A Model of Electoral Competition with “Smart Voting”

The paper is devoted to the study of "Smart voting", proposed by the Russian opposition to increase the probability of winning the opposition in the elections in the conditions of electoral manipulation of the authorities in an authoritarian regime. The paper answers the question of whether "Smart voting" can influence electoral processes and election results. The answer is given by the game-theoretic model developed in the study, in which electoral processes are represented at the micro level – at the level of behavior of rational actors seeking to maximize their benefits. Predictions are extracted from the model, which are then tested on empirical material by regression analysis. As a result of the work, the author concludes that the introduction of "Smart voting" has a few effects on electoral behavior and affects the outcome of elections (an increase in turnout, a change in the structure of the electorate, a shift of opposition candidates to more oppositional views). At the same time, the scale of these effects can vary depending on several indicators (the party affiliation of the candidate from the "Smart Vote", the share of the opposition in the electorate, the cohesion of the opposition-minded part of the voters and the degree of opposition of the electorate that is not loyal to the government).