Trade Sanctions in International Environmental Legislation: Stimulating or Discouraging the Implementation of Obligations at the National Level

The paper explores the interaction of the two countries in the process of discussing issues of international cooperation in the field of environmental protection. Constructed a theoretical model of the multi-period interaction for the analysis of optimal strategies of countries. The state of equilibrium is analyzed by finding a perfect subgame Nash equilibrium. In this paper it was shown that the Nash equilibrium in sub-games in the multiperiod game has the following features: In a world where trade sanctions are allowed, countries have less incentive to waive obligations. On the other hand, in a world where trade sanctions are banned, punishment that follows a waiver of compliance has major implications for countries. It can also be concluded that the more attention the countries pay to the future streams of wins, the less they have incentives to refuse to fulfill their obligations. Thus, countries with perfect democracy and a longer electoral cycle are less motivated to fulfill commitments than countries with a shorter electoral cycle.