changes in the existing regimes of the six partner countries, by transforming them into prosperous states sharing European values and ideals (one of the main official EaP objectives) (www.regnum.ru/news/1160734.html). The EU might find it difficult to achieve the desired result (it has problems in “digesting” even the so-called “new” members of the Union). The present generation of post-Soviet politicians is prepared only to pay lip service to democracy and liberalism rather than to actually put these values into practice (Sergunin, 2009: 10).

- Some Russian analysts suspect that Brussels intends to use the EaP to bring the Kaliningrad question back on to the EU-Russia agenda on Brussels’ own terms (Sergunin, 2009: 9). They put this interpretation on a number of statements by Polish diplomats that some EaP-related programmes could cover the Kaliningrad Region (Poland invites the Kaliningrad Region of the Russian Federation to the EU’s Eastern Partnership programme).

- There are serious disagreements between the EaP participants themselves, which may prevent implementation of the project (Malkov, 2009; Sergunin, 2009: 10). For instance, the problem of Nagorny Karabakh is still an obstacle to cooperation between Azerbaijan and Armenia (The EU’s Eastern Partnership faces the problem of Nagorny Kharabakh, 2009). Moldova has uneasy relations with Romania because of Romanian
attempts to interfere in Moldovan internal affairs during the election campaign (Spring 2009). In the context of relations between Romania and Ukraine, Bucharest periodically complains to Kiev about infringements of the rights of the Romanian minority in the Ukrainian border regions. All the three countries have different approaches to conflict resolution in Transnistria.

- The attitude of EU member states to the EaP project is also quite ambiguous. Some analysts have noted that the leaders of several influential EU countries such as the UK, France, Italy, and Spain did not attend the Prague summit on the EaP. Nor did the leaders of Austria, Portugal, Luxembourg, Malta and Cyprus. This is an obvious demonstration of the fact the EAP is not one of their major foreign policy priorities (Gorbunov, 2009; Sergunin, 2009: 10-11).

- The EaP financial and economic base has yet to be put in place. The global financial and economic crisis and the necessity of rendering assistance to the “newcomers” mean that the EU is unable to allocate large sums of money to the EaP project. For the same reasons it cannot attract resources from international financial organizations, or private capital. The 600 million Euro that are to be allocated by the EU to the project in 2010-2013 represent only a symbolic sum, not enough to deal with the problems in the partner countries. In addition, this sum is half what was promised earlier (Malkov, 2009; Sergunin, 2009: 11).

- Many Russian experts believed that these inconsistencies would sooner or later result in numerous duplications and parallels with similar EU regional initiatives, and in financial and organisational problems relating to the EaP project implementation (Gorbunov, 2009; Sergunin, 2009: 11). For this reason, there was no surprise at the position on the EaP, adopted by the EU Swedish presidency in July 2009. It led to the effective
cessation of EaP funding because of the EU’s financial troubles (although Sweden, along with Poland, was one of the initiators of the EaP).

- There is also a certain inconsistency between different EU regional/sub-regional initiatives in the “new neighbourhood.” The Prague declaration especially emphasised that the EaP would not interfere with the implementation of existing bilateral and regional projects, but it is unclear how the EaP will be coordinated, for example, with the Northern Dimension Initiative and especially with the Black Sea Synergy. Both overlap with the EaP territorially, substantially, and institutionally in many respects. For example, five of six EaP partner countries (except Belarus) are participants of the Black Sea cooperation. It is also characteristic that some European analysts (especially the French) express concerns regarding potential competition (for resources) between the EaP and the “Mediterranean union” project supported by Paris (Sergunin, 2009: 11).

In summary, it appears that both the Russian expert community and practitioners lack a clear and objective vision of the EaP and its implications for Russia. Most Russian experts are either negative or sceptical about the EaP and its future. Quite often emotional and subjective assessments prevail, or assessments that are not supported by solid empirical evidence. It seems that the lack of a sound Russian strategy towards the EaP is one of the sources of misunderstanding in EU-Russia bilateral cooperation – a misunderstanding that sometimes contributes to derailing the Brussels-Moscow dialogue. As a result, both EU and Russian policies often give the impression of haphazard muddling on, rather than a sound and forward-looking strategy.
Conclusions

Several conclusions emerge from the above analysis:

- Identification of international security as an important priority of the EU-Russia co-operation (and its inclusion on the list of the EU-Russia common spaces) exemplifies significant progress in bilateral relations and a growing trust between Moscow and Brussels (although the relationship had and continues to have its ups and downs).
- There are some specific positive results of the EU-Russia co-operation on security matters: a certain rapprochement of security philosophies and doctrines; more transparency and mutual trust in the security-related spheres; creation of some new institutional mechanisms; a more active engagement of existing regional and sub-regional organisations in security co-operation (such as NATO, the OSCE, the CBSS, the BEAC, the Arctic Council, the Nordic Council, etc.); more co-ordination of security policies on the global level; some joint operations to fight international terrorism, drug trafficking, smuggling, etc.; joint military exercises, military exchange programmes and visits; enhancement of exchange of security-related information, and so on.
- At the same time, as compared to other spheres the EU-Russia dialogue, the common space on external security still remains a less developed area of bilateral co-operation. Many of the declared priorities for such co-operation, specified in the respective road map, still remain only on paper.
- There exist numerous barriers to the EU-Russia security co-operation and, consequently, to implementation of the road map on external security. They include: differences in the understanding of basic security-related concepts, such as the nature of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ security (and interaction between them), security threats, confidence-building, peace-keeping, international terrorism, arms control and its priorities, etc.; the residual mistrust between Russia and
Europe; differences in current EU and Russian geopolitical priorities (especially in the post-Soviet space, the Balkans and the Middle East); internal problems (for instance, for Moscow these are the ongoing Chechen war and growing authoritarian tendencies in the Russian political life; for the EU – the uncertainties with the future of the Constitutional Treaty, difficulties with absorption of new members, debates around the needs and priorities for the next round of enlargement, the dispute between the so-called ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe, including attitude to Russia and negotiations on a new EU-Russia co-operation agreement, etc.); lack of progress in the regional and sub-regional arms control process; lack of institutional support for some critical areas of security co-operation (e.g., peace-keeping, fighting international terrorism, intelligence co-operation, defence industry co-operation, etc.); lack of proper coordination and division of labour between various regional and sub-regional institutions, and so on.

