Incentive effects of an uncertainty in a group moral hazard model

<p>Based on the models of the principal-agents interaction represented by E.<br />Winter in his numerous works the present paper provides an extension to<br />the model, in which the principal can manipulate the measure of information,<br />available to the agents. The manipulation affects the agents&rsquo; decisions about<br />exerting effort doing their tasks. Detailed models description is given at the<br />literature review section.<br />The model with the possibility of information manipulation by principal was<br />formalized. Then the equilibriums under deferent conditions were found, including<br />the case of complete and incomplete information. The conditions of complimentaries<br />and substitutions were preserved. There were found the probabilities of playing<br />exact strategies. Furthermore there were found the probability of overall project<br />success depending on uncertainty measure.</p>