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Regular version of the site
Master 2022/2023

Corporate Governance

Type: Elective course (Finance)
Area of studies: Finance and Credit
When: 1 year, 3 module
Mode of studies: offline
Open to: students of one campus
Master’s programme: Finance
Language: English
ECTS credits: 3
Contact hours: 32

Course Syllabus

Abstract

The elective course “Corporate governance” is intended for master students following the programs “Finance” and “Applied Economics and Mathematical Methods”. The main goal of the course is to give the students a firm grasp of corporate governance as an academic field, with emphasis on the agency (or finance) perspective (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny, JF 1997) as opposed to alternative theories (stakeholder, stewardship, resource-dependence theories, etc.). In addition, the course draws the students’ attention to modern methods of empirical analysis in the field of corporate governance, finance and economics. The main topics covered include: Defining corporate governance and key theoretical models; Mechanisms to incentivise and discipline badly performing managers; Corporate governance and stakeholders; National models of corporate governance; Corporate governance in Russia. The course consists of lectures and seminars (in the form of a colloquium). The seminars involve student presentations (individually or in small groups) of contemporary research on corporate governance published in leading economics and finance journals. For each topic, a list of suggested articles is provided by the instructor. After the course, the students are expected to understand corporate governance as a rapidly developing field of research at the intersection of economics, finance and management, know the key theoretical concepts and main empirical results within the finance perspective on corporate governance, as well as be familiar with modern methods of empirical research in this field.
Learning Objectives

Learning Objectives

  • The main goal of the course is to give the students a firm grasp of corporate governance as an academic field, with emphasis on the agency (or finance) perspective (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny, JF 1997) as opposed to alternative theories (stakeholder, stewardship, resource-dependence theories, etc.).
Expected Learning Outcomes

Expected Learning Outcomes

  • Be able to critically evaluate current research in this field
  • Be able to recognize and take into consideration interests of various stakeholders when assessing corporate governance at the firm level
  • Be able to take reasonable and responsible financial decisions aimed at addressing agency problems in firms
  • Be familiar with modern methods of empirical research in the field of corporate governance
  • Know the key theoretical concepts and main empirical results within the finance perspective on corporate governance
  • Understand corporate governance as a rapidly developing field of research at the intersection of economics, finance and management
Course Contents

Course Contents

  • Introduction to corporate governance
  • Mechanisms of corporate governance
  • National models of corporate governance
  • Corporate governance and stakeholders
  • Corporate governance in Russia
Assessment Elements

Assessment Elements

  • non-blocking Presentation
    The student’s presentation on a particular topic at the seminar
  • non-blocking Final exam
  • non-blocking Test
    A closed book, closed notes written test
  • non-blocking Class participation
Interim Assessment

Interim Assessment

  • 2022/2023 3rd module
    0.15 * Class participation + 0.2 * Test + 0.25 * Presentation + 0.4 * Final exam
Bibliography

Bibliography

Recommended Core Bibliography

  • Becht, M., Bolton, P., & Roell, A. (2003). Corporate governance and control. Handbook of the Economics of Finance, 1. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.h.eee.finchp.1.01
  • Corporate governance matters: a closer look at organizational choices and their consequences, Larcker, D.F., 2011
  • International corporate governance, Goergen, M., 2012
  • Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997). A Survey of Corporate Governance. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x

Recommended Additional Bibliography

  • A theory of the firm : governance, residual claims, and organizational forms, Jensen, M. C., 2000
  • Ichiro Iwasaki. (2007). Enterprise Reform And Corporate Governance In Russia: A Quantitative Survey. Journal of Economic Surveys, (5), 849. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.a.bla.jecsur.v21y2007i5p849.902
  • Michael C. Jensen, & William H. Meckling. (1976). Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsbas&AN=edsbas.608A4D5A
  • Microeconomic theory: basic principles and extensions, Nicholson, W., 2016
  • Olga Lazareva, Andrei Rachinsky, & Sergey Stepanov. (2007). A Survey of Corporate Governance in Russia. Working Papers. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.p.abo.neswpt.w0103