One Party Control over the Legislative and Executive Branches of Power as an Opportunity for Subversion of Democracy

In this thesis, I attempted to find out whether the transfer of control over the highest legislative and executive bodies to one political party leads to subversion of democracy. In contrast to existing studies on the causes of subversion of democracy, I examined the effect of the actual distribution of power in parliament and executive bodies between parties (not the effect of institutions that promote or impede its concentration). In this paper, I presented and tested hypotheses about the direction of the effect of the transfer of control over the executive and legislative branches to one party on the degree of compliance with democratic principles. Before hypothesis testing, the data were pre-processed by propensity score matching.Then I used linear regression models, including models with fixed effects, to find estimates of the causal effect. The results of data analysis generally did not confirm the idea that the impact of the transfer of control over the executive and legislative branches on the degree of compliance with democratic principles is negative.