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The Battle of Poltava in Russian Historical Memory

ALEXANDER KAMENSKII

In 1995 the Russian official calendar was expanded by the addition of sixteen new commemorative days called “Days of Russian Military Glory” (Dni voinskoj slavy Rossii). One of them, 10 July, was supposed to commemorate Peter I’s victory over the Swedes at the Battle of Poltava in 1709. For about a decade after its introduction hardly anyone remembered this date, nor was it even mentioned in the media. But with the approach of the 300th anniversary of the battle and the escalation of tensions between Russia and Ukraine, the Battle of Poltava became an increasingly popular issue, with political analysts and publicists wielding it as a tool in their fight against sundry opponents. As for professional historians, only a handful of them took part in the debates around the question of whether Mazepa was really a traitor or a Ukrainian national hero. But Russian historians specializing in the Petrine era, eighteenth-century Russia, or military history in general seized the opportunity to write at least a dozen lengthy works with the word “Poltava” in the title, and publishers were more than willing to print them. Several volumes of collected papers appeared, some of them based on conferences organized by various institutions, which some participants from abroad attended.

Some of these authors devoted entire chapters in their books to the memory of the Battle of Poltava. One may question why there was any need to do this, inasmuch as all the fuss that arose in 2009 in connection with the Poltava anniversary and the numerous publications were ample proof that the memory of the battle was still very much alive and important to the Russian people. This scholarly overkill may be explained by the fact that the study of historical memory is a very popular topic among Russian historians today, and that the authors of all those books on Poltava were simply caught up in this trend. However, these works describe mostly official celebrations of the Poltava anniversaries and other commemorative activities of the political elite. Although these events certainly go a long way to showing that the memory of Poltava has been kept alive for the last three centuries, they do not explain whether they are evidence of the Russian people’s collective memory.

The Battle of Poltava is one of those unique historical events that have
never been a point of controversy among historians. Though interpretations
of this event and its impact may differ, no one doubts that it was a victory of
the Russian army over the Swedish forces, as well as a turning point in both
Russian and European history. What’s more, even if one were to argue that the
set of historical events comprising the traditional scheme of Russian history,
which was constructed for the most part by the end of the eighteenth century,
imented by Nikolai Karamzin in the early nineteenth, and reproduced in the
Soviet Union, is somewhat artificial and has little to do with “real” history, it
would still be difficult to prove that the Battle of Poltava should not be included
in the canon. At the same time, it is instructive to examine what happened to
the memory of this event.

When we read Peter’s letters written on the eve of the battle and immediately
afterwards, it seems as though he had not fully absorbed what had happened.
He was full of joy, yet the crushing defeat of the Swedes was unexpected and
too rapid and too easy to be true. Two weeks later Peter ordered a church to be
erected on the site of the battle, as well as a pyramid bearing his portrait, and
a painting depicting the battle, complete with explanatory plaques. Building
a church was the traditional Russian way of marking important sites, while a
pyramid with pictures and explanations was something more innovative and
surely borrowed from the West, if not classical Rome. Still, it is very likely
that a more comprehensive understanding of the significance of the victory,
and particularly its political importance, came to Peter almost a month later
and, as often happens with rulers, he found himself requiring the assistance
of an intellectual, namely Feofan Prokopovych, a native of Ukraine. On 22 July
Russian troops marched into Kyiv and during a solemn service held in the main
cathedral in the tsar’s presence Prokopovych read his famous panegyric Slovo
pokhv’il’noe, which contains all the images and assessments—in fact, all the
elements of the Poltava myth—that are traditionally dusted off whenever the
Battle of Poltava is mentioned.

