Moscow Research seminar 'Mathematical Methods of Decision Choice and Analysis'

On September 17, 2014, Moscow research seminar 'Mathematical Methods of Decision Choice and Analysis' will be held at the Higher School of Economics.

The seminar is moderated by:

• Professor Fuad T. Aleskerov,
• Professor Vladislav V. Podinovskiy
• Professor Boris G. Mirkin. 

1. Topic 'Absence-Proofness: A New Cooperative Stability Concept'

   Speaker: Emre Doğan (HSE International Laboratory of Decision Choice and Analysis).

Abstract:
We introduce a new cooperative stability concept, absence-proofness (AP). Given an allocation problem in a society , and a solution well defined for all subsocieties, a group of people  may benefit by leaving a subgroup  “out” of the allocation process. After the allocation takes place in the society , agents in  may reallocate what they received, plus ’s endowments (if they have any) among all of . This reallocation is profitable if it is Pareto superior to what  would get in the society  had  not been left aside. We call the solutions that are immune to this kind of manipulations absence-proof. Absence-proofness implies core stability by definition. In fair division problems, where core has no bite, AP imposes core-like participation constraints on solutions. In both fair division problems and TU games, well-known population-monotonicity (PM) property implies AP. Although solutions that are AP but not PM exist for very specific problems, our work suggests that these properties have very close formal implications. In exchange economies with private endowments we provide many negative results. Particularly, the Walrasian allocation rule is manipulable.

2. Topic 'On Manipulation from an Unacceptable Social Choice to an Acceptable One'.

         Speaker: Bora Erdamar (HSE International Laboratory of Decision Choice and Analysis).

         Co-authors: ​Remzi  Sanver (Istanbul Bilgi University) и Shin Sato (Fukuoka University)

Abstract:
Non-manipulability in collective decision making problems has been analyzed mainly through the axiom of strategy-proofness. In this paper, we propose a new concept of non-manipulability. We postulate that each agent misreports his preferences if and only if the misrepresentation leads to a change of the social outcome from an unacceptable one for this agent to an acceptable one. For the formulation of this idea the preference-approval framework is used. Possibility and impossibility results for the existence of a non-manipulable rule are provided.

The seminar will be conducted in English.

Time: 4.30 pm

Address: 26 Shabolovka Ulitsa, bldg 5, room 5306

Everyone is welcome to atttend.

If you need a pass to enter HSE building please email your full name and the name of your organization to math.methods.hse@gmail.com no later than 12.00 on September 17, 2014.