- It is hard to believe that these numerous barriers to the EU-Russia security co-operation can be easy to remove. It is clear that there is still a long way to go until the entire situation changes for the better, and the desired co-operation finally materializes. However, looking at the positive aspects of the current situation, we can conclude that there is a growing feeling among the Russian and European politicians and experts that the time is ripe for some radical changes in mutual perceptions and practical policies, and that there is a need for political will on the both sides to start moving in the right direction.
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DOCUMENTS
Part I. VISION OF THE EU FOR ITS PARTNERSHIP WITH RUSSIA

…3. Cooperation to strengthen stability and security in Europe and beyond

Russia and the Union have strategic interests and exercise particular responsibilities in the maintenance of stability and security in Europe, and in other parts of the world.

The Union considers Russia an essential partner in achieving that objective and is determined to cooperate with her. It proposes that the strategic partnership develop within the framework of a permanent policy and security dialogue designed to bring interests closer together and to respond jointly to some of the challenges to security on the European continent. That dialogue will allow greater concertation in all the relevant forums to which both Russia and the Member States belong, particularly the UN and the OSCE.

4. Common challenges on the European continent

Geographical proximity, as well as the deepening of relations and the development of exchanges between the Union and Russia, are leading to growing interdependence in a large number of areas. Only through common responses will it be possible to find solutions to challenges which are more and more often common to both parties.
The Union and Russia have a common interest in developing their energy policies in such a way as to improve the exploitation and management of resources and security of supplies in Russia and in Europe.

Nuclear safety is an essential issue. The Union is prepared to continue providing expertise and support in that area.

The environment is the common property of the people of Russia and the European Union. The sustainable use of natural resources, management of nuclear waste and the fight against air and water pollution, particularly across frontiers, are priorities in this area.

Russia and the Union have a common interest in stepping up their cooperation in the fight against common scourges, such as organised crime, moneylaundering, illegal trafficking in human beings and drug trafficking. The fight against illegal immigration is also a major preoccupation. The Union proposes to put increased cooperation in place in these areas by creating the necessary tools and forms of cooperation between the competent bodies and by developing exchanges of experts. It is also ready to offer its expertise, particularly in the development of legislation and competent institutions.

Regional cooperation, particularly in the framework of existing regional organisations, is a useful framework for putting practical cooperation in place which will allow a local response to these challenges.

**Part. II. AREAS OF ACTION**

**3. Cooperation to strengthen stability and security in Europe and beyond**

The EU wishes to deepen and widen cooperation with Russia and identify common responses to the security challenges in Europe and beyond through:

(a) *reinforcing political dialogue*
• by considering ways to give more continuity to the existing political dialogue and render it more operational, including through the important role to be played by the Secretary-General of the Council, High Representative for the CFSP,

• by working with Russia to develop joint foreign policy initiatives in support of common foreign policy objectives;
  (b) Russia's place in the European security architecture,

• by further developing cooperation with Russia in the new European security architecture within the framework of the OSCE, in particular in the run-up to the Istanbul Summit,

• by continuing cooperation with Russia in the elaboration of aspects of the European Security Charter,

• by considering facilitating the participation of Russia when the EU avails itself of the WEU for missions within the range of the Petersberg tasks;
  (c) preventive diplomacy,

• by enhancing EU-Russia cooperation to contribute to conflict prevention, crisis management and conflict resolution, including within the OSCE and the UN,

• by promoting arms control and disarmament and the implementation of existing agreements, reinforcing export controls, curbing the proliferation of WMD, and supporting nuclear disarmament and CW destruction.

4. Common challenges on the European continent

The European Union will, in particular, cooperate with Russia in:
  (a) energy and nuclear safety,

• by enhancing the Russian commitment to energy sector reform, including nuclear safety and environmental protection; for example by working with Russia to improve energy efficiency and by providing technical assistance
on energy conservation in Russia; by improving the safety of Russian nuclear power stations and by cooperation on nuclear waste and spent fuel issues in north-west Russia,

- by encouraging Russian commitment to nuclear safety in the framework of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, through the Nuclear Safety Account Agreement and in the framework of international initiatives and by helping to strengthen the Russian nuclear safety regulatory authority (GAN),
- by promoting Russian ratification of the Energy Charter Treaty and continuing consultations on a multilateral transit framework which will enhance cooperation between Russia and its neighbours over access to the Russian pipeline system;

(b) environment and health,

- by encouraging and supporting the secure storage of nuclear and chemical waste and the safe management of spent fuel, in particular in north-west Russia,
- by supporting the integration of environmental considerations in economic reform and by assisting in the creation of effective systems for monitoring and ensuring compliance with multilateral environmental agreements, and supporting Russian efforts to strengthen the enforcement of national environmental legislation, by working with Russia, especially in areas adjacent to the enlarging Union, to reduce water and air pollution and to improve environmental protection and by cooperating on promoting sustainable use of natural resources in particular in the various forums for regional cooperation,
- by cooperating with Russia in order to improve precautions against infectious diseases, including by supporting vaccination programmes,
- by cooperating also in strengthening phytosanitary controls;
(c) fight against organised crime, money laundering and illicit traffic in human beings and drugs; judicial cooperation,