The Slovo pokhv’il’noe is a lengthy work (seventeen printed pages in the
latest edition) supplemented by a four-page-long poem. Its reading on 22 July
1709 lasted no less than an hour, but the lengthy reading did not tire Peter.
On the contrary, he was greatly impressed and ordered it to be published and
widely distributed. There is no need to delve into all of Prokopovych’s battle
descriptions and what he wrote about its significance, as the Slovo pokhv’il’noe
has been thoroughly analyzed in recent articles by Evgenii Anisimov and Gio-
vanna Brogi Bercoff. The real crux of the Poltava question is the deliberate
attempt to construct a myth about a real historical event, which was to be used
as a tool of Russian political propaganda and official ideology. Prokopovych’s
advice to Peter was to use images of the victory at Poltava as widely as possible:
“Depict it with skillful art not only on great pillars, walls, pyramids, and other
buildings, but also on small weapons and guns.”
In establishing the political significance of Poltava, Prokopovych turned it into an event of secular, not sacred, history. It is no accident that in 1709 Peter refused to approve the text of Feofilakt Lopatyn’s’kyi’s sermon dedicated to the victory at Poltava. In his letter to Lopatyn’s’kyi the tsar commented that, inasmuch as the Swedes also had a blessed cross that they worshipped, it was not so much a war about religious beliefs as about “measure,” as he put it. (As is often the case with Peter I’s pronouncements, it is not clear what he meant by that word.) This shift in interpretation provides a clue to a speech that the tsar reportedly made before the start of the battle, in which he enjoined his troops to fight, not for the Orthodox faith or the tsar, as Russian tradition dictated, but for the Fatherland (Otechestvo). Historians doubt whether such a speech was ever made or was composed after the battle; but this merely confirms the above remarks.

The following example reveals the mechanism of constructing a historic myth. The Battle of Poltava took place on the very day of the Orthodox Church feast day of St. Sampson the Hospitable (Sampsonii Strannopriimets). In his Slovo pokhval’noe Prokopovych replaced St. Sampson with the biblical Samson, depicting Peter as Samson tearing apart the jaws of the Swedish lion. This image proved to be very effective: it also appears in Stefan lavors’kyi’s work on the victory at Poltava and was reproduced in the decorations that appeared in Moscow in December 1709 when the victory was celebrated, as well as in an engraving by Ivan Zubov and Mykhailo Karnovs’kyi created during the same period. The Peter-as-Samson image was reproduced in the 1720s in the design of a triumphal pillar by Andrei Nartov and Bartolomeo Rastrelli. In 1735 a statue of Samson and a lion, sculpted by Carlo Rastrelli, was erected in Peterhof; the statue that we see today is not the original but a replica made by Mikhail Kozlovskii in the early nineteenth century. By the mid-eighteenth century this image had become familiar to everyone. In his “Ode to the Sovereign Emperor Peter the Great” Aleksandr Sumarokov wrote: “Peter, by God’s will / Tormented a lion in the Poltava field: / The lion roared helplessly / Beneath the eagle’s wings, / Wounded by its claws / The lion did not dare resist.”

The fate of the Swedish lion, the image of Peter as Samson, and the glorification of Peter’s heroic military deeds were all elements common to the many poetical and prose texts written in eighteenth-century Russia. Mikhail Lomonosov, for example, mentions the Battle of Poltava twice in his Slovo pokhval’noe blazhennia pamiati imperatora Petra Velikogo. To this Russian writer the victory at Poltava symbolized the success of Peter’s efforts to create a new Russian army; at the same time it was proof of God’s mercy. He repeats this idea when he mentions that Peter was not killed, or even wounded, during the battle. Other literary works, such as the one written by Ioan Maksymovych, the archbishop of Chernihiv, contained vivid descriptions of the battle, but they never enjoyed popularity and were quickly forgotten.
The Battle of Poltava was also a source of inspiration for many artists. The first paintings appeared soon after the battle, a theme that was frequently revisited throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Among them is the famous mosaic by Mikhail Lomonosov, but none of the dozens of paintings that we know became a universally recognized masterpiece familiar to all Russians.

Meanwhile, 27 June became part of the official calendar of Russian holidays, first celebrated during Peter’s reign as one of the so-called victory days (viktorial’nye dni). The first celebration in 1710, described in the memoirs of Just Juel, the Danish ambassador, included a military parade featuring the Preobrazhenskii and Semenovskii regiments, a church service, a public sermon read by Feofilakt Lopatyn’s’kyi, fireworks, and a feast.10 That year, and two years afterward, Peter still remembered that 27 June was associated with St. Sampson, as he mentioned in a letter to Alexander Menshikov on 29 June 1712. In later years this day was associated strictly with the Poltava victory and celebrated regularly every year, including the celebration that was held in 1718, the day after Peter’s eldest son Aleksei died. Elena Pogosian, who has studied the Russian calendar of the Petrine era, notes that until 1718 there was no concrete “ideology” underpinning this holiday. In some cases, it was combined with celebrations of Peter’s name day or some other important event, like the arrival of the ambassador of Persia in 1713. The way it was celebrated did not differ greatly from other holidays, including New Year’s celebrations.11

