1. Всероссийская олимпиада школьников "Высшая проба" (профиль "Экономика"): председатель методической комиссии / жюри (2018/2019 учебный год), член методической комиссии (2019/2020 и 2020/2021 учебный год). 

2. Участие в комиссиях по защите бакалаврских и магистерских выпускных квалификационных работ.

3. Отбор заявок, поданных на XX Апрельскую международную научную конференцию по проблемам развития экономики и общества (Москва, Россия).

4. Участие в отборе статей для HSE WP BRP Series.

5. Участие в отборе статей для Economic Journal, Southern Economic Journal, International Economic Review, International Journal of Game Theory, Journal of the European Economic Association, Games and Economic Behaviour, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization.

Microeconomics-2 (Бакалавриат; где читается: Факультет экономических наук; направление "38.03.01. Экономика", направление "38.03.01. Экономика"; 2-й курс, 1, 2 модуль)Анг

1. Optimal Allocation of Multi-Dimensional Prizes in Contests with Heterogeneous Agents 

We develop a model where two players with asymmetric preferences engage in a contest game. The key novelty is the introduction of multi-dimensional rewards. We characterize the optimal prize allocation that maximizes aggregate effort. When heterogeneity in preferences is strong and the designer cannot assign identity-dependent prizes, the loser must get a positive reward, which is in stark contrast to the existing literature. Such allocation eliminates the advantage of the stronger competitor and incentivizes the opponent to exert more effort (the equilibrium effect). Using data from twelve professional tennis competitions where prizes include money and the ATP ranking points, we test our theoretical predictions empirically. The identification strategy relies on exogenous variation in prizes over both dimensions and random matching between the players. We document the equilibrium effect in the data and recover the underlying preference profiles that define its direction.

2. Information Disclosure in Contests with Communication 

We study information disclosure in static contests where players do not know their own values of winning. The designer chooses a disclosure policy that maximizes the total expected effort and commits to it before learning the realized value profile. The available disclosure regimes include (1) public disclosure, (2) private disclosure, when each contestant learns only his own type, and (3) concealment. A distinct feature of our model is that before the actual competition starts, contestants are allowed to communicate with each other by sending informative (truthful) or uninformative (empty) messages independently and simultaneously. Our results show that under private disclosure, the contestants reveal their types with a positive probability. The designer’s choice of the disclosure regime depends on the communication technology. If this technology is assortative (the types get revealed more often when the contestants’ values of winning are the same), then concealment always delivers the highest total effort. With a disassortative technology, the designer must choose private disclosure if and only if the correlation between the contestants’ values of winning is sufficiently high. These results are in a stark contrast with the no communication benchmark.

3. Optimal Information Disclosure in Competing Contests with Capacity Constrained Players 

This paper studies optimal information disclosure in competing contests with identical players. Each player faces a capacity constraint on the total effort contribution and is ex ante uninformed about the difficulty of the task to be performed in one of the contests. The task can be either difficult (associated with a high effort cost) or easy (associated with a low effort cost). Before the game starts, the designer of a contest with the unknown task can commit to (1) fully disclose the task type or to (2) keep it private in order to maximize the aggregate effort exerted in her competition. When the capacity constraint is slack, the game between contests is equivalent to the non-competitive case. Otherwise, the contests become linked, and there is a substitution effect which forces the players to reallocated their effort to a competition they perceive as easiest. If the difficult task is sufficiently costly, then full disclosure generates substantial competitive gains from revealing the easy task and, hence, mitigates the substitution effect. When the cost of performing a difficult task declines, full disclosure results in significant competitive losses from revealing the difficult task to the contestants, and concealment turns to be more attractive.

Adverse Selection in Job Promotion Contests with Multi-Dimensional Skills (with Anna Ponomarenko)

Сентябрь 2011– Август 2017: Ассистент Кафедры эконометрики и статистики, ВШЭМ, УрФУ (Екатеринбург, Россия)

Сентябрь 2016 – Май 2017: Ассистент профессора Филиппо Таддеи, The Johns Hopkins University, SAIS Europe (Болонья, Италия)

https://sites.google.com/site/aantsygi/home-1