- by enhancing the rule of law and offering assistance in developing the legal order, including by encouraging Russia to sign, ratify and implement key conventions, especially in the field of judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters,
- by pursuing, on the basis of existing common positions, an appropriate dialogue with Russia in the ongoing negotiations in Vienna on the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime,
- by increasing the cooperation and exchange of experts between Member States and Russia in the context of combating organised crime, including in the field of the treatment and rehabilitation of drug addicts as well as in the field of drug prevention. This shall be achieved in cooperation with the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction,
- by organising seminars on types and methods of money laundering,
- by developing the cooperation of Europol with the competent Russian authorities as provided for under the Europol Convention, notably for improving the fight against illicit traffic in human beings and drugs as well as immigrant smuggling,
- by intensifying cooperation between the liaison officers of the Member States in Moscow, within the limits of their respective national laws,
- by developing cooperation mechanisms in combating transnational drug crime, and the involvement of Russia in the concertation process of the Dublin Group,
- by carrying out information campaigns in cooperation with Russian agencies in order to prevent the traffic of human beings,
- by improving the cooperation regarding the readmission of own nationals, persons without nationality and third country nationals, including the
conclusion of a readmission agreement; by combating illegal migration including by continuing the basic and advanced training courses for staff members of border and migration authorities,

- by intensifying dialogue with Russia on the adjustment of Russia’s visa policy to the European Union through the introduction of visa requirements in accordance with the EC provisions and introduction of travel documents which are sufficiently fake-proof,

- by working together with Russia with a view to the introduction of sanctions by Russia on carriers providing transfrontier transport of inadequately documented passengers and with a view to the introduction of penal provisions for combating immigrant-smuggling…

1. OBJECTIVES

The EU and Russia share responsibility for an international order based on effective multilateralism. They will therefore co-operate to strengthen the central role of the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and act effectively, and promote the role and effectiveness of relevant international and regional organisations, in particular the OSCE and Council of Europe, as well as regimes and treaties, which make an important contribution to a more just and secure world.

The EU and Russia will also strengthen co-operation and dialogue on security and crisis management in order to address the global and regional challenges and key threats of today, notably terrorism, the proliferation of WMD, existing and potential regional and local conflicts. They will give particular attention to securing international stability, including in the regions adjacent to the EU and Russian borders.

The EU and Russia recognize that processes of regional cooperation and integration in which they participate and which are based on the sovereign decisions of States play an important role in strengthening security and stability. They agree to actively promote them in a mutually beneficial manner, through close result-oriented EU-Russia collaboration and dialogue, thereby contributing effectively to creating a greater Europe without dividing lines and based on common values.

The EU and Russia share common values, as defined in the Helsinki Final Act as well as in the PCA and other relevant international documents notably

28 Adopted at May 2005 EU-Russia summit (St. Petersburg) along with other three roadmaps (economy, trade, environment; internal security; education, research and culture).
respect for international law, including respect for democratic principles and human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities, equality and respect of mutual interests. The EU and Russia will aim at preventing the spread of practices that contribute to fuelling contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance. EU-Russia co-operation will aim at strengthening international peace and stability, in accordance with the UN Charter, creating favourable external conditions for security and prosperity in the European Union and Russia.

2. SCOPE

In order to pursue these common objectives, the European Union and the Russian Federation will enhance co-operation in the following priority areas:

- Strengthened dialogue and co-operation on the international scene;
- Fight against terrorism;
- Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, strengthening of export control regimes and disarmament;
- Co-operation in crisis management;
- Co-operation in the field of civil protection.

These objectives, that do not exclude the possibility of elaborating action plans for particular areas of EU-Russia co-operation in the sphere of external security, will be monitored within existing formats at the meetings of the PSC Troika at Ambassadors' level and at Political Directors' consultations. The parties will report on the implementation of this Road map to the PPC Ministerial meetings and/or Ministerial EU/Troika-Russia meetings. Conclusions will be formulated as required at EU-Russia summits. This Road Map can be amended by mutual consent and upon proposal of either of the parties. Work will continue to further develop and operationalise the political
dialogue and cooperation, including the exploration of appropriate ways and modalities in order to ensure full implementation of the Road Map.

1. Strengthened dialogue and co-operation on the international scene

**Objective**: to strengthen EU-Russia dialogue and co-operation on the international scene, in particular in regions adjacent to the EU and Russian borders, both bilaterally and within international and regional organisations with the aim to promote security and stability based on international law and respect for democratic principles and human rights. In order to pursue this overall objective, the EU and Russia will enhance co-operation in the following priority areas:

- Strengthening and deepening of the EU-Russia bilateral dialogue on political and security issues and on human rights;
- Strengthening of the international order based on effective multilateralism in support of the United Nations playing the central role, and of other relevant international and regional organisations, in particular the OSCE and the Council of Europe. This will include full implementation of all international commitments, including the OSCE commitments;
- Promoting conflict prevention and settlement through mutual result-oriented cooperation, including through elaboration of possible joint initiatives in support of efforts in agreed formats as well as by relevant international organizations and structures, in particular the UN and the OSCE. To this end the EU and Russia will consult, on a regular basis, on early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management actions and post-conflict rehabilitation;
- Exchange of views on new initiatives and on possible use of instruments related to security and stability;
- Strengthened political dialogue at all levels on EU and Russian security and foreign policy strategies and concepts, and academic co-operation in this field;

- Exchange of information on relevant major international contacts of the EU and Russian officials with respect to the space of external security;

- Promotion of contacts between the EU and Russian military structures, including the European Defence Agency;

- Optimisation of agenda and parameters of political dialogue with a view to making the dialogue more effective;

- Exchange of relevant experts of the EU Institute for Security Studies and the network of Russian academic bodies with a view of possible joint research projects concerning security problems.

2. **Fight against terrorism**

   **Objective**: to work together at the international level to prevent and combat terrorism in accordance with international law, in particular international human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law.