The victory at Poltava was celebrated regularly even after Peter’s death, and in 1727 it is mentioned in a long list of other victories over the Swedes. Altogether thirty-seven victories are mentioned, and while they comprised only part of the official calendar, it is obvious that each of these victories could not be celebrated. During the reign of Anna Ivanovna (1730–40) only so-called tsar’s days, like name days, birthdays, and anniversaries of the coronation, were publicly marked. Other holidays, including the day commemorating Poltava, were celebrated only at the royal court. In 1739, toward the end of this period, the date of the Battle of Poltava found its way into the list of official holidays; but now it was slated as a public holiday and not celebrated at the royal court.

The holiday was restored during the rule of Elizabeth, but in Catherine II’s time it was pushed aside by new military victories. Aleksandr Khrapovitskii, whose diary covers the ten years that he was Catherine’s secretary, refers to the Poltava holiday only three times. The first entry mentions that on 27 June 1786 he congratulated the empress on the day of the holiday. Exactly two years later Catherine was signing orders about a new war with Sweden, and Khrapovitskii commented to the empress that this was not accidental. In 1790 he mentions a service at the cathedral in Tsarskoe Selo, which was dedicated not to the memory of Poltava, but Russia’s latest (naval) victory over the Swedes, the Battle of Vyborg Bay.12 This service is also mentioned in Catherine’s letter to
Grigorii Potemkin, dated 28 June 1790. "I held a service here yesterday, on the
day of the Battle of Poltava," she writes, congratulating her correspondent on
the occasion of "today's holiday." The date of 28 June was marked in Cath-
erine's calendar as the day she ascended to the Russian throne, and it is clear
that of the two events Catherine certainly preferred the latter. The story of
the coup d'état that brought Catherine to power in 1762 shows that during
the short reign of Peter's grandson (Peter III) there was no great celebration
of the Poltava date, either. On 27 June of that year the emperor was away from
St. Petersburg, and some kind of festivity was scheduled to take place the next
day, Peter III's name day.

Peter I is often mentioned in the pages of another diary, that of Semen
Poroshin, the tutor of Grand Prince Paul. Although stories of Peter's life and
deeds were widely used in the lessons given to his great-grandson, the Battle
of Poltava was never mentioned. It would appear that from the standpoint of
Paul's tutors Peter I the statesman was a much more instructive figure for the
young man than Peter the military leader. In his diary for the year 1765 Poroshin
describes a typical pastime on 27 June. On that day the court remained in
Krasnoe Selo, and officers from the two divisions that had come to take part
in the parade paid a visit to eleven-year-old Paul. In the evening the prince's
other tutor, Nikita Panin, discussed some historical issues with the boy, but did
not mention Peter I: "He spoke about Aleksei Petrovich Besstuzhev, and how
he had come here as a minister in the time of the Sovereign, and also about
the revolutions under Anna Ioannovna and after her death." What happened
to the memory of the Battle of Poltava?

Two facts must be considered in order to answer this question. First, in the
immediate aftermath of the battle Peter took control over all information con-
cerning this event, and the official and undisputable version of the battle was
soon constructed. Second, fifty-five years later there were no more witnesses
of the battle left at Catherine's court who could tell the heir to the Russian
throne about this event. Moreover, not only had no readable history of it been
published, none had even been written. The only sources of information were
official announcements from the Petrine era or panegyrical compositions. Both
of these types of sources contained an identical canonical version, not a living
story, and one reading of either sufficed.

Another important fact to consider is that there are no memoirs by Russian
veterans of Poltava. It would seem that one of the greatest events in Russian
history had not impressed its participants enough for them to commemorate
their experiences. Furthermore, besides Peter's correspondence, there is no
extant personal correspondence of those who witnessed the battle. Thus, it is
not possible to write a book about the Battle of Poltava, like Peter Englund's
Poltava, based solely on Russian documents.

