The Problem of Evil: Theodicy and Anti-theodicy in Analytic Philosophy

The work is devoted to the analysis of the problem of evil in the context of analytic philosophy, with particular attention paid to the critique of the concepts of theodicy and anti-theodicy. The problem of evil, which originated in ancient philosophy, became more acute in the Christian tradition and found systematic expression in Gottfried Leibniz's concept of theodicy. However, the tragic events of the 20th century revealed the inadequacy of traditional theodicies, leading to the emergence of a new critical paradigm—anti-theodicy. The latter emphasizes the moral unacceptability of any attempts to justify evil and accuses theodicy of instrumentalizing suffering and fostering greater tolerance toward tragedies. The methodological tools of the analytic tradition allow for a rigorous and rationally justified analysis of these concepts, revealing their strengths and weaknesses. The analysis demonstrates that theodicy can offer logically coherent explanations for the existence of evil that are compatible with belief in God, yet its arguments lose persuasiveness in the face of radical evil. In turn, anti-theodicy exposes the ethical vulnerability of traditional theodicies but fails to provide a positive alternative necessary for comprehending and overcoming suffering. Thus, both concepts have their own limitations and advantages, and their joint consideration within the analytic tradition allows for a deeper understanding of the nature of the problem of evil and the prospects for its philosophical-theological interpretation.