   In order to pursue this overall objective, EU and Russia will enhance co-operation in the following priority areas:

   - Implementation of the Joint Statement on the fight against terrorism adopted in November 2002;

   - Intensification and enhancement of co-operation between the EU and Russia in all relevant international and regional fora (including, *inter alia*, the UNSC Counter-terrorism Committee), including improvement of capacity of third countries to fight terrorism;
- Co-operation within the UN in implementing UNSC resolutions, in particular 1373 and 1566, with a view to further improving and strengthening international efforts in the fight against terrorism;

- Cooperation between the EU and Russia, in accordance with their obligations under international law, in order to find, deny safe haven and bring to justice, on the basis of the principle to extradite or prosecute, any person who supports, facilitates, participates or attempts to participate in the financing, planning, preparation or commission of terrorist acts or provides safe havens;

- Co-operation within the UN on elaborating under UN aegis an integrated strategy to respond to global threats and challenges of the 21st century in the context of advancing towards the goals approved in the UN Millennium Declaration;

- Becoming party to all 12 UN counter-terrorism conventions and protocols and implementing fully their provisions;

- Promotion of the early signature and ratification of the UN International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism;

- Promotion of the early finalisation of the UN Comprehensive Convention Against International Terrorism;

- Co-operation within the Council of Europe for developing and adopting instruments in the fight against terrorism;

- Cooperation within the OSCE as a forum for the promotion of international norms and standards and taking collective decisions on crucial matters of European security in order to strengthen its antiterrorist efforts as well as promoting implementation of OSCE commitments in this field;

- Develop co-operation to strengthen the fight against the financing of terrorism, including freezing of funds and other terrorist assets, in accordance with the relevant international instruments.
Co-operation will be intensified through dialogue at both political and expert level between the relevant EU and Russian bodies *inter alia* by:

- Information exchange on the issues of the fight against terrorism through consultations in Brussels and in Moscow or by other means;
- Consultations on the eve of major antiterrorist meetings to exchange views on positions and possible joint actions;
- Consultations during such events to co-ordinate positions and activities.

3. Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, strengthening of export control regimes and disarmament

**Objective:** to strengthen EU-Russia dialogue and co-operation on non-proliferation, export controls and disarmament with a view to possible closing in of positions as well as co-ordination of actions within existing international fora.

In order to pursue this overall objective, EU and Russia will enhance co-operation in the following priority areas:

- Dialogue on non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control, including regional aspects, for further convergence of positions and possible co-ordination of activities within existing international mechanisms, including relevant international and regional fora;
- Promotion of universal adherence to and greater effectiveness of the relevant international instruments (such as NPT, CWC, BTWC, CTBT, IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards and Additional Protocol, HCOC), enhancement and, where relevant, enlargement of export control regimes (MTCR, NSG, WA), promotion of a policy of reinforcing compliance with multilateral treaty regimes and other international obligations such as UN Security Council resolution 1540,
as well as strengthening of export controls for WMD, their means of delivery, conventional weapons and related goods and technologies;

- Enhancement of ongoing work, including in the context of the G8 Global Partnership in accordance with the Kananaskis documents, including new projects in the priority areas identified at Kananaskis;

  – Strengthening of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament activities (e.g. co-ordination of EU and Russian positions at the 2005 NPT Review Conference, promotion of earliest entry into force of CTBT, contribution to early commencement of negotiations on a Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices) and arms control;

  – Strengthening of chemical and biological non-proliferation activities (e.g. co-operation on implementing action plans of promoting the CWC universality and national implementation, strengthening of BTWC through promoting its universality and implementation as well as developing adequate measures to verify compliance with the BTWC;

  – Co-operation on further universalisation of the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile proliferation (HCOC) in facilitating subscription in particular of countries possessing missile technology or capability to develop it and on furthering implementation of the Code’s confidence building measures;

  – Dialogue on the opportunity of developing a legally binding arrangement for a global system of control for the non-proliferation of missiles and their related technology, taking into account the wide subscription to the HCOC and efforts on establishing a link with the UN;

- Active support through the UN and the Conference on Disarmament to the goal of preventing an arms race in outer space as an essential condition for the strengthening of strategic stability and for the promotion of international cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes;
– Comparative analysis of EU’s and Russian approaches to non-proliferation with a view to elaborating a joint document on strategic partnership in this area by 2006;
– Enhancement of ongoing work on threats posed by old ammunition, including anti-personnel land-mines, and explosive remnants of war;
– Strengthening co-operation to resume substantial work of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva;
- Establishment of a channel for regular exchange of views within existing formats on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons;
- Dialogue on the implementation of the UN Programme of Action on the illicit trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its aspects.
- Co-operation will be intensified through dialogue at both political and expert level between relevant EU and Russian bodies, *inter alia* by:
  - Information exchange on the issues of non-proliferation through consultations in Brussels and in Moscow or by other means;
  - Consultations on the eve of major non-proliferation or disarmament events to exchange views on positions and possible joint activities;
  - Consultations during such events to exchange views on positions and to co-ordinate activities;
  - Paying special attention to co-operation and regular consultations between the EU and Russia in the context of the G8 Global Partnership.

4. Co-operation in crisis management

**Objective:** strengthen EU-Russia dialogue on matters of practical co-operation on crisis management in order to prepare the ground for joint initiatives, including in support of on-going efforts in agreed formats and resulting from the strengthened EU-Russia dialogue and co-operation on the
international scene, in the settlement of regional conflicts, inter alia in regions adjacent to EU and Russian borders.

In order to pursue this overall objective, the EU and Russia will enhance co-operation in the following priority areas:

- Exchange of views at expert level on matters related to the EU's and Russia's procedures in response to crisis situations, including exchange of views on lessons learnt, in order to improve mutual understanding of respective procedures and concepts and to explore possibilities for joint approaches. This exchange of views could lead to the development of principles and modalities for joint approaches in crisis management;

- Conclusion of a standing framework on legal and financial aspects in order to facilitate possible co-operation in crisis management operations;

- Conclusion of an agreement on information protection;

- Experts’ exchange of views on specific areas like logistical aspects of crisis management operations, naval forces co-operation in the sphere of navigation and hydrography, underwater exploration with a view of ensuring navigation safety, hydrometeorology and early warning of disasters, co-operation of the EU Satellite Centre with Russia;

- Consideration of possibilities for co-operation in the field of long-haul air transport;

- Co-operation in the field of training and exercises which could include observation and participation in exercises organized by either Russia or the EU and participation in training courses;

- Strengthening of the EU-Russia academic networking in the field of crisis management through exchange of research fellows between the EU Institute for Security Studies and the network of Russian academic bodies for the purpose of joint studies;
- Promotion of contacts between the EU and Russian military and civilian crisis management structures.