As long as the Poltava veterans were still alive, the memory of the battle lived
on. One may agree with Evgenii Anisimov, who in his book on Tsarina Elizabeth wrote that the veterans of the Preobrazhenskii Regiment probably recounted stories about Peter I to their young comrades in arms, thereby preparing them for the coup d'état of November 1741 that brought Peter's daughter to power. But since the military service of the veterans was mostly lifelong and the battle had taken place in faraway Ukraine, their stories could not spread throughout the country. When the veterans died, the living memory of Poltava disappeared with them. Thus, there was simply no way for the Battle of Poltava to become part of the collective memory of the Russian people. Also, neither Peter nor Prokopovych's suggestions concerning the wide distribution of images of Poltava were realized. The first monument was erected at the battle site during the reign of Catherine II, but it was a private initiative.

The anniversary of the battle was occasionally celebrated in later centuries. On 27 June 1812, the day on which Alexander I was planning a decisive battle with Napoleon, the Russian tsar issued a manifesto to the army reminding his troops that this was a day of Russian military glory. Five years later the 3rd Infantry Corps held maneuvers on the site of the victory at Poltava, where they tried to recreate the battle. By now, the memory of Poltava had become transformed into a matter of artificial formality. For the majority of Russians it was just another state holiday, with which they had no personal connection.

Where Russian intellectuals were concerned, the situation was slightly different. In the early part of the nineteenth century Peter I was still an intriguing and attractive figure, and his heroic image continued to inspire poets. In one of his early poems (1818) Petr Viazemskii writes about Peter astride a "Poltava horse" and describes "an enemy frightened by repeated Poltavas." The poet was thus attempting to turn the word "Poltava" into a watchword for all Russian military victories, but his poetic endeavor failed. Viazemskii's close friend, Aleksandr Pushkin, was a more gifted poet and therefore more adept at creating memorable images. Thanks to his poem Poltava (1828–29), the Battle of Poltava was restored—but to cultural memory, not historical memory. For those who read Pushkin today the very word "Poltava" is now associated with (1) the title of the poem, (2) the name of a city in Ukraine; and (3) the name of a historical event. One should also keep in mind that the original title of Pushkin's poem was not Poltava but Mazepa, a clear indication that the Russian poet was inspired by the romantic figure of the Ukrainian hetman, not the Russians' victory over the Swedes.

A trend critical of Peter I and his achievements emerged in the late eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth. Prince Mikhail Shcherbatov was the first to attempt an examination of Peter's mistakes in his essay "On the Corruption of Morals in Russia." In 1810 Nikolai Karamzin wrote "A Note on Old and New Russia," a detailed analysis of Peter's rule. Neither Shcherbatov nor Karamzin denied Peter's greatness; that was a given. This perhaps explains
why neither Peter's heroic deeds nor his military victories, including the Battle of Poltava, were mentioned in these two works.

Most Russian thinkers of the nineteenth century concurred. As Aleksandr Panchenko put it, "Peter is a touchstone of Russian thought, its eternal problem, which has to do not only with the philosophy of history but also with religion, not only with the national path but also national existence." Thus, one need only examine the writings of any nineteenth- or early-twentieth-century Russian essayist, philosopher, or literary critic to find numerous references to Peter I and diverse assessments of what he had done for Russia. But readers will search in vain for any mention of the Battle of Poltava.

In 1994 an anthology devoted to Peter I, consisting of several hundred citations by about 250 authors, was published in Russia. The citations are grouped under thirteen headings, such as "The Creator of Russia," "A Typical Russian," "The Heir to the Muscovite Tsardom," "A Nontraditional Autocrat," "Antipatriot," "Pseudo Reformer," and so on. The various authors discuss what Peter accomplished for the benefit of the Russian people, Russian culture, and Russian traditions. Again, there is nothing about Peter as the military leader who defeated Charles XII at Poltava. Clearly, both Peter's supporters and his detractors regarded as positive his transformation of Russia into an empire that became an active player in the international arena.

This is not to say that the Battle of Poltava disappeared altogether from the official patriotic discourse or the pages of school textbooks. The noted children's writer and educator Aleksandra Ishimova, in her book entitled The History of Russia in Stories for Children (1837), devoted a whole chapter to Poltava. "Peter was fighting for the happiness of his people, for the tsardom that he had created anew, that would have been destroyed with Charles's triumph. Charles was defending his glory, his hero's name, and his poor soldiers, who were unable to escape death in the land of their victorious enemies. On that famous day it was not possible to decide which of the two sovereigns was more fearless. Thousands of bullets were flying past them; frightening neither.... In the history of Peter's reign this victory is regarded as the most famous. By asserting Russian power over the lands captured from the Swedes, with a new port and a new capital there, this victory allowed the Russian people to join the ranks of educated Europeans, which was the main goal of Peter's life." It should be noted that the respectful description of Charles XII disappeared in the Soviet period.

