A Model of Bayesian Persuasion with Aligned Interests

This paper, based on the model of Bayesian persuasion, demonstrates the solution to the problem of environmental protection when interests of Sender (public) and Receiver (industry) are partly aligned – Sender gains from both environmental protection and economic efficiency while Receiver cares only about efficiency – and the game is dynamic – if we examine most “green” policies , we can see that they all manifest what has to be done by 2030/2050 in order to meet the target of zero emissions for the year 2100, hence, it seems logical to assume model dynamics. There are two states of the world – climate crisis or natural climate change – and three actions – “green” policies are not implemented by the industry in period one, “green” policies are implemented in period one but not in period two, and “green” policies are implemented throughout the whole time span. Since it is also suggested that the “old” progress is not fully lost when switching from one action to the other over time, and “new” progress can be gained from switching, conflict of interest between the two parties should decrease or even disappear.