5. Co-operation in the field of civil protection

Objective: strengthen EU-Russia dialogue and co-operation to promote common ability to respond to disaster and emergencies, including in specific crisis management situations.

In order to pursue this overall objective, the EU and Russia will enhance co-operation in the following priority areas:

- Strengthening of co-ordination on the most effective use of relevant available capabilities, including through possible practical steps of co-operation in the field of civil protection;

- Work on implementation of the administrative arrangement between the Monitoring and Information Centre and the Operations Centre of EMERCOM signed on 19 May 2004. In particular, to exchange contact details in order to be able to contact each other on a 24-hour basis; to exchange templates for early warnings and requests/offers for assistance; to exchange information during an emergency, where appropriate; to conduct communication exercises on an agreed basis; and to enable operation staff to spend one week a year in the operational centre of the other service in order to gain practical experience;

- Continued discussion on concrete areas of EU-Russia cooperation, including concerning civil protection and assistance in response to natural disasters and crisis situations in order to ensure an effective response to disasters and emergencies.

- Exchange of information on lessons learnt from terrorist attacks;

- Invitation, on a case-by-case basis of experts to specific technical workshops and symposia on civil protection issues;
- Invitation, on a case-by-case basis of observers to specific exercises organized by the EU or Russia;
- Facilitate mutual assistance in search and rescue operations for submarines, ships and aircraft in emergency situations.

**Source:** [http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia](http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia)
EU-RUSSIA PERMANENT PARTNERSHIP COUNCIL
1st April 2005
Press Release

The Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, Benita Ferrero-Waldner will attend the second meeting of the EU-Russia Permanent Partnership Council meeting in Foreign Ministers format, in Luxembourg on 1 April, together with Luxembourg Foreign Minister Jean Asselborn. The Russian Federation will be represented by Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergey Lavrov. The agenda will focus on current negotiations for a package of Road Maps to create four “common spaces”, in the fields of the Economy, External Security, Freedom, Security and Justice and Education, Research and Culture. The EU’s proposals to step up cooperation on the socio-economic development of Kaliningrad and the forthcoming European Commission fact-finding mission to the northern Caucasus region of Russia will also be discussed, as will a range of international issues including Moldova, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Iran.

On the eve of the meeting, Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner said: “The EU’s objective is the conclusion of an ambitious package of road maps by the next EU/Russia Summit on 10 May. We have significantly reduced the issues which remain outstanding, but a number of points remain open. We must not let this chance for a more effective relationship slip through our fingers”.

The meeting will focus in particular on the Road Map for the Common Space of External Security. The EU will underline its determination not to create new dividing lines across the European continent and continue to push for constructive EU-Russia cooperation on frozen conflicts in the common neighbourhood, notably in Moldova and Georgia. It will also note the
importance of Russia fulfilling its Istanbul commitments. The EU will also underline the importance of respect for human rights obligations in the context of combating terrorism.

Significant progress was made in negotiations on the Common Economic Space during Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner’s recent visit to Moscow with Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson. The EU continues to seek full implementation of the agreement reached with Russia last year to phase out by 2013 Siberian overflight payments charged to European Airlines.

In the Common Space of Freedom Security and Justice, the EU would like to see visa facilitation and readmission agreements enter into force as soon as possible and continues to seek common ground with Russia on the timing for these to enter into force in parallel. The EU will call for the signature and ratification of outstanding border agreements between EU Member States and Russia and the demarcation of borders.

The meeting will provide an opportunity to discuss a number of other issues key to the success of the May summit, including the EU’s wish to focus on the socio-economic development of Kaliningrad region through the flexible use of existing institutions; developments in the OSCE; and the EU’s planned ‘needs assessment’ mission to support economic and social recovery in the northern Caucasus, which leaves for the region on 9 April.

The PPC was established in June 2003 to replace the Cooperation Council whose task was to oversee the implementation of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with a body at Ministerial level which would meet more regularly and in different formats, bringing together relevant Ministers. A PPC of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers has already met. The EU is keen to hold meetings of the PPC in particular in environment and energy formats.

Source: http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia
EU-RUSSIA RELATIONS
May 2007
European Commission
(Excerpt)

…V. Foreign Policy Cooperation and External Security

The EU and Russia have agreed to reinforce their cooperation in the area of external security as they both have a particular responsibility for security and stability on the European continent and beyond.

**EU Policy Aims**

There are 5 priority areas for enhancing EU-Russia cooperation:

- Strengthening dialogue and cooperation on the international scene
- The fight against terrorism
- Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, strengthening export control regimes and disarmament
- Cooperation in crisis management
- Cooperation in the field of civil protection

**EU Strategy**

The EU and Russia work to strengthen the roles of the United Nations, OSCE and Council of Europe (CoE) in building an international order based on effective multilateralism. An extensive and ever more operational political dialogue characterises EU-Russia relations...

The EU has a strong interest in engaging Russia in strengthening stability on the European continent, notably in regions adjacent to EU and Russian borders – our common neighbourhood.
The regional conflicts in Moldova (Transnistria) and the South Caucasus (Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno_Karabakh) are regularly discussed. The EU also stresses the importance of promoting democracy in Belarus. These discussions simultaneously grant both partners the opportunity to voice a frank exchange of views regarding the situation in the common neighbourhood and a platform to seek common solutions.

The EU and Russia seek to strengthen their cooperation in all relevant international and regional fora in the fight against terrorism, notably by promoting and developing the relevant conventions and instruments in the UN, OSCE and Council of Europe. The EU in particular seeks an early finalisation of the UN Comprehensive Convention against International Terrorism.

In the area of non-proliferation, export controls and disarmament, a major objective of the EU and Russia is to promote the universal adherence to and greater effectiveness of the relevant international instruments. A particular EU concern at present is to seek Russian support for the accession of all EU Member States to the Multilateral Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Russia is seeking to join the Australia Group (Biological and Chemical Weapons Control).

A major part of EU funding has supported the International Science and Technology Centre (ISTC) in Moscow for the redeployment of weapons experts to work on peaceful projects.

Since 1994, some 60,000 experts have benefited from about 2100 projects worth a total of $635 million. Out of this figure the EU has contributed €150 million to the ISTC redeployment efforts.