A tremendous effort to restore the memory of the Battle of Poltava was undertaken in 1909, during the celebrations of the 200th anniversary. Nicholas II arrived in Poltava, where lavish festivities took place over several days: military parades and church services were held, monuments were unveiled, and delegations arrived from various communities, bringing bread and salt for the tsar. Russian newspapers reported, for example, that "the Moscow city council
was invited to buy a silver scoop from which Peter the Great had drunk, a silver picture depicting the feast after the Battle of Poltava, and a silver tray on which the keys from the fortress at Orekhov were brought to Peter. For these treasures the owner wants 6,000 rubles." On 8 June "Mazurovskii, a well known painter of battle scenes, was leaving for Poltava to make sketches of the place. He was preparing a large painting for the military museum." It is interesting to note that two weeks prior to the celebration the Russian emperor and his family visited Sweden. On 15 June the royal yacht anchored at Stockholm Harbor, where it was greeted with fireworks. That day a large detachment of policemen left St. Petersburg for Poltava to participate in the celebrations. 21

Thirty years later the newspaper Bolshevik Poltavshchina republished an article that Vladimir Korolenko had written in 1909, on the eve of the tsar's visit to Poltava. In his commentary the author offers a different view of the celebrations: "Many townspeople are asking with anxiety, what will the next days bring them and the Russian people—repressions, prison, administrative obstacles, pogroms?" In Korolenko's view, Peter I's reforms had given birth to a progressive Russian people. But "where are the children of the reforms?" he asked. His answer: "There—in penal servitude, in prisons, in exile; everyone is under the control of the secret police." 22

The 1909 celebrations, held just a few years after Russia's defeat in the war with Japan, had a strong patriotic connotation. This facet of the memory of the Battle of Poltava deserves special discussion. In 1854 Petr Chaadaev wrote in his "An Extract from a Letter by an Unknown Man to an Unknown Woman": "When by happenstance we had a victory over it [Europe], as it happened with Peter the Great, we used to say: we owe this victory to you, gentlemen." (Chaadaev was referring to a legend about Peter drinking a toast to the "Swedes—our mentors" during the feast after the battle.) "Let me love my motherland as Peter the Great, Catherine, and Alexander did. I believe that soon it will probably be acknowledged that this kind of patriotism is no worse than any other," he concluded. 23

In my article on Russian patriotism in the eighteenth century I argue that it is worth trying to determine in what way Hetman Ivan Mazepa's "treason" and the victory over the Swedes at Poltava influenced mass consciousness. 24 This question has yet to be explored. In general, the story of what happened to the memory of the Battle of Poltava clearly demonstrates that sometimes even a vigorous propaganda campaign cannot make an important event, one that is crucial to a nation's history, part of collective memory if most people have no personal connection with it.
Notes

1. Russian lawmakers who established this date obviously did not know that there is a difference of eleven (not thirteen) days between the eighteenth-century Russian calendar and the twentieth-century calendar. Thus, the correct date should have been 8 July.


4. Richard Wortman views the victory at Poltava as a symbolic watershed in the presentation of the tsar, who now claimed to be both emperor and deity. The triumphal celebration in Moscow combined both biblical and classical images. See his study, *From Peter the Great to the Death of Nicholas I*, vol. 1 of *Scenarios of Power: Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy* (Princeton, N. J., 1995–2000).


6. V. P. Grebeniuk, "Panegiricheskie proizvedenia pervoi chetverti XVIII v. i ikh sviazy s petrovskimi preobrazovaniami," in his *Panegiricheskaia literatura petrovskogo vremen*, ed. O. A. Derzhavina (Moscow, 1979), 27.

7. Ibid.


10. *Larry Poltavy*, comp. V. Naumov (Moscow, 2001), 188.


16. P. Viazemskii, Zapisnye knizhki (Moscow, 1992), 43.
19. The only exception, as Rolf Torstendahl notes, was probably the anarchist Mikhail Bakunin, who condemned Peter’s military victories because they strengthened the Russian state (R. Torstendahl, “Poltava: srazhenie, istoriia i simvol,” in Poltava: Sut’ by plennykh i vzaimodeistvie kul’tur (Moscow, 2009), 32.