The EU contributes also to the G8 Global Partnership against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. At the G8 Summit in December 2003 former Commission President Prodi committed €1 billion over ten years as a contribution to the Partnership. Currently, the EU is well on its way to meeting
its pledge with around €800 million committed and more than €400 million spent. The EU commitment refers to the four areas of cooperation that have been identified: non-proliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism and nuclear safety.

At the Seville European Council in 2002, the EU defined the arrangements for Russian participation in EU *crisis management operations*. Russia has however not accepted to participate in EU operations under these conditions. Nevertheless a policy dialogue is developing in the field of crisis management and European Security and Defence Policy, notably through the regular meetings of the Russian Ambassador in Brussels and the Political and Security Committee Troika. There are also regular meetings between the Chief of General Staff of the Russian Federation and the Chairman of the EU Military Committee as well as expert level contacts.

In the field of *Civil Protection*, the aim is to strengthen dialogue and cooperation to respond to disasters and emergencies. Cooperation primarily takes place between the EU’s Civil Emergency Monitoring and Information Centre based in the Directorate General for Environment of the Commission and the Russian Ministry for Emergency Situations. An arrangement for practical cooperation was established in 2004 providing for exchanges of information, contact details for 24-hour communication and exchanges of staff between the operational centres...

**Northern Caucasus**

Since the beginning of the conflict in Chechnya in autumn 1999 and including the new €17.5 million funding decision for 2007, *the European Commission has provided around €220 million in humanitarian aid* for this crisis, making the EU the largest donor in the region.

The aid is aimed at supporting internally displaced persons (IDPs) and vulnerable groups in Chechnya, as well as IDPs in Ingushetia and Dagestan.
Assistance is provided mostly in the following sectors: protection of the civilian population, shelter rehabilitation, income-generation activities, health and psycho-social assistance. Additionally, support will be provided to Chechen refugees in Georgia and Azerbaijan. Funds are being allocated via the Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid of the European Commission (ECHO).

Relative improvements in the socio-economic situation in Chechnya over the last two years and a significant reconstruction effort have led, in 2007, to a downsizing of ECHO’s humanitarian programmes in the region for the first time since the beginning of the crisis.

However, although the conflict in Chechnya has receded, the humanitarian situation in the region remains difficult. Some 150,000 people continue to be internally displaced within the Republic. Many of them are returnees who have come back from Ingushetia over the past few years but could not go home because their houses were destroyed during the conflict. Living conditions remain extremely difficult. Outside Chechnya, around 18,000 people are still displaced in Ingushetia and some 7,000 in Dagestan.

In parallel to a phasing down of humanitarian aid activities, the EU’s focus is shifting from purely humanitarian assistance to development programmes. The EU has recently launched a new special programme for economic recovery of the North Caucasus with a budget of €20 million for health, education and economic development. There exists a clear mutual interest in the stability, and therefore the recovery and development, of the North Caucasus. The EU stands ready to provide further support to the recovery programme put in place by the Russian Federation and regional governments for Chechnya and the surrounding region…

Source: http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia
…2. THE OBJECTIVES OF EU COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA

EU cooperation with Russia is conceived in terms of, and is designed to strengthen, a strategic partnership founded on shared interests and common values.

The main interests of the EU in Russia lie in fostering the political and economic stability of the Federation; in maintaining a stable supply of energy; in further co-operation in the fields of justice and home affairs, the environment and nuclear safety in order to combat ‘soft’ security threats; and in stepping up cooperation with Russia in the Southern Caucasus and the Western NIS for the geopolitical stability of the CIS region.

In 1997, the EU and Russia committed to a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, to run for an initial period of ten years. The Agreement establishes the institutional framework for bilateral relations, and sets out the principal common objectives for trade and economic cooperation across a range of sectors, for political dialogue, and, to a limited extent, for cooperation in justice and home affairs.

At the St. Petersburg Summit in May 2003, the EU and Russia agreed to create four ‘common spaces’ in the framework of the Agreement: a Common Economic Space; a Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice; a Space of co-operation in the field of External Security; and a Common Space for Research and Education, including Cultural Aspects. The overriding objective of
all four Common Spaces is to strengthen the strategic partnership between the EU and Russia across the broadest range of policy domains.

• The objective of the Common Economic Space is the establishment of an open and integrated market between the EU and Russia.

• The objective of the Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice is to facilitate ease of movement between the EU and Russia, in particular for business, travel and tourism, within a context free of terrorist threat, organised crime and corruption.

• Within an international order based on effective multilateralism, the objective of Common Space on External Security is to strengthen cooperation on security and crisis management in order to address global and regional challenges and the key threats of today, notably terrorism, the proliferation of WMD, and existing or potential regional and local conflict.

• For the Common Space on Research, Education and Culture, the objective is to create and reinforce bonds between the EU and Russian research and education communities and to build on a shared cultural and intellectual heritage.

A set of roadmaps towards the Common Spaces were agreed at the St Petersburg Summit in May 2005. The roadmaps in effect set out the agenda for co-operation between the EU and Russia for the medium-term in order to make the four Common Spaces a reality. Annex 2 provides a summary of the range of policy objectives which have been set out, by the Commission in consultation with the Member States, corresponding to each roadmap.

• The EU has a particular concern for developments in the North Caucasus. In partnership with the authorities and in respect of Russian sovereignty, the objective of EC financial cooperation is to support the stabilisation, recovery and ultimately the development of the region.
• Because surrounded by EU Member States, the EU maintains a particular interest in the Kaliningrad Oblast. Its objective is to ensure that the potential for socio-economic development of Kaliningrad and the surrounding region is fulfilled…

…Progress towards achieving the Common Spaces may at any time be undermined by security threats, putting lives at risk, endangering the environment and compromising socio-economic reform and growth. One of the key implications of the European Union Security Strategy of December 2003 is the need for the EU to promote a ring of well-governed countries surrounding the EU with whom close and cooperative relations can be enjoyed. If the regions adjacent to Russia are not stable, this will have consequences for the security of the EU itself.

The conflict in Chechnya has engendered humanitarian disaster, and the continuing crisis threatens to tip the wider Northern Caucasus into disarray and conflict. The NIS region as a whole remains vulnerable to other regional tensions boiling over, putting national and even regional security at risk, particularly since the illicit availability and misuse of conventional weapons is a problem for which the NIS region is notorious. The threats of organized crime and terrorism cannot be discounted.

The threat to safety – and indeed to regional security - posed by the continuing operation of aged nuclear plants and equipment in Russia cannot be over-emphasised. In the light of the insecure management and regulatory régime applying to the whole industry, it must remain one of the objectives of EU policy to maintain pressure for continuous improvements in this area.

Alleviating and preventing security threats of all kinds, as well as enabling states to comply with and implement their international obligations, are key objectives of EU external action. Equally, the EU and Russia share an interest in strengthening cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs in
order to tackle the threat of organized crime, terrorism and other illegal activities of a cross-border nature. A balance will need to be struck by both sides between security on the one hand, and justice and freedom on the other.

The European Union has recently set out its Neighbourhood Policy for relations with its neighbours to the south and east. Russia has made clear that it should not be considered as falling under this policy. The EU has acknowledged this by establishing, in cooperation with the Federation, the quite distinct Common Spaces framework. Yet the overriding objectives contained within the Neighbourhood Policy remain highly relevant to the Common Spaces: preventing the emergence of new dividing lines in Europe; the progressive consolidation of a zone of shared stability, security and prosperity to be achieved through a significant degree of economic integration and political cooperation, and on the basis of shared values and common interests.

This Country Strategy Paper is based on the premise that the Common Spaces as the defining expression of EU policy towards the Russian Federation, the wider EU Neighbourhood Policy, the EU Security Strategy and EU development objectives, are mutually-reinforcing; and that they thus together form a robust and coherent approach to the EU relationship with Russia. This Paper, and particularly the associated National Indicative Programme for Russia, describe how this ambitious set of objectives can most effectively be supported through the financial cooperation extended by the EU to this strategic partner…

.. 3. RELATIONS WITH THE EU AND THE RUSSIAN POLICY AGENDA

3.2. Foreign and regional affairs

of territorial disintegration and sought to prioritise the Federation’s near abroad. Yet the Georgian Rose Revolution, a failure to resolve the Transnistrian dispute and eastern enlargement all seemed to demonstrate a decline in Russian influence. Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Ukraine participate in the European Neighbourhood Policy and dream of EU membership. Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan are more interested in building good relations with the US than with Russia.

The Ukraine Orange Revolution of December 2004 has galvanised Moscow. Increases in oil prices make Russia stronger, while the EU seems a great deal weaker following its constitutional crisis (it is already clear that the Kremlin considers Berlin, London, Paris and Rome of more significance than Brussels). The EU cannot take Russia for granted.

A constitution for the Russia-Belarus union is now being drawn up, and Russia has started to devote more attention to the Single Economic Space with Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. This may be in part in reaction to the Orange Revolution, and indeed the Russian Prime Minister has hinted that the renewed emphasis is in response to the EU’s eastern enlargement. While results have been mixed - Ukraine’s position is ambivalent, and Belarus resists economic liberalisation - Russia’s apparent objective seems to be to create a customs union, just as the objective of the Eurasian Economic Community (‘Evrazes’) is to establish such a union with Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Meanwhile Russia has considerably increased trade with China (largely through sales of energy and military equipment).

While Russia also offers security and military partnership through the security-oriented Collective Security Treaty Organisations (as well as through Evrazes since its merger with the Central Asian Cooperation Organisation), it is not likely to repeat the mistake of relying purely on military strength to extend its influence. In March 2005 Putin created a Kremlin department specifically
dedicated to promoting Russian influence in its near abroad particularly through the exercise of its ‘soft power’: energy supply, trade and investment, jobs for migrant workers, cultural and linguistic influence. The signs are that the Kremlin is also getting into the game of ‘creating’ NGOs to counter the influence of Western-funded organisations operating in its sphere of influence.

As Russia becomes more assertive, the EU must rely on Russian goodwill, not only for its efforts to promote a ring of stable and prosperous states to its east, based on democracy and respect for human rights, but also for final border demarcation with Latvia and Estonia, and indeed for the resolution of international issues from Moldova to the Middle East. Of particular concern to the EU are the questions of Kaliningrad and the continuing conflict in the North Caucasus; as well as frozen conflicts in the neighbourhood.

The EU is concerned that the Kaliningrad exclave may skew the development of the Baltic region. At present statistics tend to indicate that employment, GDP per capita, income, wages and investment - in Kaliningrad on the one hand and in surrounding EU Member States on the other - are starting to converge. Growth is high, and trade with and through Kaliningrad is currently increasing. The Oblast is due to be granted ‘Special Economic Zone’ status from April 2006 (although it is not clear whether this measure is WTO-compatible). Yet it remains difficult to do business in Kaliningrad due to centralisation and bureaucracy. Once its neighbours - Poland and Lithuania in particular - start implementing substantial EU structural funds in 2007, social indicators and standards of living in Kaliningrad may once again start to diverge. Both factors would favour the present tendency to corruption and organised crime, which in turns threatens EU investors and even regional stability. The EU is also concerned by Kaliningrad’s poor environmental record, particularly in terms of water pollution, and by the potential for catastrophic oil spills in the Baltic.
The North Caucasus region is characterised by flagrant socio-economic inequality, massive unemployment and a general breakdown of education and social services, in turn provoking general disaffection and disorder. A decade of conflict and instability has largely destroyed civilian infrastructure in Chechnya itself, while oil and chemical pollution and general environmental degradation pose a serious threat to human health. Low-intensity armed conflict and inter-communal tension persists, rights violations are commonplace, and the application of the rule of law is heavily restricted. Small arms and landmines will continue to pose a formidable threat to human security, life and livelihood for some time to come; civilian casualty rates are higher than in Afghanistan or Cambodia, and around a third of agricultural land is affected. There has still been no effort to date to comprehensively survey the mine problem, let alone start clearance.

The EU has signalled its intention to play a beneficial role - not least through the commitment in 2005 of €20m from the EC budget to contribute to economic and social recovery – while recognising that the Russian Government must play the leading part in bringing about the peaceful and durable settlement of the conflict, and regional socioeconomic recovery. The Kremlin claims to have invested some €2 billion in Chechnya alone over the past five years.

Yet it is far from clear that instability can be contained; there have been a number of terrorist incidents throughout Russia in recent years, notably the bombing of apartment blocks in Moscow and the notorious Beslan siege. The EU is particularly concerned, particularly since the events of Autumn 2005 in Nalchik, that instability threatens to spread to other parts of the North Caucasus. Given the relatively fragile hold exercised by the Russian authorities on a

29 UNICEF estimates that 500,000 landmines have been planted in Chechnya, making it one of the most landmine-polluted zones in the world; some estimates put the number of mines at six times this amount.
sprawling and multi-ethnic Federation, further regional or sub-regional conflict cannot be ruled out.

Russia supports the Non-Proliferation Treaty and cooperates with the IAEA. The Federation is a member of the Missile Technology Control Régime, of the Cooperative Threat Reduction and Global Partnership programmes, and of the G8 Global Partnership against the spread of Nuclear Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. National export control agencies have been strengthened under President Putin…

… 6. EC RESPONSE STRATEGY

\textit{Common Space of External Security}

Work is ongoing to strengthen cooperation in the five priority areas identified in the Road Map: strengthening dialogue and cooperation on international matters; the fight against terrorism; non-proliferation of WMD (for example, the EU encourages Russia to agree that the new Member States and Acceding States be admitted to export control regime groups such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Régime and the Wassenaar Arrangement); crisis management; and civil protection. Particular attention is paid to securing stability in the regions adjacent to Russian and EU borders (notably the ‘frozen conflicts’ in Transnistria, Abkahzia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh). For the North Caucasus, the Commission has followed up on the EU commitment to assist Russia to resolve the conflict, expressed in the framework of the CFSP, through the North Caucasus Action Programme…

… 6.7. Stability Instrument

The Stability Instrument will apply principally in situations of political crisis, man-made or natural disasters. It is designed to deliver an effective,
timely, flexible and integrated response to unforeseen needs until such time as normal cooperation can resume under the normal policy instruments. It is also designed to allow the Community to support measures to prevent violent conflict and to finance Community measures accompanying initiatives taken by the Council in the framework of the ESDP. Thus the Instrument may be used to provide support where there is an unforeseen window of opportunity to help avoid further conflict, or promote stabilisation.

Funding under this Instrument will be divided between short-term crisis response for operations of up to 18 months; and longer-term, cross-regional activities designed to take place under conditions of relative stability and intended to counter the proliferation of WMD and in support of the fight against organised crime more generally. Although funding is limited, actions under the Instrument for Stability may thus complement those funded under the ENPI for Russia, in particular any in support of the Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice, the Common Space of External Security, and any designed to support recovery in the North Caucasus…

Annex 2

The implementation of the roadmaps to the four Common Spaces – summary of objectives

<table>
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<th>Security</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
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<tr>
<td>To intensify EU-Russia cooperation in the field of counter-terrorism, and to identify ways to work</td>
<td>a) implement the Joint Statement on the fight against terrorism adopted at the EU – Russia summit in November 2002, and regularly review its implementation in existing appropriate EU-Russia formats</td>
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<td></td>
<td>b) sign, ratify and implement all 12 UN counter-terrorism conventions and protocols; fully implement</td>
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together to prevent and combat terrorism

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<th>relevant UN Security Council resolutions, including UNSCR 1373, 1540, 1267 and 1566</th>
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<tr>
<td>c) pursue efforts to seek the early finalisation of the draft <strong>UN Comprehensive Convention against international terrorism</strong> and to sign and ratify the <strong>International Convention Against Acts of Nuclear Terrorism</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>d) continue to cooperate within the <strong>Council of Europe</strong> including by finalizing and implementing the draft <strong>European Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>e) develop cooperation including through exchange of know-how and typologies / models to strengthen the <strong>fight against the financing of terrorism</strong>, including by freezing of funds and other terrorist assets, in accordance with the relevant international instruments</td>
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<tr>
<td>f) exchange legislation models in due course on the fight against the financing of terrorism, including on the <strong>abuse of non-profit/charitable sector</strong> and the confiscation of assets</td>
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<td>g) implement the <strong>agreement on cooperation between Europol and the Russian Federation</strong> signed in Rome on 6 November 2003, in order to enhance cooperation to fight terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h) enhance cooperation in all relevant international and regional fora to improve the <strong>capacity of third countries</strong> to fight terrorism</td>
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<tr>
<td>i) cooperate fully in the <strong>fight against terrorism</strong>,</td>
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in accordance with obligations under international law, in order to find, deny safe haven and bring to justice, on the basis of the principle to extradite or prosecute, any person who supports, facilitates, participates, or attempts to participate in the financing, planning, preparation, or commission of terrorist acts or provides safe havens

j) discuss within existing structures **specific measures** to fight against international terrorism in new areas, such as the use of internet for terrorist purposes and recommendations for selfregulation of mass media

k) explore the possibility of an EU-Russia agreement on **Mutual Legal Assistance**, based on the experience gained from the implementation of the Second Additional Protocol to the 1959 European Convention

l) consider the possibility of a **Memorandum of Understanding on the fight against terrorism** between EU and Russia, taking account of the Joint Statement of 2002 on the fight against terrorism

**Source:** http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia
External Security:

• Agreement on the protection of classified information, which will allow for the exchange of classified information in the context of EU-Russia cooperation on any matter of common interest. Negotiations on technical arrangements are still ongoing;
• Good cooperation continued between EU NAVFOR Atalanta and the Russian naval mission deployed off the Somali coast, enhancing the levels of protection provided to merchant shipping;
• Russian readiness to move forward on a framework agreement in the field of crisis management operations. First expert talks have taken place and will continue in 2011.

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Александр Анатольевич СЕРГУНИН

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